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Abstract
Many policy decisions involve discontinuous and irreversible shifts, 
often in the face of substantial uncertainty. This dissertation studies two 
types of regime shifts under uncertainty: stabilization from hyperinflation, 
and privatization of a government corporation. In both cases, policy-makers 
face decisions that involve uncertainty and irreversibility. These topics are 
examined using a theoretical model (Chapter 1), econometric evidence 
(Chapter 2), and a case study (Chapter 3).
The first chapter presents a real options model of stabilization given 
uncertainty over the behavior of inflation. The model is used to argue that 
despite the costs of hyperinflation, stabilization delays do not necessarily 
indicate either irrationality or the presence of political economy effects.
The second chapter constructs a comprehensive data set of 
hyperinflations over the past 35 years. The data set is used to examine the 
empirical regularities of high inflation episodes, and to test the predictions 
of the model presented in Chapter 1. We conclude that (1) high inflation is 
rare; (2) most high inflation episodes are short; (3) most economies 
experience only one high inflation; (4) high inflation is noisy but not 
necessarily explosive; (5) many high inflations end without a large fall in 
inflation; and (6) there is weak evidence supporting the real options 
approach to stabilizations.
The third chapter studies another type of regime shift, that of moving 
a corporation from public to private ownership. The proposed privatization 
of the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC) illustrates the costs and benefits 
of privatization. While a private firm would be more efficient, privatization 
may endanger a crucial nuclear non-proliferation program of the U.S. 
government. The chapter examines the uranium enrichment market; 
analyzes the proposed privatization of USEC within a framework developed 
by Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1990); and extends the analysis to 
incorporate limited information and irreversibility.
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Chapter 1: Why Are Stabilizations Delayed? 
A Real Options Approach
I. Introduction
Hyperinflations are costly. During a hyperinflation, relative price 
changes are obfuscated, uncertainty is exacerbated, and the opportunity cost 
of holding domestic money rises sharply.1 These distortions can be 
significant: Barro (1972) suggests that the welfare costs of 50 percent 
monthly inflation may be as high as 15 to 22 percent of national income.2 In 
Keynes’s often-quoted words, "There is no subtler, no surer means of 
overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency."3 
And popular images of people pushing shopping carts full of cash to the 
market and of firms using furniture vans to deliver wages to workers 
reinforce the notion that hyperinflations impose substantial welfare costs.
Despite the costs of hyperinflation, however, stabilizations are 
delayed — often for extended periods of time. As Bruno (1993) observes, 
"One of the most marked, and at the same times puzzling, features of the 
episodes...relates to the time dimension of the process of recovery once a 
country goes into crisis. We have seen examples of high inflation spanning 
periods of up to ten to twelve years before a comprehensive stabilization 
program was first adopted..."4 Sachs and Larrain (1993) add that in "several 
high inflation experiences, stabilizations were delayed for some time before 
a coherent program was launched to stop inflation. Yet there is widespread 
evidence that the longer the wait to attack the problem, the more the damage
1 For a taxonomy of the costs of inflation in various institutional settings, see S. Fischer 
and F. Modigliani, "The Real Effects and Costs of Inflation," Weltwirtshaftliches Archiv., 
1978, 828-829.
2 R. Barro, "Inflationary Finance and the Welfare Cost of Inflation," Journal of Political 
Economy, Sept.-Oct. 1972, Table 2, page 986. There is some ambiguity over the definition 
of a hyperinflation. Cagan defines it as "beginning in the month the rise in prices exceeds 
50 per cent and as ending in the month before the monthly rise in prices drops below that 
amount and stays below for at least a year." He admits this definition is "purely arbitrary." 
See P. Cagan, "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation," in M. Friedman, Studies in 
the Quantity Theory of Money (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1956), page 25. 
Some authors make a distinction between high inflation and hyperinflation; here the terms 
are used interchangeably.
3 J.M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences o f the Peace (Harcourt, Brace & Howe: New 
York, 1920), page 236.
4 M. Bruno, Crisis, Stabilization, and Economic Reform: Therapy by Consensus (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 1993), page 262.
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to the economy, and the more costly the policy reforms eventually needed to 
stabilize the economy."5
Therein lies the puzzle: why are stabilizations delayed? The most 
popular explanation is given by Alesina and Drazen (1991).6 Their model 
posits a War of attrition between two groups in society, which fight to 
determine which one will bear a disproportionate share of the costs of 
stabilization. Information is asymmetric, in that the preferences of a group 
are known only to the members of that group. Over time, the groups learn 
about each other’s preferences, and ultimately one capitulates. Stabilization 
thus occurs when one group decides that the marginal benefit from 
stabilizing (in terms of eliminating the costs of inflation) exceeds the 
marginal benefit from waiting (in terms of the expected hazard function for 
the capitulation of the other group multiplied by the net benefit from having 
the other group capitulate first).
Orphanides (1996) has proposed a different explanation for the 
observed delays in stabilizations.7 In his model, inflation is high and is 
either constant or growing in a deterministic fashion. This inflation imposes 
some constant welfare cost on society. The government faces a two-stage 
decision process: it can initiate a stabilization in any given period, and 
decide either to abandon it or to complete it in the next period. The success 
of the stabilization effort is dependent only on the level of the government’s 
foreign reserves relative to the demand for reserves. Because the demand 
for reserves fluctuates stochastically, there is some uncertainty over whether 
a given stabilization effort will be successful. This uncertainty implies that 
"the government should optimally wait until sufficiently favorable 
conditions materialize before attempting a stabilization" [emphasis in 
original].8
In this chapter, we adopt a different approach to delayed
5 J. Sachs and F. Larrain, Macroeconomics in the Global Economy (Harvester Wheatsheaf: 
New York, 1993), page 752.
6 A. Alesina and A. Drazen, "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?" American Economic 
Review, December 1991, 1170-1188.
7 A. Orphanides, "The Timing of Stabilizations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, Jan.-March 1996, 257-79; and A. Orphanides, "Optimal Reform Postponement," 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Finance and Economics Discussion Series Number 
94-25, August 1994.
8 A. Orphanides, "The Timing of Stabilizations," op. cit.
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stabilizations: we construct a simple model of stabilizations as irreversible 
investments in the presence of uncertainty over the future inflation rate. 
Assuming that future inflation is uncertain, that there is some divergence 
between inflationary expectations and realized inflation during the 
stabilization period, and that any costs (e.g., unemployment) associated with 
such expectational errors cannot be recovered if the stabilization is 
abandoned, observed delays before stabilization can simply reflect the 
rational decision of a benevolent government solving a stochastic dynamic 
optimization problem. Delayed stabilizations are therefore not necessarily 
the result of either political economy effects or irrationality. In this sense, 
the model formalizes the notion that, as Allan Drazen himself has put it, “the 
problem may solve itself, so that ‘benign neglect’ is the optimal response. ”9
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to delineate an 
irreversible investment approach to stabilization. Section II employs a 
variety of simplifying assumptions to illustrate our fundamental result. 
Sections HI and IV explore more general versions of the model. Two 
appendices offer other extensions. In the next chapter, we empirically test 
the irreversible investment model against the Alesina-Drazen model of 
delay.
n. A simplified model of stabilization as an irreversible investment 
under uncertainty
The real options literature suggests that sunk costs combined with 
uncertainty generate an incentive to wait before investing in a project.10 
This is because the option to invest in such circumstances is valuable. A 
positive net present value (excluding the option value) for the investment 
project therefore does not necessarily imply that it is optimal to invest 
immediately: if the net present value of investing is worth less than the
9 A. Drazen, “The Political Economy of Delayed Reform,” presented at a conference 
sponsored by Georgetown University and the University of Maryland entitled “Economic 
Reform: Latin America and the Transition Economies, ” May 12-13,1994, page 4.
10 More precisely, irreversibility and “expandability” — the ability to invest at a finite 
cost in the future —  generate the incentive to wait. We define "waiting" as failing to 
invest when the conventional net present value of the project exceeds zero. For a trenchant 
and comprehensive presentation of recent work on investment under uncertainty, see A. 
Dixit and R. Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty (Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, 1994). For an analysis of the importance of expandability, see A. Abel, A. 
Dixit, J. Eberly, and R. Pindyck, “Options, the Value of Capital, and Investment,” NBER 
Working Paper 5227, August 1995.
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value of the option to invest, the option should not be exercised. In such 
cases, it is rational to delay the investment despite the positive net present 
value of investing immediately.
Following Orphanides (1996), we view stabilizations as irreversible 
investments under uncertainty. But here the uncertainty is over inflation 
itself — perhaps the most prominent manifestation of uncertainty in a 
hyperinflation. Governments must "invest" in a stabilization to capture the 
benefits of lower inflation. The costs associated with stabilizing (mostly in 
terms of temporarily higher unemployment), combined with uncertainty 
over inflation, imply that it is optimal to wait beyond the point at which 
stabilization is first justified by conventional cost-benefit analysis. In effect, 
the government waits because it hopes that it will "get lucky" — that 
inflation will fall without incurring the costs of stabilizing. Alternatively, 
but equivalently, the government is hesitant to incur the sunk costs of 
stabilizing because ex post the stabilization effort may have been 
unnecessary.
This section assembles the model from its various constituent 
components. We first posit a reduced form for the inflationary process, then 
evaluate the benefits and costs of stabilization, and finally derive the optimal 
rate of inflation at which to stabilize. The purpose is to develop the model in 
its most basic form; simplifying assumptions are made wherever possible.
The stochastic process for inflation
We assume that inflation (n) follows a geometric Brownian motion 
with drift:
dn = andt + ondz (1)
where dz is the increment in a Wiener process,
dz -  e Jd t  (2)
and e is independently and identically distributed as a standard normal 
(N(0,1)) variable. The dz term can be thought of as representing an 
amalgamation of stochastic money demand shocks, terms of trade shocks, or
11
other shocks to the economy.11
While it is difficult to know whether (1) is a reasonable 
approximation of the inflationary process, the empirical evidence on 
hyperinflations in Table 1 suggests at least some sort of non-stationarity in 
inflation.12 (It should be noted, however, that the power of non-stationarity 
tests is very low given the extremely short samples tested.13) In any case, 
the fundamental results of the paper do not rely on non-stationarity, as our 
discussion of the mean-reverting process in Appendix II emphasizes. So (1) 
can be justified as a modeling device that simplifies the analysis and 
produces results similar to other, more complicated, processes.14
11 In an approach that has some technical similarities to the one adopted here, Marcus 
Miller and Lei Zhang assume that fiscal deficits, which must be financed through 
seignorage, follow a geometric Brownian motion. See M. Miller and L. Zhang, 
“Hyperinflation and Stabilisation: Cagan Revisited,” Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
International Finance Discussion Paper No. 529, November 1995.
12 Our model assumes that the log of inflation follows an 1(1) process, which is one form 
of non-stationarity. Interestingly, the non-stationarity in the theoretical model below 
obtains only in the sense that inflation follows (1) if the government does not intervene. 
Given the government's stabilizations, however, inflation is a stationary process (because 
it is effectively subject to an upper boundary). The important point is that during the 
hyperinflationary period, inflation seems to behave as if it were non-stationary.
13 In addition, the mapping between (1) and the empirical results for the behavior of the 
inflation rate are complicated because (1) is equivalent to the limit (as time becomes 
continuous) of a random walk with drift for the log of the inflation rate, not for the 
inflation rate itself. Theoretically, an ARIMA (0,1,1) process for the inflation rate can be 
generated by using a Cagan model with adaptive expectations and imposing a particular 
monetary growth rule to ensure that adaptive expectations are rational. See T. Sargent and 
N. Wallace, "Rational Expectations and the Dynamics of Hyperinflation," International 
Economic Review, June 1973, 328-350, and B. Friedman, "Stability and Rationality in 
Models of Hyperinflation," International Economic Review, February 1978, 45-64. Note, 
however, that (1) is not ARIMA(0,1,1), since dz is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed.
14 The stochastic process defined by (1) has three major advantages: First, it is analytically 
tractable within the stochastic control problem we consider below. Second, it ensures that 
there are never any "hyperdeflations": if inflation in the initial period is positive, it will 
remain positive in perpetuity (the process is continuous and zero is an absorbing state). 
Finally, it implies that the variance of inflation increases with the mean rate of inflation, 
as is observed empirically. See, for example, D. Logue and T. Willet, "A note on the 
relation between the rate and variability of inflation," Economica, 43: 1976, 151-158, and 
A. Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and 
Evidence (MIT Press: Cambridge, 1992), page 439.
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Table 1: Unit roots in inflation
Country, sample period (source o f data) Stochastic process followed by 
inflation
Austria, Jan. 1921-Aug. 1922 (Cagan) KD
Austria, Jan. 1921-Dec. 1922 (Barro) Id )
Hungary, July 1922-Feb. 1924 (Cagan) Id )
Hungary, Oct. 1921-Feb. 1924 (Barro) Id )
Germany, Sept. 1920-July 1923 (Cagan) KD
Germany, Jan. 1921-Aug. 1923 (Barro) 1(2)
Germany, Jan. 1921-Aug. 1923 (Abel et. al.) 1(2)
Greece, Jan. 1943-Aug. 1944 (Cagan) 1(0) plus linear trend
Poland, Apr. 1922-Nov. 1923 (Cagan) KD
Poland, Jan. 1922-Jan. 1924 (Barro) 1(1)
Russia, Dec. 1921-Jan. 1924 (Cagan) Id )
Argentina, Jan. 1971-Dec. 1989 (IFS) 1(1)
Bolivia, Jan. 1971-Dec. 1987 (IFS) Id )
Brazil, Jan. 1971-Feb. 1986 (IFS) Id )
Chile, Jan. 1971-June 1985 (IFS) KD
Peru, Jan. 1971-Dec. 1989 (IFS) Id )
Yugoslavia, Jan. 1980-Dec. 1989 (IFS) KD
Sources: M. Taylor, "The Hyperinflation Model of Money Demand Revisited," Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, August 1991, part 1, Table 2, page 331 and page 330, footnote 8; K. Phylaktis 
and M. Taylor, "Money Demand, the Cagan Model, and the Inflation Tax: Some Latin American 
Experience," Review o f Economics and Statistics, February 1993, 32-37, Table 2, page 34; and J. 
Frenkel and M. Taylor, "Money Demand and Inflation in Yugoslavia, 1980-1989," Journal of 
Macroeconomics, Summer 1993, pages 455-481.
The benefit o f stabilizing
As noted above, inflation imposes costs on society. The welfare 
cost of inflation at time t is assumed to be:
Lt = ?*t
where y>0 and 0>O.15
The benefit of stabilizing is the expected present discounted value of 
the welfare costs that would have been imposed on society had the
15 This specification for the cost function may seem somewhat ad hoc. One motivation 
for it is the public finance perspective: the distortion imposed by a tax is proportional to 
the square of the tax rate. Since inflation imposes a tax on the holders of outside money, 
the welfare cost of inflation could be assumed to increase with the square of the inflation 
rate. In that case, 0=2.
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inflationary process been allowed to continue without intervention. More 
precisely, a stabilization at time t will be assumed to reduce the inflation rate 
to zero (in the next section, we assume that stabilization reduces inflation by 
some proportion X, where 0 < X < 1). Since zero is an absorbing state in
the stochastic process, inflation remains zero from the stabilization point 
onward. The benefit to stabilizing at time s, B s, is thus:16
B =Es s
= ~  e  - p ( t - s ) , )  yit”e ^  dt
Kt = s J
\ (4)
1 2
where p is the discount rate. We assume that p  > a 0 + — o  6(0 - 1)
2*
To evaluate (4), we must derive an expression for Esfat®) given that 
7tt follows (1). To do so, define F=7t® and apply Ito’s lemma:
dF = a 0 F + 1  < ? 0 (0 -l)F \d t  + oGFdz + o(dt) (5)
where o(dt) contains terms that go to zero faster than dt. Thus F follows 
another geometric Brownian motion, and therefore:
[■cc0+-cr2 0 ( 0 - l ) ] [ t - s ]
Es (Ft ) = Fse 2 (6)
Since F=7t®, we can now evaluate (4):
(= „ o (a 0 + - c P '0 ( 0 - \ ) - p ) ( . t - s )
B = I yx%e 2 dt (7)
t  =  S
which is just:
16 This functional form ignores the effects of inflationary shocks on unemployment. With 
ongoing inflation, the stochastic part of (1) implies that inflation will diverge from 
expected inflation almost surely. Even imposing rational expectations (so that the 
deviation of inflationary expectations from realized inflation has mean zero), the log- 
linear Phillips curve posited below implies (by Jensen’s inequality) that the expected cost 
of unemployment is positive as long as inflationary shocks continue. Since such shocks 
cease after stabilizing to an inflation rate of zero, there is an additional benefit to 
stabilizing: the expected (and actual) cost of unemployment falls to zero following the 
stabilization.
14
1 2
The motivation for the restriction p  > a d + — a  9(0 - 1) is clear from (8): it 
ensures that Bs is positive for positive inflation rates.
The cost o f stabilizing
Despite some recent evidence to the contrary,17 the available 
empirical evidence seems to suggest that stabilizations entail costs in the 
short run. Stabilization programs are never fully credible; disinflation is 
therefore costly because inflationary expectations do not fall as quickly as 
actual inflation. The behavior of the exchange rate on black or free markets, 
for example, demonstrates this lack of perfect credibility.18 For the Israeli 
stabilization of 1985, moreover, there is even better evidence: inflationary 
expectations can be imputed from the difference between the yields on non­
indexed and indexed government bonds. Cukierman (1988) reports that 
inflationary expectations exceeded actual inflation for six months after the 
stabilization, "reflecting the fear that the program would break down."19
The divergence between inflationary expectations and actual 
inflation implies that stabilizations entail costs such as increased 
unemployment and other dislocations. Almost all scholars of stabilization 
have recognized these costs. As one argues, "The notion that the 
stabilization of a hyperinflation could be an almost costless process is not
17 W. Easterly, “When is stabilization expansionary? Evidence from high inflation,” 
Economic Policy, April 1996, 67-107. Easterly concludes that stabilizations are 
expansionary, even in the short-run, but he uses annual data and does not investigate the 
impact of stabilization on unemployment
18 In the German stabilization of November 1923, for example, the program did not 
represent "an immediate, obvious set of measures reflected instantly in the exchange rate 
in the free market...Only toward the middle of December, a full month after stabilization, 
did the market accept the policy." R. Dombusch, "Lessons from the German Inflation 
Experience of the 1920s," reprinted in R. Dombusch, Exchange Rates and Inflation (MIT 
Press: Cambridge, MA, 1988), pages 428-9.
19 A. Cukierman, "The End of the High Israeli Inflation," in M. Bruno, G. DiTella, R. 
Dombusch, and S. Fischer, Inflation Stabilization: The Experience of Israel, Argentina, 
Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1988), page 55 and Table 2.3, 
page 58.
fully endorsed either by the European experiences of the 1920s or by the 
Bolivian experience in the mid-1980s...the short-run costs in both cases and 
the very slow recovery of growth in the aftermath of stabilization...suggest 
that stopping hyperinflation is not a simple and costless task."20 Another 
noted economist adds forcefully that "with inflation stubborn or with 
inflation inertia — be it because of contracts, relative wages, real resistance, 
or credibility — reducing inflation involves inevitably a protracted 
recession" [emphasis in original].21
As one motivation to the cost of stabilizing, consider an 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve:
U = ea { n - n e) + b (9)
where a<0 and b>0. Reverting heuristically to discrete time, assume that for 
a stabilization at time s, rcs+l=(l-A)fts and ftes+1 =( 1/y)(1 - A)7ts> where A, is 
the proportional disinflation from the stabilization, and \j/ is an index of the 
government's credibility ( 1 - A < ^ < 1  ).22 If \|/=1-A, so that the government 
has zero credibility, expected inflation equals the pre-stabilization rate of
20 A. Solimano, "Inflation and the Costs of Stabilization: Historical and Recent 
Experiences and Policy Lessons," The World Bank Research Observer, July 1990, page 
182.
21 R. Dombusch, "Inflation Stabilization and Capital Mobility," in R. Dombusch, 
Exchange Rates and Inflation, op. tit., page 405.
22 Two important points should be noted: First, at all times other than the stabilization 
point, rational expectations are assumed to hold. The deviation of inflationary 
expectations from inflation is therefore a mean zero variable. But, from Jensen’s 
inequality, (9) implies a positive expected cost of unemployment even if inflation minus 
expected inflation has mean zero. As discussed in footnote 16, this effect is not 
incorporated into the present analysis. Second, expectations are only partially rational in 
this model: in particular, agents do not solve the government’s optimization problem, and 
therefore do not anticipate the government’s actions. In this sense, they are behaving 
naively (for example, by not recognizing that inflation is a regulated Brownian motion —  
and therefore mean-reverting — rather than a regular Brownian motion). In models such 
as Flood and Garber’s model of stochastic process switching, agents form expectations of 
the government’s intervention. See R. Flood and P. Garber, “A Model of Stochastic 
Process Switching,” reprinted in R. Flood and P. Garber, Speculative Bubbles, Speculative 
Attacks, and Policy Switching (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1994); R. Flood and P. 
Garber, “An Economic Theory of Monetary Reform,” reprinted in R. Flood and P. Garber, 
Speculative Bubbles, Speculative Attacks, and Policy Switching, op. cit.; and R. Flood and 
P. Garber, “Process Consistency and Monetary Reform: Some Further Evidence,” 
reprinted in R. Flood and P. Garber, Speculative Bubbles, Speculative Attacks, and Policy 
Switching, op. cit. Also see Krugman’s model of exchange rate bands, in which the 
government’s planned interventions affect agents’ expectations (and which uses formal 
techniques similar to those applied here). See P. Krugman, “Target Zones and Exchange 
Rate Dynamics,” Quarterly Journal o f Economics, August 1991, 669-82.
16
inflation. For a fully credible government, \|/=1 and expected inflation 
equals the actual post-stabilization rate of inflation. Then stabilization does 
not cause a rise in unemployment.
The expectations-augmented Phillips curve (9) suggests a cost 
function of the form:23
a(l-A )>zia>(l-” )
C ,= * < l-iy )e  v (10)
where k and co are multipliers on the overall cost and on the responsiveness 
of the cost to changes in inflation, respectively. For a fully credible 
government (\|/=1), the cost function (10) implies that stabilization is 
costless.24
In order to derive the basic insights of the model, we will initially 
assume that co=0, so that there is a fixed cost of stabilizing that is inversely 
related to the credibility of the government:
Cs = K { \ - y / )  (ii)
The fixed costs assumption is not essential to the model; it will be relaxed in 
Section III.
23 One commentator has objected to this form of the cost function, advocating instead a 
cost function that is linear in inflation. But a linear cost function together with a linear 
benefit function would imply one of three trivial possibilities for the optimal stabilization 
threshold: zero, infinity, or indeterminate (i.e., stabilization is optimal at any inflation 
rate). Which of these three cases obtains depends on the values of the parameters in the 
cost and benefit functions. A linear cost function together with a quadratic benefit 
function (0=2) would imply similar results to those presented below if r (defined in the 
text below) exceeds 2. If r<2, then the optimal threshold and the conventional threshold 
would coincide (see text below for definitions of these terms). If r=2, then the optimal 
threshold would not be well-defined.
24 Although this implication may initially seem theoretically attractive, it is not clear how 
realistic it is. Even Sargent seems to back away from a completely costless view of 
disinflation: "How costly such a move would be in terms of foregone output and how long 
it would be in taking effect would depend partly on how resolute and evident the 
government’s commitment was" (italics added). T. Sargent, "The Ends of Four Big 
Inflations," reprinted in T. Sargent, Rational Expectations and Inflation (Harper Collins: 
New York, 1993), page 45.
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The stochastic dynamic optimization problem
The government faces a stochastic dynamic optimization problem: it 
must choose a strategy that maximizes the net present value of stabilizing 
given the stochastic process for inflation (1), the benefit function (8), and 
the cost function ( l l ) .25 To solve this optimization problem, we define a 
value function for the value of the option to stabilize:26
For well-behaved problems, there exists a 7t* such that for k < k*, 
the second argument on the right hand side of (12) is larger than the first, 
and for 7t > k*, the first argument is larger.27 For such problems, the state 
space can be split into two regions: for n<n*, it is optimal to allow the 
hyperinflation to continue (the “continuation region"), and for n>K*, it is 
optimal to have stopped the hyperinflation (the "stopping region"). At 
n=n*, it is optimal to stabilize. In the region for which n < 7C*, which has to 
be determined endogenously, the value of the option to stabilize must obey:
25 More precisely, the government’s objective function at time t is to choose a 
stabilization point, s, to maximize Et^e~p(-s~t\B ^ s)-c(jcs))
26 In an infinite horizon problem, (12) is independent of the time unit in the sense that 
what matters is the level of inflation and not the time t per se. For an introduction to 
stochastic dynamic programming (in discrete time), see N. Stokey and R. Lucas with E. 
Prescott, Recursive Models in Economic Dynamics (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 
MA, 1989).
27 Sufficient conditions for this separation property to obtain are that B(n)-C(7u) is 
increasing in n and that the distribution function of future n conditional on a higher 
current k exhibits first order stochastic dominance over the distribution function 
conditional on a lower current n. See A. Dixit and R. Pindyck, Investment under 
Uncertainty, op. cit., pages 128-130.
28 This is a simple "arbitrage-type" equation. The option to stabilize, V, is an asset 
without any dividend flow. Equation (14) therefore confirms that the return on V, pVdt, is 
equal to the expected capital gain.
V( 7t(t)) = max\ B ( 7 t ( t ) ) -K ( \ - y / ),
V(K(t)) (13)
pVdt = E(dV) (14)
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Applying Ito’s lemma to solve for dV:
dt+CT7U— dz + o(dt) (15)
d n
where <?(dt), as in (5), contains terms that go to zero faster than dt. In the
infinite horizon problem considered here, —  =0; all of the models in this
ot
paper will be autonomous in this sense.29 Dividing both sides of (15) by dt, 
letting dt go to zero, and taking expectations, we have:
Using (14) and (16), we obtain the following ordinary homogeneous 
differential equation defined on the interval (0,7t*]:
This differential equation must be solved subject to the following 
boundary conditions:30
Condition (18) holds because if inflation is zero, it will remain zero 
forever — so the option to stabilize is worthless at 7t=0. Equation (19) is a 
"value matching" condition and holds because the payoff to exercising the 
option must equal the value of the option at the optimal exercise level. 
Equation (20) is a "smooth pasting" condition that must also hold at 7t*: if
29 In general, allowing V to be a function of time necessitates numerical rather than 
analytical solutions to the control problem. The non-autonomous problems also generally 
result in an optimal threshold that varies over time, whereas the optimal threshold is 
constant over time in all the examples considered here. The tradeoff between autonomous 
and non-autonomous problems is one of analytical tractability versus increased realism .
30 We need three boundary conditions to solve (17), even though it is a second-order 
ordinary differential equation, because we must solve for the two constants in the general 
solution to the differential equation, as well as the free boundary (tc*) itself.
(16)
-  (?* 7?  V '\k )  + ajtV '(n) -  pV{7c) = 0 
2
(17)
V(0) = 0
V(n*) = B (n * )- C(n*) 
V'(n*)= B'(n*)-C '(7i*)
(18)
(19)
(20)
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the value of the option to stabilize and the net benefit from stabilizing did 
not meet smoothly at 7t*, then it can be shown that small movements away 
from k* would produce net benefits to the government, and thus 7t* could 
not be the optimal level at which to exercise the option.31
The threshold inflation rate for stabilization
To solve (17), we posit a solution of the form:32
V = Anr +Knq (21)
where r and q are the characteristic roots of (17):
(—  -  a) + J ( —  -  or)2 + 2p a 2,
2 1 2  H r = --------------------- x-------------------  (22)
o L
( - y  -  cc) -  ^ ( - y  -  a)2 + 2p o 2
q = — ------------------   (23)
o L
Assuming p>a (which is implied by the restriction on p above if 6 > 1), r>l 
from (22). From (23), q<0. Since q<0, K=0 from (17) and (20). Thus the 
solution for k* is:
p - a O  - -  a 16{6 - \ )
ti* = ------------ 6-------------------- K { \ - y f )  (24)r  r - 0
Assume for simplicity that 0=1 (so that the costs of inflation are 
linear in inflation) and that a=0 (so that there is no trend in the inflation 
rate). Then (24) becomes:
31 For a heuristic motivation of both the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, 
see A. Dixit, "The Art of Smooth Pasting," Volume 55 in J. Lesoume and H. 
Sonnenschein, Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics (Harwood Academic 
Publishers: Chur, Switzerland, 1993).
32 Both the Lipshitz and "restriction on growth" conditions obtain for (17). Therefore the 
solution to (17) exists and is unique. See Theorem 6.1 in A. Malliaris and W. Brock, 
Stochastic Methods in Economics and Finance (North-Holland: Amsterdam, 1982), pages 
93-94.
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(25)
Therein lies the crucial insight of the model: pK(l-\j/)/y is the
threshold inflation rate derived from equating the expected discounted
benefit, yzc /p, of a stabilization to the cost, K(l-y). Under uncertainty, a
benevolent social planner would not stabilize at that inflation rate, but rather
at a higher one because of the option value of waiting. For example,
suppose that <7=1/3 (so a 2=l/9), a=0, and p=.15. Then r=2.2 from (22), and 
r
 =1.8. In other words, if conventional cost-benefit analysis suggests
r -1
stabilization is socially beneficial at 300 percent inflation, this paradigm 
suggests it is sub-optimal to stabilize before inflation reaches 550 percent. 
We refer to the former type of threshold, derived from a simple net present 
value calculation, as the "conventional threshold" and the latter, derived 
from the stochastic dynamic optimization problem, as the "optimal 
threshold."
Several results follow directly from (25). The optimal threshold is
higher:
• The higher a 2. Increased volatility raises the value of the option to 
stabilize, and thus raises the inflation rate at which the option is optimally 
exercised. Note also that higher volatility raises the markup between the 
optimal threshold and the conventional threshold, since by definition it 
does not affect the conventional threshold.
• The higher k, or the lower \\f. The more expensive a stabilization, the 
higher the inflation rate must be before the government stabilizes.
• The lower the cost of inflation (the lower is y). Less costly inflation 
makes it optimal to stop the inflationary episode later.
• The higher p. The benefit from stabilizing accrues over time, whereas the 
costs are paid immediately. A higher discount rate thus reduces the 
expected net benefit from stabilizing at any given inflation rate, and
21
raises the optimal threshold.33
We can now use the model to examine delayed stabilizations. Given 
any initial value 7to, define the delay as the waiting time until t z *  is reached 
(the so-called "first crossing" of 7t* by the Brownian motion process for 
inflation). To solve for the distribution of the first crossing time, consider a 
Brownian motion process defined by:
dX = fidt + odz (26)
Let T(y) be the first time X has risen by some amount y. Then the
probability that T(y) is larger than some time t is given by:
P (T (y)> t)= N (I ^ j £ ) - e 2Mya 2 N f ^ L )  (27)
where N is the normal (0,1) distribution function.34 In order to apply (27), 
we map (1) into a form that obeys (26) by defining X=ln(7t). Then using 
Ito’s lemma on (1):
dX = ( a - ^ a 2)dt + adz (28)
which is of the same form as (26). Perhaps the most natural Kq to choose is
the conventional threshold (in the example above, nQ = ? ). Then let
Y
X0 = l n |^ y ^ ~  ^ 'j and X*= l n j ^ ^ — + lnj — . Imposing the
r
same assumptions as above, ln( r _ l )=0.6. Then using (27) with y=0.6,
u = -0.056 , <7=-, and t=l year:
^  2{ 9J  3
Probability (delay > 1 year) = P(T( 0.6) > 1) = .95 (29)
33 Note that the optimal threshold increases proportionately less than the conventional 
threshold when p rises, because an increase in p implies an increase in r.
34 See J. M. Harrison, Brownian Motion and Stochastic Flow Systems (Krieger Publishing 
Company: Malabar, Florida, 1990), page 14.
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In other words, the probability of reaching the optimal threshold
within one year, given that the process starts at the conventional threshold of 
pK{ 1 -  y/) _
  , is 5 percent. The upshot is that this simple model provides a
possible explanation for observed delays in stabilizations. If the delay is 
measured as the time that elapses between when the conventional threshold 
is reached and when the stabilization occurs, and if the stabilization occurs 
at the optimal threshold, (29) suggests that delays will often exceed a year.35
III. The generalized model
After identifying the basic insights of the model in Section II, we are 
now ready to study a more general version. This section therefore removes 
our previous assumption that co=0, allows partial stabilizations (0 < X < 1 
rather than X=l) and relaxes the constraints on the other parameters as 
well.36 If a stabilization of size X occurs at time s, then 7Es+i=(1- )^TCs- So 
the benefit of such a stabilization will be:37
B =Es s
( l —OO
/ yi£ e
\ t - s
0  - f i t  -  S)dt
t — oo A
- E
t - s
(30)
y
Then, following the same steps as above, (30) can be evaluated to yield:
w 6(1 - (1 -A )6 )
B = ------ 4----------   (31)
p - a d - - c P ' d ( d - l )
The cost function is as above, but without the restriction co=0. For 
reference, we repeat (10):
Cs =ic(\-yr)e (10)
35 In this sense, the model actually explains too much. Given the same parameter values, 
the model predicts delays that are too long relative to observed lengths of hyperinflations. 
For example, the probability of reaching n* within several years is also extremely small.
36 The degree of stabilization, X, is assumed to be exogenous here. But the model could 
be extended to allow the government to maximize over X.
37 The logic behind (30) is that for every sequence from t=s to infinity that originates 
with 7is, there is a proportionate one, (1- X)ni, that originates with (1-A,)tcs.
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With these cost and benefit functions, an explicit solution for the 
optimal threshold inflation rate is not possible. But the implicit solution for 
7t* is:
We can use (32) to examine how various parameter values affect 7t*. 
For example, Figure 1 illustrates that the higher the volatility in the 
stochastic process driving inflation, the higher the optimal threshold, and the 
higher the ratio of the optimal threshold to the conventional threshold. As in 
the simplified model above, this result obtains because higher volatility 
raises the value of the real stabilization option, and thus raises the optimal 
threshold for exercising it.
y0x*e ( l - ( l ~ z f )  ryjt*0 (1 - (1 —A)^)
p - a 0 - l c r ^ 0 ( 0 - l )  p - a 0 - l c r20 (0 - l)
+ rK( 1 -  y/)e
-a (  1 - /L)x* cv( 1 )*r(l -  y/)e
¥
(32)
Figure 1: Threshold inflation vs. volatility
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Parameter values: a=0, p=. 15, \|/=0.9, y=l, 0=1, A^.95, a=-.l, k=5,000, g>=1
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Figure 2 illustrates that the higher the distortions imposed by 
inflation, the lower the optimal and conventional thresholds. The more 
distortionary is inflation, the more costly it is to permit inflation to continue, 
and therefore the lower the intervention threshold.
Figure 2: Threshold inflation vs. distortionary impact of
inflation
Optimal threshold -  Conventional threshold
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Parameter values: g2=1/9, ot=0, p=.15, \j/=0.9, y = l, X=.95, a= -.l, k=5,000, co=1
Similarly, Figure 3 shows that an increase in a , the drift rate, reduces 
both the optimal threshold and the conventional threshold. A higher drift 
rate raises the benefit of stabilizing, and thus induces stabilization at a lower 
rate of inflation. (It should be noted, however, that the optimal threshold 
does not monotonically decline as the drift rate rises in the version of the 
model presented in Section IV.)
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Figure 3: Threshold inflation vs. drift rate of inflation
Optimal threshold Conventional threshold
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Parameter values: o 2= l/9 , p=. 15, y=0.9, y = l, 0=1, A^.95, a=-.l, k=5,000, co=1
Along other dimensions, the optimal threshold is generally higher:
• The higher the discount rate;
• The lower the government’s credibility;
• The lower the cost of inflation;
• The larger the extent of stabilization; and
• The larger (in absolute value) the Phillips coefficient
The precise results, however, are sensitive to the parameter 
assumptions. The model’s numerous non-linearities produce complicated 
(and often non-monotonic) relationships, especially for extreme parameter 
values.
Given the implicit solution of (32), we can also examine how various 
parameters affect the delay until reaching the optimal stabilization point. 
For example, Figure 4 shows the probability of reaching the optimal 
threshold within 1 year, starting from the conventional threshold, as a 
function of a 2. The increase in the optimal threshold relative to the
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conventional threshold as a 2 rises (see Figure 1) reduces the probability of 
reaching the optimal threshold within a year.38
Figure 4: Probability of reaching optimal threshold 
within 1 year vs. volatility
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Parameter values: oc=0, p=.15, y=0.9, y=l, 0=1, 95, a=-.l, k=5,000, co=1
IV. Multiple stabilization options
The model presented in Section III assumes that the government has 
only one option to stabilize. This section extends the model to incorporate 
multiple stabilization opportunities. In particular, we assume that once the 
government exercises one option to stabilize, it receives another.39
Allowing the government to stabilize as many times as desired
38 For a broader range of parameter values, the relationship is more complicated than may 
be suggested by Figure 4. An increase in volatility has two effects. First, it raises the 
optimal threshold relative to the conventional threshold, and thus reduces the first crossing 
probability. But, second, it also puts more probability mass on large movements in 
inflation, and thus raises the probability of reaching any given threshold within a specific 
period of time. The interplay between these two effects produces a complicated, non­
monotonic relationship between volatility and the first-crossing probability.
39 The government’s objective at time t is thus to pick a stabilization date, s, in order to 
maximize E ,{ e - '(,- ° ( S (* ,  ) -  C { x s) + V((l -  A)* ,) ) } .
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changes the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions (19) and (20). 
Now, if the government stabilizes, it receives the benefits of the disinflation 
engendered by that stabilization and  another option to stabilize, valued at the 
inflation rate obtaining after the first stabilization. The value-matching and 
smooth-pasting conditions therefore become:
V(n*) = B(n*) -  C(n*) + V((l -  A) n*) (33)
V'(n*) = B'(n*) -  C'(/z*) + V'((l - \ )n * )  (34)
None of the other aspects of the stochastic dynamic optimization 
problem is affected.40 The optimal threshold is therefore defined implicitly 
by:
y 6 n * e  ( 1 - ( 1 - A ) g ) l - q - X ) r ~ 1 r y i t* 6  (
p - a O - - 0^0(0- \ )  1 —(1 —A )r p - a 0 - —a 20(.0-1)
2>
, u r - 1 a ( l-A )* * a > (l-  —)l - ( l - X )  „  x H/+ ------------- — r/c(l-t//)e Y (35)
1 -  (1 -  X) ’
a{\-X)7t*CQ{l-— )
-a {  1 -  X)7i* cd( 1  )jr(l -  y/)e ^  = 0
¥
Allowing the government to stabilize multiple times does not change 
the fundamental precept of the model: that there is a divergence between the 
optimal threshold and the conventional threshold. Indeed, the optimal 
threshold with multiple stabilizations is often higher than with a single 
stabilization, because multiple stabilizations increase the value of the option 
to stabilize, since the option has embedded in it the rights to other options. 
The irony is thus that allowing the government more opportunities to
40 In particular, the benefit function defined by (31) continues to hold, even though it had 
been derived under the assumption that there was only one option to stabilize. This is 
because for each sequence of n, there is a proportionate one at (1-X)7t. Therefore, if there 
is a stabilization subsequent to the first one, the inflation rate in the absence of the first 
stabilization would have risen to 7r*/(l-A). Although the actual inflation rate falls back to 
7t*(l-A,) after the second stabilization, the benefit from the first stabilization is still the 
welfare gain between 7t*/(l-X) and tu*. The total benefit of the two stabilizations is the 
welfare gain between tc*/(1-X,) and tt*(1-V), and continuing to use (31) correctly 
apportions that total benefit between the first and second stabilizations.
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stabilize can reduce the probability of observing a stabilization within some 
given time period.
Multiple stabilizations can also change the nature of the relationship 
between the optimal threshold and various parameters. With multiple 
stabilizations, for example, a higher drift rate can raise the optimal 
threshold. Figure 5 employs the same parameter assumptions as Figure 3 
above. It illustrates two effects of multiple stabilizations. First, for the 
parameter values shown, the optimal threshold with multiple stabilizations is 
strictly higher than the optimal threshold with a single stabilization. Second, 
for sufficiently large drift rates, an increase in the drift rate raises the 
optimal threshold when multiple stabilizations are allowed.
Figure 5: Threshold inflation vs. drift rate, multiple 
stabilizations
 Optimal threshold with unlimited stabilizations
Optimal threshold with one stabilization 
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The intuition for the lack of a monotonic effect on the threshold is 
that there are two effects of a higher drift rate. The first is that a higher drift 
rate raises the benefit of stabilizing sooner, tending to lower the optimal 
threshold. But a higher drift rate also raises the value of the option to 
stabilize, since it reduces r. In the multiple stabilization scenario studied 
here, this second effect is magnified: a higher drift rate raises the value of 
the option to stabilize at 7t* and also at (I-X)ti*, which then feeds back into 
the value of the option to stabilize at 7t*. For sufficiently large drift rates, 
the second effect dominates and the optimal threshold increases when the 
drift rate increases. Thus an increase in the drift rate, which raises the cost 
of delay, can make governments more averse to stabilizing at any given 
inflation rate. A similar counter-intuitive result is obtained, albeit through a 
much different motivation, by Perraudin and Sibert (1995).41
V. Conclusion
This paper has presented a simple model of stabilizations as an 
irreversible investment under uncertainty. The model offers a possible 
explanation for delayed stabilizations — an explanation that depends on 
uncertainty and costly stabilizations, not irrationality or political economy 
constraints. The next chapter provides a partial empirical test of the model 
by examining the relationship between the volatility of the inflationary 
process and the stabilization delay.
In addition to the extensions offered in the appendices, the model 
could be linked to the political economy literature on delayed stabilizations 
by viewing the decision-maker as a politician, rather than a benevolent 
social planner. The benefits and costs would then be limited to those 
enjoyed or incurred by the faction supported by the decision-maker, and the 
real option decision-making rule would be embedded within a political 
economy game among different factions. This extension would be in the 
spirit of Lambrecht and Perraudin (1996), who embed a real option
41 In the Perraudin-Sibert model, a higher cost of delay raises the incentives for a foreign 
lender to withhold loans in order to learn more about the type of borrowing government. 
Since the loans are necessary for reform, delays are longer in equilibrium. W. Perraudin 
and A. Sibert, “The Timing of Reform,” Institute for Financial Research Working Paper 2, 
Birkbeck College, December 1995.
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investment decision within a game between competing firms.42 The 
approach delineated here could also be incorporated into models of 
designing broader reform packages under uncertainty, as in Dewatripont and 
Roland (1995).43
42 B. Lambrecht and W. Perraudin, “Real Options and Preemption,” Institute for Financial 
Research Working Paper 26, Birkbeck College, July 1996.
43 Dewatripont and Roland argue that gradualism may be preferred to big-bang reform 
because gradualist packages engender less initial opposition and may subsequently create 
stronger constituencies for further reform. See M. Dewatripont and G. Roland, “The 
Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty,” American Economic Review, December 
1995, 1207-1223. Note that the irreversible investment model presented here does not 
address the question of gradualism versus big bang: a stabilization of a given size (X) is 
assumed, and the only question is when that stabilization is undertaken.
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Appendix I. A stochastic process for inflation with discrete Poisson 
jumps
In this section, we allow inflation to follow a mixed diffusion-jump 
process.44 The benefit and cost functions are assumed to be the same as 
above, with 0 set to l .45 The only difference is that (1) is modified to 
incorporate discrete Poisson jumps:
dn = andt + ondz + ndq (Al)
where
k -1  with probability £dt 
0 with probability 1 - fdt
The Poisson process defined by (Al) is of a particularly simple form: 
a shock moves the process discretely from n to kn  with probability ^dt. With 
probability 1- ^dt, there is no discrete jump, and inflation behaves as the 
diffusion process in (1).
With the stochastic process for inflation defined by (Al), the 
differential equation for V (the analog to (17) above) is:
i  cp-Tp- V"(k) + anV'(it) -  pV(7t) + £( Vikn) -  V(x)) = 0 (A3)
Again, (A3) only holds for n<n*, and we need three boundary conditions to 
identify the two arbitrary constants in (A3), as well as the free boundary 7t*. 
These three boundary conditions are precisely the same as those defined by 
(18)-(20) above. Condition (18) holds here because the Poisson shocks are 
multiplicative — so if inflation is zero, it will continue to be zero in 
perpetuity. Condition (19) holds for the same reason as in the model above.
44 This type of stochastic process for inflation is similar to the stochastic process for stock 
returns analyzed by R. Merton in "Option Pricing When Underlying Stock Returns are 
Discontinuous," reprinted in R. Merton, Continuous Time Finance (Blackwell: 
Cambridge, MA, 1990), pages 309-329.
45 We assume p>a+^(k-l) to ensure that the denominator in the benefit function is 
positive.
(A2)
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Condition (20) continues to hold despite the Poisson jumps.46
There are two ways of solving the government’s stochastic dynamic 
optimization problem. The first posits a solution of the form A7tr, so that the 
characteristic equation of (A3) is:
-  <?*r (r -  1) + ocr - p  + £ + %k r = 0 (A4)
For any given value of k, (A4) can be solved implicitly for r, and
then the analysis can proceed. The results are generically the same as in the 
second solution method, which uses a Taylor series approximation. In this 
second approach, we assume that k is approximately 1 and then use a first- 
order Taylor series approximation to V(k7t) around n:
V(kn) ~ V(n) + (k -X)nV'{n) (A5)
Thus (A3) becomes:
i  (?]?■ V"(n) + (a  + £(* -1  ))jcV’( z ) - p V ( z )  = 0 (A6)
Following the same steps as above, the optimal threshold is 
therefore:
* ( p - a - £ ( k - 1)) z7t* = -------- 21 k { 1 -  \i/) (A7)
Y z - 1
where z>l is the positive characteristic root of (A6):
2 I 2
( ~ —  « - f ( f c - l ) ) + J ( “ "— a-t;(k  -1)) +2pcr‘
—=----------------------- — h -------------------------------  (A8)
c r
As in the section above, assume that oc=0. It is then illuminating to 
examine whether the optimal threshold defined by (A8) is higher or lower
46 See discussion in A. Dixit and R. Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty, op. cit., page 
171. In addition, Merton applies the same boundary conditions when stock returns have a 
Poisson element as when they do not. See R. Merton, "Option Pricing When Underlying 
Stock Returns are Discontinuous," op. cit., page 318.
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than the optimal threshold defined by (25). In other words, does the Poisson 
process induce optimally behaving governments to stabilize at a higher or 
lower rate of inflation? The Poisson jumps have two effects: they change 
both the volatility of inflation and its drift rate. The variance of the 
stochastic process (A3) is:
V(dn) = o 2n 2dt + £ ( k - l f  n 2dt > o 2n 2dt (A9)
so that the farther k is from 1 (i.e., the larger is the jump in either direction), 
the more volatile is the change in inflation. This higher variance tends to 
raise the optimal threshold.
The Poisson jumps also affect the drift rate of inflation, however, 
and thus also affect the optimal threshold indirectly through this conduit. 
We now must consider two different cases: k<l and k>l (when k=l, the 
Poisson "jump" is always zero). First consider k<l. Then the Poisson 
jumps diminish the drift rate of inflation, since the impact of the Poisson 
process on the drift rate is ^(k-1). The lower drift rate tends to raise the 
optimal threshold (with a lower drift rate, there is less of an incentive to 
stabilize at any given inflation rate, and the optimal threshold rises). For 
k<l, both the lower drift rate and the higher variance tend to raise the 
optimal threshold, and the optimal threshold is therefore unambiguously 
higher than without the Poisson jumps. Intuitively, the discrete shocks 
accentuate the incentive to wait because they introduce more uncertainty 
(they raise the variance of the change in inflation) and because they are 
inherently disinflationary (they reduce the drift rate).
For k>l, however, the impact on the optimal threshold is ambiguous. 
In this case, there are two opposing effects: the drift rate of inflation is 
higher than in the absence of discrete jumps, tending to diminish the optimal 
threshold, but the volatility of the change in inflation is higher, tending to 
raise the optimal threshold. For values of k close to 1, the first effect 
dominates and the optimal threshold is lower than in the absence of the 
Poisson jumps. For larger values of k, the second effect dominates and the 
optimal threshold is higher than in the absence of the Poisson jumps.
34
Appendix n. A mean-reverting stochastic process for inflation
As noted in the text above, the evidence for the non-stationarity of 
inflation during hyperinflations is at least somewhat tenuous. It is therefore 
necessary to consider how robust our results are to the assumption of non- 
stationarity. In this appendix, we posit a stationary, mean-reverting process 
for inflation:
d n = a ( n -  7i)ndt + ondz (A10)
where a >0 is the "speed of adjustment parameter" (determining the rate at 
which n reverts to n )  and n  is the "long-run" or steady-state value of 7t. 
As one motivation for (A10), assume that monetary growth is some constant 
11. Then in a wide variety of theoretical models, n  =|i.
The benefit function to a stabilization at time s for the stochastic 
process defined by (A 10) is analytically intractable. As an approximation to 
the true benefit function, we therefore consider a linearization of (A10) 
around n :
dn ~ a ( n -  n)ndt + ondz (A ll)
The expected value of 7tt conditional on the information set at time s is 
therefore given approximately by:
Moving the expectations operator through the integration operator, 
differentiating with respect to time, and solving the resultant first-order 
differential equation (subject to the boundary condition that Es(7ts)=7ts), we 
have:
The benefit to a stabilization at time s (assuming 0=1) is therefore 
approximately:
Es(nt) = ns + Es a{n~ n)ndj + ondz (A12)
Es(nt) = n + (n s -n)e~mt-s) (A13)
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B =Es s J ynfe ^  ^ 1 =  J f u T ^  S\ f i n s-J $ e ~ ^ r+^ ' t S^ dt (A14) 
\t= s  J  t=s
which is just:
B = 2 1 + 2 i l L ^ l  (A15)
5 p  a n  + p
We assume co=0, so that the cost function is fixed, as in the simplified model 
of the main text.
Once again, we must solve for the value of the option to stabilize, 
V(7t), as a function of the inflation rate. Applying Ito’s lemma and 
following familiar steps, we obtain:
^  <PtP  V"{n) + a ( n -  n)nV '(n) -p V (n )  = 0 (A16)
which must be solved subject to the boundary conditions (18)-(20). Note 
that (18) continues to hold because zero is an absorbing state in the 
stochastic process (A10).
In order to solve for the value function, we posit a solution of the
form:47
V(7l)= AnrZ(n) {All)
Taking the appropriate derivatives of (A17) and plugging them into (A16), 
we have:
r<x2 _  in rZ  (n )j —  r{r - 1) + a m  -  p
(A18)
+ JT"1' '  ^tl\cP’rZ '(x)+  —  rtZ"(x) + o & K -n)Z ’( n ) -  arZ(K )\ = 0
I 2 J
47 The solution strategy follows A. Dixit and R. Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty, 
op. cit., pages 161-167.
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This solution must hold for all values of n<n*. Thus both terms in
brackets must be equal to zero. Setting the first term in brackets equal to
zero implicitly defines r, whereas equating the second term to zero, after
some manipulation, produces a differential equation with a known solution.
2 an
In particular, define a function h(x)=Z(7t), with x  = — t  , so that
o
2 a ( 2 a \ 2h '(x)—r  - Z \ k ) and h"(x) —r = Z ”(n ). Substituting these into the 
o \ o  J
second term in brackets in (A18), and setting the resultant expression equal
to zero, we have:
xh"(x) + { b -  x)h'(x) -  rh{x) = 0 (A19)
2(aJr + ro2) , • j  •where b = -------- =-------. This is known as Kummers equation, and its
o
solution is the confluent hypergeometric function H(x,r,b):48
t t (  r  t r(r +  l ) x 2 r(r+ l)(r  +  2 )  x 3H(x.r.b) = 1 + — x  + -----------------1---------------------------- h .. (A2U)
V ; b b(b + 1)2! b(b + l)(b+ 2)  3!
Thus the solution is:
V(x) = An H (^ -  ,r,b) (A21)
o
We can now use (A21) together with the value-matching and 
smooth-pasting conditions to solve for A and it*. The solution for n* is 
defined implicitly by:
f , 2Q7T*
1 p  Offr+p J |  cr2 | cm+p
The optimal threshold defined by (A22) is higher than the 
conventional threshold, and therefore the fundamental precept of the model
48 M. Abramowitz and I.A. Stegun, Handbook o f Mathematical Functions (National 
Bureau of Standards: Washington, 1964), Section 13.1.1.
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carries across even when inflation is mean-reverting.49 For example, for 
g2=1/9, a = .l, p=.l, n  =15 percent, k=5,000, \|/=.9, and y^l, rc*=580 
percent.50 The conventional threshold is 575 percent. Furthermore, the 
closer the inflationary process is to being non-stationary, the larger the ratio 
of the optimal threshold to the conventional threshold (this ratio is what 
determines the waiting time or delay). For a=.01, for example, the optimal 
threshold is 108 percent and the conventional threshold is 102.5 percent 
(ratio=1.05). For a=.001, the optimal threshold is 71 percent and the 
conventional threshold is 55 percent (ratio=1.29). For a non-stationary 
process (a=0) with the same variance and discount parameters, the ratio of 
the optimal threshold to the conventional threshold is 1.28. So a stationary 
process that is nearly non-stationary produces results that are approximately 
equivalent to those produced by a non-stationary process.
In sum, the empirical evidence in Table 1 suggests that inflation is 
either a non-stationary process or is very nearly so. This appendix suggests 
that little is lost in terms of accuracy, and much is gained in terms of 
tractability, by simply assuming that inflation is non-stationary. None of the 
principal results depends on that assumption.
49 As noted in a footnote above, inflation will be mean-reverting, even given the Brownian 
motion process defined by (1), because the government’s stabilizations establish an upper 
boundary on the process. The point here is that the stationarity or non-stationarity of 
inflation in the absence of government intervention is not crucial for the fundamental 
results of the paper.
50 In calculating this value from (51), the infinite series H and H* were approximated by 
series containing 100 terms.
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Chapter 2: Hyperinflations and Delayed Stabilizations: 
Some Simple Empirical Tests
I. Introduction
Previous empirical work on high inflation has tended to focus on a 
select number of well-known case studies.1 The approach undertaken here is 
more general: we apply several objective definitions of hyperinflation to the 
entire universe of monthly inflation data from the International Monetary 
Fund’s International Financial Statistics. The result is a comprehensive 
data set of all recorded experiences of high inflation over the past 35 years. 
We use the data set both to expand our knowledge of the empirical 
regularities of high inflation, and to test two models of delayed 
stabilizations. The database constructed for this chapter complements the 
one developed by Easterly (1996), who uses annual data and applies only a 
single definition of hyperinflation.2
The chapter is organized as follows: Section II analyzes the high 
inflation episodes and concludes that some commonly assumed facts about 
high inflation seem inconsistent with the data. Section HI briefly 
summarizes two models of delayed stabilizations; the models can be tested 
empirically because they offer different predictions for the relationship 
between the volatility of the inflationary process and the duration of an 
episode. The next two sections compare the two models by performing 
various tests of this relationship: Section IV uses ordinary least squares, and
1 See, for example, P. Cagan, "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation," in M. 
Friedman, Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago, 1956); R. Dombusch, F. Sturzenegger, and H. Wolf, "Extreme Inflation: 
Dynamics and Stabilization," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2: 1990 (The 
Brookings Institution: Washington, 1990); M. Bruno, G. Di Telia, R. Dombusch, and S. 
Fischer, Inflation Stabilization: The Experience o f Israel, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and 
Mexico (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1988); M. Bmno, S. Fischer, E. Helpman, and N. 
Liviatan, Lessons of Economic Stabilization and Its Aftermath (MIT Press: Cambridge, 
MA, 1991); and T. Sargent, "The Ends of Four Big Inflations," reprinted in T. Sargent, 
Rational Expectations and Inflation (Harper Collins: New York, 1993). The principal 
exceptions are M. Bmno and W. Easterly, “Inflation’s Children: Tales of Crises that Beget 
Reforms,” AEA Papers and Proceedings, May 1996, 213-217, and W. Easterly, “When is 
stabilization expansionary? Evidence from high inflation,” Economic Policy, April 1996, 
67-107. Unlike some other authors, we do not distinguish between high inflation and 
hyperinflation.
2 W. Easterly, “When is stabilization expansionary? Evidence from high inflation,” op. 
cit. Easterly’s definition is 40 percent annual inflation.
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Section V uses hazard rate analysis. Appendices provide additional 
information on, and analysis of, the inflationary episodes.
II. Episodes of high inflation, 1957-1994
Any comprehensive investigation of hyperinflation must adopt some 
definition of the term. The definition we use is in the spirit of Cagan 
(1956): a hyperinflation begins in the month in which the monthly inflation 
rate first exceeds some threshold level, and ends in the month before the 
monthly inflation rate remains below that threshold level for 12 months.3 
For example, let the threshold be 10 percent per month and consider a 
monthly inflation series of {5,12,7,12,12,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8}. Then the 
episode begins in the second month (the first month when inflation exceeds 
10 percent) and ends in the fifth month (the first month that is followed by 
12 months of under 10 percent inflation). Note that the episode includes the 
third month, even though inflation during that month is below the threshold. 
The threshold levels used in this study are 10 percent, 20 percent, 30 
percent, and 40 percent.4
The data sets of high inflation episodes were constructed from the 
entire universe of monthly price data between January 1957 and July 1994 
from the January 1995 International Financial Statistics. The data on prices 
were converted into inflation rates by taking log differences; the monthly 
inflation rate for month t is thus defined as the natural logarithm of the price 
level in month t minus the natural logarithm of the price level in month t-1.5 
Appendix I presents summary statistics on the inflation rates from the 
countries included in the sample. The inflation rates are not seasonally
3 Cagan defines a hyperinflation as "beginning in the month the rise in prices exceeds 50 
percent and as ending in the month before the monthly rise in prices drops below that 
amount and stays below for at least a year." He admits this definition is "purely arbitrary." 
See P. Cagan, "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation," op. cit., page 25. To check 
for robustness, we also constructed an alternative set of episodes by requiring that inflation 
remain below the threshold for 6 months, rather than 12. The results obtained from this 
alternative data set are similar to those presented in the text.
4 These threshold inflation rates are defined in terms of the log difference of the price 
levels. They correspond to actual monthly inflation rates of 10.5 percent, 22.1 percent, 
35.0 percent, and 49.2 percent respectively. Cagan used an actual inflation threshold of 50 
percent. Dombusch and Fischer propose a threshold of 1,000 percent per year, which 
corresponds to 22.1 percent per month. See R. Dombusch and S. Fischer, 
Macroeconomics (McGraw Hill: New York, 1990), page 663.
5 The series for Argentina, Brazil, and Zaire were spliced together from overlapping but 
rebased price indices. The splice dates were January 1990, August 1990, and January 
1992, respectively.
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adjusted.6
For each definition of high inflation, we extracted the individual 
episodes from the aggregate data set. We focus on episodes lasting 4 or 
more months to ensure that all the relevant volatility measures are defined in 
a meaningful way. Table 1 presents summary statistics on the episodes.
Table 1: Summary statistics on episodes
Monthly
inflation
threshold.
Total 
number of 
episodes
Episodes
with
duration>3
months
Countries with 
episodes of duration 
>3 months (more than ' 
1 episode of 
duration>3 months)
Percent of episodes 
in which final fall in 
inflation is smaller 
than one (two) std. 
dev. of change in 
inflation7
10 percent 119 42 32 (9) 42(71)
20 percent 39 18 14(3) 25 (67)
30 percent 15 10 8(2) 14 (43)
40 percent 12 7 6(1) 20 (80)
There are several striking features of Table 1:
1. A substantial proportion of episodes end within 3 months, 
especially at the lower thresholds. At the 10 percent and 20 percent 
thresholds, over half of the episodes have durations of 3 months or less. 
Even at the 30 and 40 percent thresholds, a third or more of the episodes do 
not persist for more than 3 months.
6 The lack of seasonal adjustment introduces a potentially serious bias. For example, 
consider an economy in which there is a sharp price increase every January. Assume this 
price increase exceeds 10 percent. Applying our definition of an episode, and setting the 
threshold at 10 percent, the country would perpetually be in a hyperinflation. One 
solution is seasonal adjustment. Seasonally adjusting the data, however, could introduce 
other biases, especially since it would be necessary to detrend the data as part of the 
process. For countries with short time series, this could lead to overfitting problems. In 
addition, inflation in most countries is either non-stationary or very close to non- 
stationary, raising the specter of introducing severe biases from spurious detrending 
procedures. We therefore adopted a different approach to the seasonality problem: we 
applied another filter to the episodes, in the form of a mean rate of inflation threshold. A 
mean rate of inflation substantially below the monthly inflation threshold could be 
indicative of severe seasonal fluctuations. In practice, this additional threshold does not 
affect the results. Furthermore, as the monthly inflation threshold increases, it becomes 
more and more likely that seasonal factors are strongly dominated by the hyperinflation 
process. We therefore tentatively conclude that the lack of seasonal adjustment is not a 
serious problem.
7 The figures in this column and the next apply only to completed episodes of duration 
greater than 3 months. The mean change in inflation was subtracted from the post-episode 
change in inflation.
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2. The number of episodes drops sharply as the definition of high 
inflation increases. The total number of episodes falls from 119 at the 10 
percent threshold to just 15 at the 30 percent threshold. Note that this decline 
does not necessarily have to obtain as the threshold increases: one episode at 
the lower threshold can be transformed into multiple episodes at higher 
thresholds, so that the total number of episodes could increase as the 
threshold increases.8
These two conclusions seem inconsistent with a commonly held view 
that high inflation is necessarily explosive.9
3. Most countries experience only a single episode of hyperinflation, 
and most episodes are accounted for by countries experiencing only a single 
episode. At the 10 percent threshold, only 9 countries have experienced 
more than 1 episode of high inflation that lasted more than 3 months. At the 
20 percent, 30 percent, and 40 percent thresholds, the number falls to 3, 2, 
and 1 respectively.
4. Many episodes end without a "large" fall in inflation. In over two- 
fifths of the cases at the 10 percent threshold, the mean-corrected post­
episode fall in inflation is smaller than the standard deviation of the change 
in inflation during the episode itself.10 And the majority of cases at all 
thresholds except 30 percent end with a mean-corrected fall in inflation that 
is smaller than twice the standard deviation of the change in inflation. This 
result suggests that many high inflation episodes end without dramatic 
stabilizations, or perhaps without any meaningful stabilization at all. In this 
sense, the set of post-World War II high inflations differs dramatically from 
the classical post-World War I hyperinflations, whose ends, as Thomas
8 For example, consider a monthly inflation series of {21,21,21,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,1 5, 
15,15,15,15,21,21,21,....}. At the 10 percent threshold, this would constitute one episode. 
But at the 20 percent threshold, it would split into two episodes.
9 As one example of the conventional wisdom, Dombusch, Sturzenegger, and Wolf write: 
"We view high inflation as intrinsically unstable. Shocks to high inflation economies 
easily translate into explosive inflation until a fundamental stabilization program can reset 
the dials." See their "Extreme Inflation: Dynamics and Stabilization," op. cit., page 9. As 
noted below in the text, many of the episodes end without a "large" fall in inflation. This 
seems to undermine the potential argument that the observed decline in the number of 
episodes is entirely caused by fundamental stabilizations.
10 See footnote to the relevant column in Table 1. The post-episode fall in inflation is 
defined as (the negative of) inflation in the first month following the episode minus 
inflation in the final month of the episode. There are clearly many other metrics for 
defining a "large" fall.
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Sargent has stressed, were abrupt and dramatic.11 Our metric confirms 
Sargent’s conclusion: for all four of the classical hyperinflations (Austria, 
Germany, Hungary, and Poland), the post-episode fall in inflation was larger 
than the standard deviation of the change in inflation.12
Tables 2-5 present more detailed statistics for episodes of 4 or more 
months duration at each of the threshold levels. In each table, an “n” or 
“nc” appended to a country name indicates an episode that was not 
completed at the end of the available time series, and k stands for monthly 
inflation. An empty value in any of the cells indicates at least one missing 
value in the underlying data.
Table 2 provides more detailed statistics on the 10 percent threshold 
episodes. Note the large number of episodes for which the maximum 
inflation rate is under either 20 percent or 30 percent — implying that they 
do not qualify as episodes at the higher threshold levels. Also note that 
many of the episodes in Table 2 may be apocryphal, in the sense that they 
may reflect measurement error or severe seasonal patterns rather than a true 
high inflation period — a problem that seems particularly acute for some of 
the African cases (e.g., Niger, Equatorial Guinea, and Burkina Faso). 
Finally, the average (unweighted) standard deviation of the inflation rate is 
substantially higher for the countries listed in Table 2 (0.07) than for the 
complete IFS sample of countries (0.03).13 The average standard deviation 
over the episodes (0.09) is even higher.14 In other words, relative to a norm 
of either the average standard deviation for all countries or even the average 
standard deviation for those countries that have experienced a high inflation 
episode, recorded inflation tends to be more volatile during high inflation
11 See T. Sargent, "The Ends of Four Big Inflations," op. cit.
12 As in Table 1, the mean change in inflation is subtracted from the post-episode change 
in inflation before comparison with the standard deviation of the change in inflation. The 
months included in the episodes are as defined in J. Sachs and F. Larrain, 
Macroeconomics in the Global Economy (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), Table 
23-1, page 730. The ratios of the post-episode change in inflation (minus the mean change 
in inflation) to the standard deviation of the change in inflation are: Austria, -1.12; 
Germany, -2.89; Hungary, -2.16; and Poland, -1.34.
13 The standard deviations given are for all recorded monthly inflation rates, not limited to 
those within episodes. For the countries included in Table 2, the overall standard 
deviation conflates the effects of the episode and non-episode months. The standard 
deviation for the non-episode months is lower than the figure cited in the text.
14 The average (unweighted) mean inflation rate is 0.099. The average (unweighted) 
coefficient of variation is 2.71 including Equatorial Guinea and Niger, and 1.08 excluding 
those two economies.
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episodes.15 Although these are inexact calculations, they are consistent with 
empirical evidence suggesting that the variance of inflation is increasing in 
the mean inflation rate.16
Table 2: Episodes at 10 percent threshold
COUNTRY DURATION
(MONTHS)
BEG END STD(n) STD (drc) MAX7t MEAN
DOMINICA 4 1990
AUG
1990
NOV
0.02 0.06 0.14 0.11
SENEGALn 4 1994
JAN
1994
APR
0.04 0.02 0.12 0.06
MEXICO j: 5 1982
AUG
1982
DEC
0.03 0.05 0.11 0.07
GHANA 5 1977
MAR
1977
JUL
0.04 0.07 0.21 0.14
GHANA 5 1983
FEB
1983
JUN
0.04 0.06 0.21 0.14
NIGER 5 1981
JUL
1981
NOV
0.12 0.19 0.13 0.01
SIERRA_L 5 1987
JAN
1987
MAY
0.06 0.10 0.22 0.15
TANZANnc 5 1994
FEB
1994
JUN
0.08 0.15 0.22 0.08
PERU 8 1985
JAN
1985
AUG
0.02 0.03 0.13 0.10
AFGHANIS 8 1981
MAY
1981
DEC
0.06 0.10 0.11 0.02
ZAIRE 9 1988
JUN
1989
FEB
0.05 0.06 0.19 0.08
EQUATORI 10 1991
SEP
1992
JUN
0.18 0.30 0.31 0.00
TURKEY 11 1979
APR
1980
FEB
0.05 0.05 0.19 0.07
SOMALIA 11 1983
JUL
1984
MAY
0.07 0.09 0.18 0.06
NIGERIA 13 1988
JAN
1989
JAN
0.06 0.08 0.20 0.05
BURKINA. 14 1978
DEC
1980
JAN
0.05 0.06 0.11 0.02
SIERRAJL 15 1989
NOV
1991
JAN
0.05 0.08 0.18 0.07
SOMALIA 15 1988
AUG
1989
OCT
0.04 0.06 0.16 0.07
MONGOLIA 16 1992
MAR
1993
JUN
0.09 0.13 0.28 0.13
URUGUAY 17 1967
FEB
1968
JUN
0.05 0.06 0.16 0.08
POLAND 18 1989
AUG
1991
JAN
0.16 0.17 0.57 0.15
15 This may be at least partially due to measurement errors in the recorded inflation series 
if, for example, the variance of the measurement errors are an increasing function of the 
inflation rate.
16 See D. Logue and T. Willet, "A note on the relation between the rate and variability of 
inflation," Economica, 43: 1976, 151-158, and A. Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, 
Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1992), 
page 439.
47
SURINAMnc 19
URUGUAY 22
BURMA 23
SEYCHELL 23
BURKINA. 27
PERU 37
AFGHANIS 38
ARGENTIN 42
ARGENTIN 44
ROMANI An 44
NICARAGnc 45
ZAIREnc 45
UGANDA 46
CHILE 50
ZAMBIA 56
ARGENTIN 57
ISRAEL 58
BOLIVIA 74
SUDANnc 78
GUINEA.B 89
BRAZILnc 133
1992 1994 0.06
OCT APR
1972 1974 0.05
APR JAN
1973 1975 0.06
JUL MAY
1971 1973 0.06
JUL MAY
1975 1977 0.08
APR JUN
1988 1991 0.26
JAN JAN
1988 1991 0.07
JUL AUG
1982 1985 0.06
JAN JUN
1987 1991 0.22
AUG MAR
1990 1994 0.05
NOV JUN
1985 1989 0.30
DEC NOV
1990 1994 0.28
OCT JUN
1984 1988 0.08
OCT JUL
1972 1976
MAY JUN
1988 1993 0.05
DEC JUL
1974 1979 0.06
DEC AUG
1980 1985 0.05
OCT JUL
1979 1986 0.19
DEC JAN
1988 1994 0.07
JAN JUN
1986 1993 0.07
APR AUG
1983 1994 0.11
JUN JUN
0.07 0.22 0.10
0.08 0.19 0.06
0.08 0.17 0.03
0.09 0.13 0.02
0.12 0.15 0.02
0.34 1.60 0.29
0.13 0.23 0.05
0.04 0.27 0.15
0.19 1.09 0.21
0.07 0.27 0.10
0.33 0.82 0.26
0.27 1.25 0.32
0.11 0.32 0.09
0.63
0.06 0.26 0.08
0.06 0.32 0.10
0.05 0.24 0.09
0.16 1.04 0.15
0.09 0.25 0.06
0.26 0.04
0.06 0.59 0.17
As noted in the discussion of Table 1, the number of episodes 
included in Table 3 falls dramatically relative to Table 2 — despite splits in 
some of the episodes (e.g., the long Brazilian episode in Table 2 has been 
transformed into two shorter episodes in Table 3). The average standard 
deviation of inflation for the countries represented in Table 3 is 0.10 — 
substantially higher than either the entire IFS sample or those countries 
represented in Table 2. The average standard deviation for the 20 percent 
threshold episodes is even higher, at 0.14.17
17 The average (unweighted) mean inflation rate is .20; the average (unweighted) 
coefficient of variation is 0.80.
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Table 3: Episodes at 20 percent threshold
COUNTRY DURATION BEG END STD(n) STD (dn) MAX n  MEANn
(MONTHS)
POLAND 6
ROMANIA 6
ARGENTIN 10
ISRAEL 10
ARGENTIN 11
SUDAN 13
GUINEA_B 14
MONGOLIA 16
BRAZIL 19
CHILE 19
GUINEA.B 19
UGANDA 19
BOLIVIA 30
ARGENTIN 32
BRAZILnc 33
PERU 34
NICARAGnc 45
ZAIREnc 45
1989 1990 0.15
AUG JAN
1990 1991 0.07
NOV APR
1975 1976 0.09
JUL APR
1984 1985 0.07
OCT JUL
1984 1985 0.04
AUG JUN
1991 1992 0.09
JAN JAN
1991 1992 0.09
JUL AUG
1992 1993 0.09
MAR JUN
1988 1990 0.15
SEP MAR
1972 1974
AUG FEB
1986 1987 0.09
APR OCT
1987 1988 0.11
JAN JUL
1983 1986 0.22
AUG JAN
1988 1991 0.25
JUL FEB
1991 1994 0.06
OCT JUN
1988 1990 0.26
MAR DEC
1986 1989 0.30
MAR NOV
1990 1994 0.28
OCT JUN
0.23 0.57 0.33
0.24 0.14
0.10 0.32 0.19
0.08 0.24 0.14
0.04 0.27 0.21
0.10 0.25 0.07
0.11 0.26 0.05
0.14 0.28 0.13
0.07 0.59 0.29
0.63
0.22 0.07
0.14 0.32 0.10
0.24 1.04 0.29
0.22 1.09 0.24
0.02 0.40 0.27
0.35 1.60 0.31
0.34 0.82 0.26
0.27 1.25 0.32
At a threshold of 30 percent, the number of episodes lasting 4 or 
more months falls to just 10. Two of the countries (Argentina and Brazil) 
have a pair of episodes, so that only 8 countries are represented in Table 4. 
In other words, only 6 percent of countries in the IFS sample (8 out of 132) 
have experienced a 30 percent inflation episode that lasted 4 or more 
months. Hyperinflations are indeed rare events. And, as is clear from the 
table, the average standard deviation of inflation during these episodes is 
substantially higher (0.20) than for the episodes defined using lower 
threshold levels.18
18 The average (unweighted) mean inflation rate is .31; the average (unweighted) 
coefficient of variation is 0.68.
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Table 4: Episodes at 30 percent threshold
COUNTRY DURATION BEG END
(MONTHS)
POLAND 6 1989 1990
AUG JAN
ARGENTIN 9 1975 1976
JUL MAR
ARGENTIN 11 1989 1990
MAY MAR
UGANDA 13 1987 1988
JAN JAN
BRAZIL 15 1989 1990
JAN MAR
BRAZILnc 15 1993 1994
AUG JUN
BOLIVIA 18 1984 1985
APR SEP
PERU 24 1988 1990
SEP AUG
NICARAGnc 45 1986 1989
MAR NOV
ZAIREnc 45 1990 1994
NOV JUN
STD(rc) STD (dn) MAX n MEAN n
0.15 0.23 0.57 0.33
0.09 0.10 0.32 0.18
0.32 0.32 1.09 0.46
0.11 0.13 0.32 0.11
0.17 0.08 0.59 0.31
0.03 0.01 0.40 0.34
0.24 0.29 1.04 0.38
0.29 0.28 1.60 0.37
0.30 0.34 0.82 0.26
0.29 0.28 1.25 0.32
Finally, only six countries have experienced 40 percent episodes 
lasting 4 or more months, as indicated in Table 5. The standard deviation of 
inflation during these episodes is remarkably high: the average standard 
deviation is 0.26. The average mean inflation rate is 0.42. The average 
coefficient of variation, calculated as the simple average of each country’s 
standard deviation divided by its mean inflation rate, is 0.65.19 During a 
high inflation episode, recorded monthly inflation is quite volatile.20
19 Calculating the average coefficient of variation as the average standard deviation 
divided by the average mean inflation rate, which is not equivalent to the calculation in 
the text above because of Jensen’s inequality, produces a very similar result (0.51).
20 It is unclear whether actual inflation is as variable as measured inflation. The behavior 
of optimizing agents would presumably reflect the potential presence of measurement 
errors, even if such errors were unobservable to all relevant agents. We abstract away 
from such considerations in this study.
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Table 5: Episodes at 40 percent threshold
COUNTRY DURATION
(MONTHS)
BEG END STD(n) STD (drc) MAX n MEAN n
BRAZIL 4 1989
DEC
1990
MAR
0.08 0.07 0.59 0.52
POLAND 4 1989
OCT
1990
JAN
0.19 0.27 0.57 0.35
ZAIREnc 8 1993
NOV
1994
JUN
0.47 0.40 1.25 0.61
ARGENTIN 11 1989
MAY
1990
MAR
0.32 0.32 1.09 0.46
ZAIRE 12 1991
OCT
1992
SEP
0.22 0.27 0.76 0.36
BOLIVIA 18 1984
APR
1985
SEP
0.24 0.29 1.04 0.38
NICARAGnc 45 1986
MAR
1989
NOV
0.30 0.34 0.82 0.26
Tables 1-5 suggest several conclusions. First, high inflation is rare. 
Second, most high inflation experiences are relatively short. Third, most 
economies only experience one high inflation, and most high inflations 
occur in countries experiencing only one such episode. Fourth, an economy 
experiencing high inflation is not necessarily fated to reach higher and 
higher rates of inflation: most high inflation episodes do not explode. Fifth, 
many episodes end without a large fall in inflation. Finally, the inflationary 
process during a high inflation episode is substantially more noisy than the 
inflationary process during low inflation.
m . Two models of delayed stabilizations
One of the principal stylized facts of high inflations is that 
stabilizations are delayed. The most popular model of such delays is given 
by Alesina and Drazen (1991).21 Their model, which is introduced in 
Chapter 1 and is henceforth referred to as the AD model, argues that delays 
occur because of conflicts over how to apportion the costs of stabilization. 
More specifically, the model posits an economy comprising two groups and 
suffering from high inflation. Information is asymmetric, in that the 
preferences of each group are known only to members of that group. As 
time passes, the factions learn about each other’s preferences, and ultimately 
one acquiesces to bearing a disproportionate share of the costs of stabilizing. 
Stabilization thus occurs when one group decides that the marginal benefit
21 A. Alesina and A. Drazen, "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?" American Economic 
Review, December 1991,1170-1188.
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from stabilizing exceeds the marginal benefit from waiting. Anything that 
raises the benefit from stabilizing should therefore ceteris paribus cause a 
stabilization to occur more quickly.
An alternative explanation for observed delays, presented in Chapter 
1, is based on a real options approach. If there is uncertainty over the future 
path of inflation, sunk costs create an incentive to delay stabilization. The 
fundamental prediction of such a model of stabilization as an irreversible 
investment under uncertainty, henceforth the IRRINV model, is that the 
higher the volatility of inflation, the longer governments wait before 
stabilizing.22 This effect obtains because the higher the volatility of inflation, 
the more valuable the option to stabilize, and therefore the higher inflation 
must be before the option is exercised.23 Alternatively, the higher the 
volatility of inflation, the more likely it is that a stabilization will ex post 
have been unnecessary, thus providing an incentive to wait.24 The effect of 
volatility within the IRRINV model differs sharply from the effect within 
the AD model, which would predict a negative relationship between 
volatility and duration.25
The different predictions given by the IRRINV model and the AD 
model for the effect of higher volatility on the timing of stabilizations 
provide one method of empirically discriminating between them. But in 
both models, the volatility of inflation is just one of many variables that 
could affect delay. In particular, the drift rate of inflation is also relevant. 
The AD model unambiguously predicts a shorter war of attrition the higher 
the drift rate, since the costs of the war of attrition increase with the rate of 
inflation. The IRRINV model makes ambiguous predictions about the effect 
of a higher drift rate. In most configurations of the model, a higher drift rate
22 While this prediction does not hold uniformly across all parameter values in the model 
(see discussion in footnote describing Figure 4 in Chapter 1), it is a relatively robust result.
23 The precise definition of the volatility of inflation will be discussed below.
24 Assume the government wants to ensure that inflation falls below some threshold a. If 
inflation (n) at time t is normally distributed with mean p. and variance o \  then 
P(7t(t)<a)=<D{(a-|i)/ a 2t}, where <D is the cumulative standard normal distribution. A 
higher variance drives the standard normal variable toward zero. Thus if a<p, a higher 
variance raises the probability of observing an inflation rate below a. In the IRRINV 
model, inflation was typically modeled as a geometric Brownian motion, so that this 
analysis would be appropriate for the log of inflation, not inflation itself.
25 Higher volatility presumably imposes higher welfare costs (through, for example, 
aggravated aggregate-relative confusion). The AD model would predict that the higher 
welfare costs, ceteris paribus, would shorten the war of attrition.
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reduces the optimal stabilization threshold. But for some configurations and 
parameter values, the effect is reversed (see Figure 5 of Chapter 1). If the 
data suggest an inverse relationship between the drift rate and the delay, 
nothing can be concluded about the relative validity of the two models. But 
a positive relationship between the drift rate and the delay would necessarily 
contradict the AD model.
To test the predictions of the AD and IRRINV model, we use the 
high inflation data sets described in Section I and define the delay in 
stabilizing as the duration of the episode, measured in months.26 This 
definition raises a potentially serious problem, because it is not clear that the 
end of an episode corresponds to a policy-induced stabilization; Table 1 
suggests that many episodes end with relatively small drops in inflation. 
Indeed, one of the fundamental driving mechanisms of the IRRINV model is 
the possibility that inflation will wander below the threshold without a 
government-imposed stabilization. Appendix II discusses this issue more 
thoroughly; the conclusion is that it is unlikely to bias our results 
significantly.
The volatility of inflation is proxied in several different ways. The 
most appropriate measure given the assumptions of the basic IRRINV model 
in Chapter 1 is the standard deviation of the change in the log of monthly 
inflation. But that measure is appropriate only for a geometric stochastic 
process for inflation, and the fundamental prediction of the IRRINV model 
obtains for other stochastic processes as well.27 For each episode, we 
therefore use several different measures of the volatility of inflation to test 
the IRRINV model in the broadest possible sense 28 If the predictions of the 
model fail to obtain for all the measures of volatility, the model must be 
rejected. But a rejection for any one particular measure may reflect an
26 Note a subtle difference between the definition of delay in Chapter 1 and the one 
applied here. In Chapter 1, the delay was defined as the time until inflation reaches the 
optimal threshold, starting from the conventional threshold. Here, the delay is defined as 
the first-crossing time from any given level of inflation (in particular, the one defining a 
hyperinflationary episode) to the optimal threshold. Because the conventional threshold is 
unlikely to coincide precisely with the definition of a hyperinflation, these two definitions 
are not equivalent.
27 For discrete stabilizations, the only requirement for the IRRINV model’s fundamental 
precept is that there be some serial correlation in the inflation rate.
28 All of our tests will be tests of the joint hypothesis of the validity of the IRRINV model 
and a class of stochastic processes for inflation. Because the data series for most episodes 
are so short, direct tests of the validity of any particular stochastic assumption for inflation 
suffer from a severe lack of power.
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erroneous assumption about the stochastic process followed by inflation 
rather than a failure of the model itself. The specific volatility measures 
used in this study are:
• The standard deviation of the monthly inflation rate;
• The standard deviation of the change in the monthly inflation rate;
• The standard deviation of the percentage change in the monthly inflation
rate; and
• The standard deviation of the change in the natural logarithm of monthly 
inflation.29
In order to test the AD and IRRINV models, we focus our attention 
on the relationships among duration, the volatility of inflation, and the drift 
rate of inflation. Other relevant variables (e.g., the degree of indexation 
within the economy, or the concentration of political power) will be 
assumed to be distributed independently of the volatility and drift rate 
factors within our sample.30
IV. Ordinary least squares analysis
As a first approach to analyzing the data and comparing the two 
models, this section uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to 
examine the relationship between the duration of an episode and our 
measures of volatility and drift rates. Tables 6-9 present coefficient 
estimates, t-statistics, and summary statistics from OLS regressions; each 
table presents results for a different threshold. The regression takes the 
form:
Dt =c + p i<Ji + p2a i + £•
where Di is the duration of episode i, c is a constant, (Ji is a measure of 
volatility for episode i, 0Cj is either the mean monthly change in inflation or
29 The last two measures should be approximately the same, with the approximation 
becoming more precise as the inflation rate goes to zero, since the percentage change in a 
variable is approximately equal to the first difference of the log of the variable (for small 
percentage changes). The inflation rates during high inflation episodes, however, are 
typically so high that there can be a substantial divergence between these two measures.
30 This may not be a valid assumption. For example, it could be that economies subject to 
more volatile inflation are also the ones more likely to adopt indexation schemes — and 
therefore the ones in which any given rate of inflation is less distortionary.
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the mean monthly change in log inflation for episode i, (3, and p2 are 
coefficients to be estimated, and e* is an error term.
In these regressions, no account is taken of censoring, so that Di for 
uncompleted episodes is their uncompleted duration at the end of the 
available time series, and durations of 3 months or less are excluded. Such 
cross-sectional regressions seem particularly susceptible to 
heteroscedasticity, since it is not unreasonable to expect the variance of the 
error term to vary with the duration of the episode or with the explanatory 
variables. In the summary statistics reported for each regression, we 
therefore include the Cook-Weisberg test of heteroscedasticity.31
Table 6 presents regressions of duration for the 10 percent threshold. 
The standard deviation of inflation, the standard deviation of the change in 
inflation, and the standard deviation of the change in log inflation all attract 
positive coefficients, while the coefficient on the standard deviation of the 
percentage change in inflation is negative. These results offer only tenuous 
support for the IRRINV model: all of the coefficients on the volatility 
factors are statistically insignificant at the 5 percent significance level (t- 
statistics are in parentheses under each coefficient estimate).32 The 
coefficient on the drift rate is negative when drift is defined as the mean 
change in inflation, and positive when drift is defined as the mean change in 
log inflation.
31 R.D. Cook and S. Weisberg, “Diagnostics for heteroscedasticity in regression,” 
Biometrika, Vol. 70: 1970, 1-10. The test assesses multiplicative heteroscedasticity by
2
using the OLS residuals to estimate an auxiliary regression of ej on a constant and a
2vector of possible explanatory variables (where ej is the square of the OLS residual for 
episode i). A variety of vectors were tested, but the results did not vary much. Since the 
fitted value of duration from the original OLS regression seemed the most intuitive 
explanatory variable, the tests reported in the tables reflect simple auxiliary regressions of 
the squared OLS residuals on a constant and the fitted values of duration. More precisely, 
the p-value given in the regression tables is the probability of observing the estimated 
coefficient on the fitted value of duration in the auxiliary regression, given that the true 
coefficient is zero. When the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient is rejected, the 
conclusion is that the variance of the error term varies (in a statistically significant 
manner) with the fitted value of duration from the original OLS regression. Despite our 
initial concerns, the Cook-Weisberg p-values indicate little evidence of multiplicative 
heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, hypothesis tests using White standard errors rather than 
OLS standard errors yield the same general conclusions as those in the text (except where 
specifically noted below).
32 Statistical significance throughout this study will be evaluated at the 5 percent 
significance level unless explicitly noted otherwise.
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Table 6: OLS regressions for 10 percent threshold_______________
Regressand: duration of episode
SD (inflation) 109.65
(1.79)
SD (change in inflation) 28.75
(0.53)
SD (change in log inflation) 1.23
(0.21)
SD (percentage change in inflation) -0.35
(-0.92)
Mean change in inflation -405.73 -2186.2
(-0.86) (-3.78)
Mean change in log inflation
N
F-test (p-value)
R2
Cook-Weisberg test (p-value)
84.54
(2.13)
41 40 31 31
0.08 0.59 0.00 0.11
0.08 0.03 0.35 0.14
0.48 0.58 0.0633 0.15
At the 20 percent threshold, the coefficients on the standard 
deviation of inflation and the standard deviation of the change in inflation, 
which remain positive, become statistically significant (Table 7). In terms 
of explanatory power, cross-sectional variation in the standard deviation of 
the change in inflation and the mean change in inflation explain 65 percent 
of the cross-sectional variation in duration, as shown by the second 
regression. But as is evident from the third and fourth regressions, the 
coefficients on the other two volatility proxies remain statistically 
insignificant. The coefficient on the mean change in inflation remains 
negative and the coefficient on the mean change in log inflation remains 
positive, as in Table 6. But the drift coefficient is not statistically significant 
except in the second regression.
33 Using White standard errors rather than OLS standard errors changes the t-statistic on 
the estimated coefficient for the standard deviation of the percentage change in inflation to 
-2.05, and the t-statistic on the estimated coefficient for the mean change in inflation to - 
4.94.
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Table 7: OLS regressions for 20 percent threshold
Regressand: duration of episode 
SD (inflation)
SD (change in inflation)
SD (change in log inflation)
SD (percentage change in inflation) 
Mean change in inflation 
Mean change in log inflation
N
F-test (p-value)
R2
Cook-Weisberg test (p-value)
117.45
(5.22)
72.27
(3.57)
-7.86
(-0.71)
0.57
(0.40)
-331.90 -192.46
(-2.96) (-1.41)
17 15 12
104.10
(0.85)
8
0.00 0.00 0.30 0.70
0.65 0.65 0.23 0.13
0.26 0.39 0.33 0.61
At the 30 percent threshold, the coefficient on the standard deviation 
of inflation remains positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent 
significance level. The coefficients on all the other volatility proxies are 
statistically insignificant (see Table 8). The coefficients on the drift rate 
terms are negative, but once again statistically significant only in the second 
regression.
Table 8: OLS regressions for 30 percent threshold
Regressand: duration of episode
SD (inflation) 78.34
(1.98)
SD (change in inflation) 62.07
(1.76)
SD (change in log inflation) -14.47
(-1.73)
SD (percentage change in inflation) -0.24
(-0.07)
Mean change in inflation -265.74 -29.20
(-2.08) (-0.21)
Mean change in log inflation -119.95
(-1.33)
N 10 8 7 6
F-test (p-value) 0.08 0.22 0.98 0.29
R2 0.33 0.45 0.01 0.56
Cook-Weisberg test (p-value) 0.09 0.11 0.25 0.28
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Finally, at the 40 percent threshold level, all the coefficients on the 
volatility regressors are positive. But only the coefficients on the standard 
deviation of the change in log inflation and the standard deviation of the 
percentage change in inflation are statistically significant. These results 
contrast with those in Table 7, where the first two volatility proxies had 
higher t-statistics than the second two. The coefficients on the drift rate 
terras are negative and statistically significant in the third and fourth 
regressions.
Table 9: OLS regressions for 40 percent threshold______________
Regressand: duration of episode
SD (inflation) 27.76
(0.54)
SD (change in inflation) 68.96
(0.84)
SD (change in log inflation) 8.54
(2.81)
SD (percentage change in inflation) 4.02
(6.87)
Mean change in inflation 41.43 -138.33
(0.36) (-7.18)
Mean change in log inflation
N
F-test (p-value) 
R2
Cook-Weisberg test (p-value)
7 7 5
-37.09
(-3.51)
5
0.61 0.71 0.01 0.11
0.06 0.16 0.99 0.89
0.39 0.27 0.97 0.16
In summary, the OLS regressions provide weak evidence of some 
positive association between duration and volatility. The relationship is 
certainly not robust to changes in the threshold level or the definition of 
volatility. Nevertheless, all the statistically significant results do support a 
positive volatility-duration effect.34 The results also generally point to a 
negative drift rate-duration effect.
V. Hazard rate analysis
Two major shortcomings of the simple OLS regressions reported 
above are that they could produce negative predicted durations, a result that
34 The results for episodes defined to end the month before inflation remains below the 
threshold for 6 months similarly provide weak support for a positive correlation.
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is difficult to interpret, and that they ignore censoring, which obtains 
because wq treated the episodes that had not been completed at the end of 
the available time series as if they had been completed. A slightly more 
sophisticated approach, which ensures non-negative predicted durations and 
easily accommodates censored data, is to use a “hazard rate” or “duration 
model” approach. We briefly review the terminology and theory of hazard 
analysis before presenting our results. 35
Assume that the duration of an episode is represented by the random 
variable T, and suppose that T has probability density f(t). Then the 
cumulative distribution function is given by:
s = t
F(t) = j  f(s)ds = Prob(T < f)
5 = 0
F(t) thus represents the probability that the duration T is less than or 
equal to t. Hazard rate analysis also relies on two other related concepts, the 
survival function and the hazard rate. The survival function, S(t), is given 
by l-F(t) and represents the probability that the duration is greater than or 
equal to t.36 Finally, the hazard rate, ^(t), represents the conditional 
probability of the episode’s ending immediately after t, given that it has 
survived up until to t  More explicitly, the hazard function is given by:
X(t) = lim Prob( ^ r ^  + g) = lim F(t + £ ) -F ( t )  _  f i t )  _  dlnSjt)  
^  ^  £S(f) S(t) dt
There are a variety of different models of the hazard rate (and 
therefore of the survival function and cumulative distribution function). The 
most popular are the Weibull and the exponential models. The Weibull 
hazard function is given by:
X(t) = Ap(At) p - i
where p determines whether the hazard rate is increasing (p>l) or decreasing
35 For a comprehensive presentation of duration analysis, see J. D. Kalbfleisch and R. L. 
Prentice, The Statistical Analysis o f Failure Time Data (John Wiley: New York, 1980).
36 For continuous density functions f(t), the probability of a duration exactly equal to t is 
zero. So both F(t) and S(t) can be defined with weak inequalities.
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(p<l) over time. Since X(t) is also equal to the negative of the time 
derivative of ln(S(t)), we can solve for S(t):
d l n S ®  = -Ap(At)p~' => in 5(0 = K - ( M ) p => S(t) = 
dt
Since S(0)=1, K=0. Therefore:
S( t)=eHMT
The exponential hazard function is the Weibull function with p=l. 
In that case, the hazard rate is a constant over time, and the survival function 
is simply S(t)=e'Xt.37 Thus far the analysis has emphasized the form  of the 
hazard rate. But our primary concern is the impact of our volatility and drift 
rate variables on the level of the hazard rate. Such exogenous covariates do 
not change the shape of the hazard rate as a function of time. Instead, we 
can think of the covariates as shifting the entire hazard function up or down; 
we are interested in the direction and size of this shift. In particular, we 
assume a proportional hazards model, so that the hazard function for episode 
i can be written as:
Aft)  = p(Xtf~lepx'
where x  is a vector of time-invariant variables and (3 is a set of coefficients 
to be estimated.38 It is assumed that the first component of the x  vector is a 
set of l ’s, so that ^=exp(pi). The effect of the covariates is thus to scale up
37 There are a plethora of possible hazard functions in addition to the Weibull (and the 
associated exponential), and for each application of hazard analysis, it is necessary to 
justify the use of one distribution over another. See J.D. Kalbfleisch and R.L. Prentice, 
The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data, op. cit., pages 21-30, or W. Greene, 
Econometric Analysis (Macmillan Publishing Company: New York, 1993), page 718. One 
test for the Weibull is derived from its survival function, which is given by exp{(-Xt)P}. 
Therefore log(S(t))=-(A,t)p, and log(-log(S(t))=plog(A)+plog(t). Since p is a constant, a 
graph of log(-logS(t)) against log(t) would yield a straight line with intercept plog(A) and 
slope p. A simple test for the appropriateness of the Weibull is thus to plot log(-logS(t)) 
against log(t). If the underlying data are consistent with the Weibull, then this plot should 
yield a straight line. If the line has slope 1, moreover, the exponential distribution is 
appropriate. Such “loglog” plots for the various thresholds used in this paper indicate that 
the Weibull assumption seems reasonable.
38 Formally, adapting the model in this way is equivalent to changing the unit of time. 
The model with covariates is therefore sometimes referred to as the “accelerated failure 
time” model. See J.D. Kalbfleisch and R.L. Prentice, The Statistical Analysis o f Failure 
Time Data, op. cit., pages 33-34, or W. Greene, Econometric Analysis, op. cit., page 721.
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or down the Weibull hazard rate.
Estimation proceeds via maximum likelihood. Defining 8i=l if 
episode i has been completed and 8]=0 if the episode has been censored, 
defining ti as the duration of episode i, assuming an independent censoring 
mechanism,39 and letting s=l/p be the so-called shape parameter, the log- 
likelihood of the observed sample is:40
, , V 'o ,  | l  Tint ,+ p x ,  rIn L = 2_j S{, ln |-  exp^— 1--------l - e  s j j  + (1 -  <5i)lnjexp|^-€
which can be written as:
ln / .+
InL = ^ ^ ( lnf| + P x i -in.?) e
This log-likelihood is then maximized over the parameters s and the 
components of p by using standard non-linear optimization techniques.41
Tables 10-14 present the results for the various thresholds and a 
variety of covariates (the coefficients on the constant term are not shown; 
similar results obtain with heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors).42 A 
positive coefficient on a covariate indicates that the partial effect of that 
variable is to raise the hazard rate and thus reduce the expected survival 
time.43 Conversely, a negative coefficient indicates that the variable reduces 
the hazard rate and raises the expected survival time. The t-statistics reflect 
standard errors conditional on the value of the estimated shape parameter.
39 Independent censoring basically requires that episodes are not censored, at any given 
duration t, because “they appear to be at unusually high (or low) risk of failure.” See J.D. 
Kalbfleisch and R.L. Prentice, The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data, op. cit., 
pages 40-41. Because censoring in our data arises solely because a time series ends, rather 
than because episodes are purposefully excluded, independent censoring seems a 
reasonable assumption to adopt. Nevertheless, the assumption could be fallacious if, for 
example, countries with very low probabilities of ending a hyperinflationary episode 
tended to drop out of (or be dropped from) the International Financial Statistics database.
40 See W. Greene, Econometric Analysis, op. cit., page 721.
41 Estimation was undertaken using the Newton-Raphson procedure built into the STATA 
econometric package.
42 The y }  p-values presented in the tables are the probability of observing a %2 value of 
2(Li-Lo) under a null hypothesis that all the additional (non-intercept) variables have zero 
coefficients.
43 The expected survival time for the Weibull distribution is (1/A)P.
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The "pseudo-R2" statistics are defined as 1-Li/Lo, where Li is the log- 
likelihood of the estimated regression and Lo is the log-likelihood of a 
constant-only regression.
As Table 10 indicates, the higher the standard deviation of inflation, 
the lower the hazard rate, and therefore the longer the duration.44 The 
standard deviation of the change in inflation also enters with a negative sign, 
but is not statistically significant. The other two volatility proxies enter 
with positive coefficients, implying a negative impact on duration, but again 
are not statistically significant. The regressions also suggest that the higher 
the mean change in monthly inflation, the higher the hazard rate, a result 
that is statistically significant. The shape parameters are consistently less 
than one (p>l), so the hazard rate is increasing in time.
Table 10: Weibull regressions for 10 percent threshold, 
hazard rate form
SD (inflation)
SD (change in inflation)
SD (change in log inflation)
SD (percentage change in inflation) 
Mean change in inflation 
Mean change in log inflation
N
7
X -test (p-value)
2
Pseudo R 
s
-7.42
(-2.02)
-2.95
(-1.05)
0.89
(1.06)
0.02
(.50)
234.51 189.22
(7.12) (5.37)
-12.39
(-6.08)
41 40 31 17
0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.04 0.30 0.24 0.34
0.90 0.65 0.07 0.58
At the 20 percent threshold, the standard deviation of inflation and 
the standard deviation of the change in inflation continue to enter with 
negative coefficients, and are statistically significant. The other two 
volatility parameters continue to lack statistical significance.
44 The results presented in Tables 10-14 are simi lar to those obtained from both 
exponential and Cox regressions, which are available upon request to the author.
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Table 11: Weibull regressions for 20 percent threshold, hazard rate 
form
SD (inflation)
SD (change in inflation)
SD (change in log inflation)
SD (percentage change in inflation) 
Mean change in inflation 
Mean change in log inflation
N
2
X -test (p-value)
2
Pseudo R 
s
- 10.10
(-3.25)
-5.13
(-1.98)
1.31
(1.07)
-0.04
(-0.24)
59.92 52.97
(4.81) (3.87)
-16.85
(-1.48)
17 15 12 8
0.00 0.00 0.05 0.45
0.26 0.38 0.25 0.09
0.49 0.40 0.35 0.48
The results are similar at the 30 percent threshold, except that the 
positive coefficient on the standard deviation of the change in log inflation 
becomes statistically significant (see the final column of Table 12). Such a 
positive coefficient contradicts the basic prediction of the IRRINV model.
Table 12: Weibull regressions for 30 percent threshold, hazard rate 
form
SD (inflation)
SD (change in inflation)
SD (change in log inflation)
SD (percentage change in inflation) 
Mean change in inflation 
Mean change in log inflation
N
2
X -test (p-value)
2
Pseudo R 
s
-7.12
(-2.05)
- 11.20
(-2.42)
5.83
(3.73)
0.03
(0.06)
39.63 -8.84
(2.39) (-0.31)
50.85
(3.51)
10 8 7 6
0.10 0.03 0.88 0.04
0.23 0.38 0.06 0.44
0.60 0.42 0.35 0.22
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At the 40 percent threshold, all of the regressions are highly 
significant (see the row of statistics for the probability that all of the non­
intercept coefficients are zero), all of the volatility parameters enter with 
negative coefficients, and all of the drift rates enter with positive 
coefficients. These regressions offer perhaps the strongest evidence in 
favor of the IRRINV model, but they are based on an extremely limited 
number of observations.45
Table 13: Weibull regressions for 40 percent threshold, hazard rate 
form
SD (inflation) -19.21
(-3.98)
SD (change in inflation) -16.79
(-3.39)
SD (change in log inflation) -16.81
(-
12.14)
SD (percentage change in inflation) -2.82
(-1.77)
Mean change in inflation 237.92 177.11
(14.11) (4.40)
Mean change in log inflation
N
X^-test (p-value) 
2
Pseudo R
7 7 5
66.77
(20.07)
5
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.43 0.86 0.77 0.86
0.54 0.13 0.12 0.07
In sum, the Weibull regressions presented in this section offer mixed 
support for the IRRINV model. Higher volatility tends to be associated with 
a lower hazard function, and thus a longer duration, but the results are not 
robust across all threshold levels and definitions of volatility. Furthermore, 
while the Weibull regressions ensure non-negative predicted durations and 
account for censored observations, and are thus superior to the OLS 
regressions presented above, they are certainly not immune from criticism. 
Perhaps most important, they assume that the volatility parameters are time- 
invariant variables. But if volatility is time-varying, the Weibull regressions 
presented above are invalid. Appendix III explores this issue in more detail 
by splitting the episodes into 6-month intervals and examining the behavior 
of the volatility parameter across these intervals. It concludes that the
45 Another potential error is that a Weibull distribution may not be an appropriate 
assumption for these episodes. But the results seem robust to an error of this type, since 
Cox regressions produce similar estimates.
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assumptions upon which the OLS and hazard rate analysis are predicated 
appear to obtain, although the evidence is admittedly mixed.
VI. Conclusion
This chapter has constructed a monthly database of high inflation 
experiences. These experiences are rare, do not necessarily explode into 
ever higher inflation, often end without a large fall in inflation, and usually 
visit a country only once. They are also very noisy: inflation tends to be 
much more variable during a high inflation episode than it is, on average, 
across the set of IFS countries.
The chapter has also attempted to discriminate between the Alesina- 
Drazen model of delayed stabilizations and an irreversible investment under 
uncertainty model. The irreversible investment model generally predicts a 
positive relationship between the volatility of inflation and the delay before 
stabilization occurs, whereas the Alesina-Drazen model predicts the 
opposite. Simple OLS regressions provide tenuous support for a positive 
volatility-duration nexus, as do hazard rate regressions using a Weibull 
distribution. The conclusion is that there seems to be weak evidence in 
support of the irreversible investment model.
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Appendix I. Summary statistics of monthly inflation rates by country
Country Months of 
data
Mean n Std. dev. k Min 7t Max k
UNITED_S 454 0.0037 0.0032 -0.0046 0.0179
UNITED K 452 0.0056 0.0068 -0.0163 0.0422
AUSTRIA 452 0.0033 0.0074 -0.0267 0.0500
BELGIUM 453 0.0035 0.0038 -0.0125 0.0161
DENMARK 333 0.0055 0.0067 -0.0258 0.0572
FRANCE 454 0.0050 0.0044 -0.0086 0.0328
GERMANY 454 0.0027 0.0033 -0.0130 0.0123
ITALY 450 0.0063 0.0060 -0.0086 0.0310
LUXEMBOU 453 0.0033 0.0043 -0.0096 0.0196
NETHERLA 453 0.0035 0.0071 -0.0285 0.0464
NORWAY 453 0.0048 0.0058 -0.0141 0.0557
SWEDEN 453 0.0051 0.0060 -0.0054 0.0328
SWITZERL 454 0.0029 0.0039 -0.0074 0.0207
CANADA 453 0.0039 0.0040 -0.0076 0.0259
JAPAN 453 0.0039 0.0078 -0.0156 0.0399
FINLAND 453 0.0054 0.0058 -0.0158 0.0366
GREECE 453 0.0087 0.0136 -0.0214 0.0578
ICELAND 142 0.0139 0.0163 -0.0156 0.0999
MALTA 452 0.0028 0.0109 -0.0677 0.0953
PORTUGAL 453 0.0089 0.0126 -0.0277 0.0848
SPAIN 453 0.0075 0.0139 -0.1521 0.1791
TURKEY 309 0.0292 0.0292 -0.0644 0.2208
SOUTH.AF 453 0.0071 0.0059 -0.0062 0.0412
ARGENTIN 453 0.0649 0.0986 -0.0618 1.0873
BOLIVIA 444 0.0328 0.0953 -0.1043 1.0394
BRAZIL 452 0.0731 0.0916 -0.0328 0.5919
CHILE 453 0.0307 0.0479 -0.0840 0.6289
COLOMBIA 444 0.0141 0.0138 -0.0605 0.0779
COSTA RI 430 0.0091 0.0143 -0.0522 0.1019
DOMINICA 443 0.0088 0.0222 -0.0668 0.1374
ECUADOR 453 0.0138 0.0174 -0.0410 0.1003
EL_SALVA 452 0.0075 0.0118 -0.0346 0.0466
GUATEMAL 451 0.0066 0.0201 -0.0620 0.1347
HAITI 416 0.0048 0.0275 -0.0944 0.1826
HONDURAS 453 0.0056 0.0111 -0.0391 0.0523
MEXICO 453 0.0170 0.0222 -0.0175 0.1438
NICARAGU 56 0.2211 0.3003 -1.2132 0.8180
PANAMA 238 0.0026 0.0053 -0.0094 0.0519
PARAGUAY 448 0.0101 0.0185 -0.0600 0.1305
PERU 454 0.0469 0.1059 -0.0282 1.6033
URUGUAY 453 0.0359 0.0291 -0.0566 0.1852
VENEZUEL 453 0.0103 0.0181 -0.0586 0.1928
ANTIGUA. 95 0.0080 0.0151 -0.0291 0.0476
BAHAMAS 265 0.0050 0.0047 -0.0173 0.0261
ARUBA 103 0.0037 0.0024 0.0000 0.0144
BARBADOS 347 0.0066 0.0127 -0.0761 0.0892
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DOMINIC 1 341 0.0062 0.1751 -2.2467 2.2879
GRENADA 219 0.0065 0.0104 -0.0343 0.0553
GUYANA 407 0.0071 0.0191 -0.0523 0.2887
JAMAICA 449 0.0114 0.0157 -0.0239 0.1256
NETHERL1 315 0.0045 0.0050 -0.0106 0.0230
ST__KITT 167 0.0038 0.0074 -0.0138 0.0405
ST_LUCI 363 0.0059 0.0104 -0.0255 0.0586
S_VINCEN 191 0.0057 0.0100 -0.0297 0.0448
SURINAME 303 0.0155 0.0328 -0.0589 0.2193
TRINIDAD 449 0.0066 0.0094 -0.0299 0.0632
BAHRAIN 212 0.0036 0.0161 -0.0428 0.0855
CYPRUS 450 0.0038 0.0119 -0.0306 0.1387
IR A N _I_ 417 0.0080 0.0163 -0.0443 0.0562
ISRAEL 453 0.0247 0.0376 -0.0493 0.2430
JORDAN 224 0.0061 0.0186 -0.0662 0.0785
KUWAIT 220 0.0041 0.0111 -0.0307 0.0482
SAUDI_AR 174 0.0004 0.0059 -0.0491 0.0179
SYRIAN.A 414 0.0076 0.0305 -0.1391 0.1269
EGYPT 453 0.0073 0.0190 -0.0725 0.0946
AFGHANIS 151 0.0090 0.0646 -0.3209 0.2276
BANGLADE 241 0.0072 0.0198 -0.0604 0.1073
BURMA 364 0.0084 0.0277 -0.1199 0.1742
SRI.LANK 453 0.0059 0.0113 -0.0357 0.0853
HONG_KON 306 0.0067 0.0128 -0.0463 0.0541
INDIA 451 0.0061 0.0109 -0.0290 0.0420
INDONESI 319 0.0100 0.0207 -0.1252 0.2003
KOREA 297 0.0082 0.0101 -0.0193 0.0515
MALAYSIA 452 0.0025 0.0060 -0.0151 0.0318
MALDIVES 29 0.0041 0.0509 -0.1507 0.0810
NEPAL 371 0.0071 0.0196 -0.0680 0.0826
PAKISTAN 453 0.0060 0.0126 -0.0645 0.0821
PHILIPPI 453 0.0082 0.0128 -0.0359 0.0856
SINGAPOR 318 0.0031 0.0090 -0.0197 0.0629
THAILAND 354 0.0048 0.0079 -0.0163 0.0419
ALGERIA 236 0.0104 0.0254 -0.0510 0.1095
BOTSWANA 232 0.0091 0.0067 -0.0087 0.0470
BURUNDI 248 0.0083 0.0229 -0.0472 0.1576
CAMEROON 266 0.0072 0.0197 -0.1249 0.0794
CAPE_VER 31 0.0042 0.0138 -0.0465 0.0298
CENTRAL. 158 0.0025 0.0197 -0.0399 0.0922
CHAD 113 -0.0003 0.0349 -0.0933 0.0934
CONGO 348 0.0049 0.0173 -0.0808 0.0896
ZAIRE 91 0.1959 0.2495 -0.0189 1.2528
EQUATORI 83 -0.0012 0.0775 -0.3106 0.3106
ETHIOPIA 339 0.0058 0.0244 -0.0592 0.0879
GABON 341 0.0046 0.0186 -0.1262 0.1083
GAMBIA__ 398 0.0074 0.0286 -0.0856 0.1204
GHANA 378 0.0221 0.0417 -0.2138 0.2163
GUINEA.B 102 0.0380 0.0668 -0.1140 0.2622
COTE_D_I 407 0.0052 0.0238 -0.0988 0.1555
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Appendix II. The definition of "delay” and the theoretical predictions 
from an irreversible investment model
By identifying the duration of an episode as the delay before 
stabilizing, we are implicitly assuming that all episodes end with a 
stabilization, an assumption that may be invalid. It is not even clear that the 
IRRINV model predicts a positive relationship between the delay as 
measured here and the volatility of inflation. The model’s predictions focus 
on the delay until hitting some upper boundary (the optimal stabilization 
threshold), not the delay until hitting either that upper boundary or some 
lower boundary.
There are two possible solutions to this problem. First, we can 
examine whether the model predicts a positive relationship between the 
volatility of inflation and the delay as defined here. Unfortunately, Monte 
Carlo simulations suggest that it is not possible to derive an unambiguous 
prediction.46
To conduct the Monte Carlo simulations, 1,000 geometric random 
walks were simulated for a given variance of the innovation to the random 
walk. For each of these 1,000 random walks, the waiting time until either 
(1) hitting the optimal threshold, or (2) hitting the lower threshold and then 
remaining below it for 12 months, was recorded. These waiting times were 
then averaged. The entire process was then repeated for a higher variance.
Figures A1 and A2 present the Monte Carlo results. They suggest 
that if the drift rate is small enough, and if the process starts above but 
sufficiently close to the lower threshold, the average waiting time until the 
end of an episode is lower the higher the variance of the change in log 
inflation (see the bottom series of Figure Al). But if the drift rate is 
sufficiently positive, or if the process starts sufficiently close to the upper 
boundary, the average waiting time until the end of the episode is higher the 
higher the variance (see the second series in Figure A l). Finally, the Monte 
Carlo simulations confirm that duration is increasing in volatility in the 
absence of a lower boundary (i.e., when the lower boundary is zero). Figure 
A2 shows the percentage of the simulations hitting the optimal threshold —
46 An analytical solution involves a complicated boundary condition involving the arccos 
law. We therefore resort to Monte Carlo simulations to study the relationship.
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that is, the percentage of completed episodes corresponding to 
"stabilizations." Not surprisingly, this result is a function of the parameters 
of the model and starting position of inflation relative to the two boundaries.
Figure Al: Average waiting time vs. standard deviation
............ Lower boundary=0 Lower boundary= 1.95
Lower boundary= 1.95, no drift
35 T0
1 30 -- 
5  25 --
•i£<D
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Standard deviation of change in log inflation
Note: The figure illustrates simulations assuming p= .l, a starting value of n of 0.2, a conventional 
threshold of 2, and a drift rate of 0.075 (unless otherwise noted). For each volatility parameter, 1000 
geometric random walks were generated, and the average waiting time until either (a) hitting the 
optimal threshold or (b) hitting the lower boundary and then remaining under that boundary for 12 
periods, was observed. The optimal threshold is predicated on the fixed cost model of Chapter 1.
Figure A2: Probability of hitting upper boundary
— Lower boundary=0
— Lower boundary=1.95, no drift
Lower boundary= 1.95
0.2 - -
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Standard deviation of change in log inflation
Note: The figure shows the percentage of simulated inflationary episodes that hit the optimal
threshold before the lower boundary (and then remain under the lower boundary for 12 periods).
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A second possible approach is to filter out the episodes that do not 
correspond to policy-induced stabilizations by applying various tests. For 
example, if the drop in inflation between the final month of the episode and 
the first month following the episode is sufficiently large, then it may seem 
more likely that a stabilization occurred (since very large disinflationary 
shocks are unlikely to obtain serendipitously). After applying such a filter, 
we can study the relationship between the delay and the volatility of 
inflation. In practice, such adjustments do not seem to alter significantly the 
results presented in the text above. As one example, Table Al presents the 
results of the Weibull regressions at the 10 percent threshold for those cases 
in which the post-sample change in inflation exceeded (in absolute value) 
the standard deviation of the change in inflation during the episode.47 Table 
A2 reproduces Table 10, and gives the corresponding estimates from the full 
sample of episodes. Filtering the data to exclude those with small drops in 
inflation changes some of the point estimates, but none of the general 
conclusions.
The results are similar for other thresholds, estimation procedures, 
and reasonable filtering levels. Since the results do not seem to be strongly 
affected by whether or not the filtering is undertaken, it seems unlikely that 
our conclusions are strongly affected by conflating non-stabilizations with 
policy-induced stabilizations.
47 In the construction of Table A l, the mean change in inflation over the episode was not 
subtracted from the post-episode change before comparison to the standard deviation. If 
the mean change in inflation is subtracted, so that the metric of a large fall is the same as 
in Section I of the paper, the results are nevertheless broadly similar. Relative to the full 
sample, the restricted sample point estimates change (with some that were previously 
statistically significant becoming statistically insignificant), but the general conclusions 
are unaffected. The most important coefficient changes involve the standard deviation of 
the change in inflation, but even these changes are not substantial enough to affect the 
conclusions. For example, in the Weibull regressions at the 10 percent threshold, the 
coefficient on the standard deviation of the change in inflation moves from a statistically 
insignificant value of -2.77 for the full sample to a statistically insignificant value of 38.66 
for the sample restricted using the mean-corrected metric. The other changes tend to be 
less dramatic. Essentially, regardless of the filter applied, the limited number of "non­
stabilizations" do not seem to be driving the results obtained in the main section of the 
text.
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Table Al: Weibull regressions for 10 percent threshold episodes with 
post-sample fall in inflation greater (in absolute value) than the std. 
dev, of change in inflation_____________________________________
Regressand: duration of episode
SD (inflation) -16.2
(-1.59)
SD (change in inflation) -10.02
(-1.50)
SD (change in log inflation) 0.61
(1.39)
SD (percentage change in inflation) -0.21
(-1.44)
Mean change in inflation 298.60
(6.26)
277.90
(5.90)
Mean change in log inflation -16.60
(-5.28)
N 17 16 16 18
2
X -test (p-value) 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
2
Pseudo R 0.09 0.41 0.40
0.34
s 0.78 0.48 0.48 0.55
Table A2 (Table 10): Weibull regressions for 10 percent threshold
Regressand: duration of episode
SD (inflation) -7.42
(-2.02)
SD (change in inflation) -2.95
(-1.05)
SD (change in log inflation) 0.89
(1.06)
SD (percentage change in inflation) 0.02
(.50)
Mean change in inflation 234.51
(7.12)
189.22
(5.37)
Mean change in log inflation -12.39
(-6.08)
N 41 40 31 17
2
X -test (p-value) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
2
Pseudo R 0.04 0.30 0.24 0.34
s 0.90 0.65 0.07 0.58
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Appendix III. Analysis of 6-month intervals within episodes
As noted in Section V, the analysis in the main text is predicated on a 
time-invariant volatility parameter over an episode. One method of testing 
whether this assumption obtains is to split each episode into intervals, 
calculate the volatility parameter for each interval, and then test whether 
there is a statistically significant difference among them. This appendix 
therefore takes each episode, splits it into 6-month intervals, and conducts a 
variety of tests on these intervals.
We focus our attention on the first two volatility parameters: the 
standard deviation of inflation and the standard deviation of the change in 
inflation. One intuitively appealing test of whether these variables are 
constant is to conduct a regression, for each episode, of volatility during 
interval t on t itself. In other words, for each episode i we regress:
(Jt =  C +  f i t  +  £ t
where Gt is the volatility parameter estimated over interval t, c is a constant, 
t is the interval number, (3 is a coefficient to be estimated, and £t is the error 
term for interval t. If our estimate of (3 is statistically insignificant, we 
conclude that there is no obvious linear relationship between the volatility 
parameter and time (measured in 6-month intervals.) The results presented 
in Table A3 suggest that the volatility parameters exhibit no statistically 
significant duration dependence.
Table A3: OLS regressions by episode of Gt on a constant and t
Threshold Number of 
episodes tested
Std(inflation) as 
dependent variable: 
episodes for which time 
coefficient is statistically 
significant
Std(change in inflation) 
as dependent variable: 
episodes for which time 
coefficient is 
statistically significant
10 percent 22 1 1
20 percent 9 0 0
30 percent 3 0 0
40 percent 2 0 0
Although the results of Table A3 imply the absence of a time trend, 
they do not necessarily indicate that volatility is constant because the
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volatility parameters could be varying from interval to interval without 
trending over time. Other tests are therefore necessary. One more rigorous 
method for testing the equality of the volatility parameters is to assume that 
inflation is normally distributed.48 It is then possible to use Hartley’s test for 
the equality of k variances. For each episode, let L be the largest value of 
the volatility parameter across the intervals, and S be the smallest value of 
the volatility parameter. Kanji (1993) gives critical values of L2/S2 for the 
null of equal variances,49 so the test is particularly easy to implement.
In about half the episodes, Hartley’s test rejects the joint null that the 
volatility parameter is a constant and that the underlying distribution is 
normal (see Table A4). But it is not clear whether rejection obtains so 
frequently because of non-constancy of the volatility parameter, because of 
non-normality of the distribution, or both.
Table A4: Hartley’s test for constant volatility within episodes
Threshold Number of episodes 
tested
Rejections of joint null 
of normality and 
constant std (inflation)
Rejections of joint 
null of normality 
and constant std 
(change in 
inflation)
10 percent 22 13 14
20 percent 9 5 6
30 percent 3 2 3
40 percent 1 0 1
In order to test for normality of the distribution (of either inflation or 
the change in inflation) within an episode, we apply a skewness-kurtosis 
test.50 Normality is rejected for about half the episodes at each threshold, 
and normality is rejected for the vast majority of the episodes for which 
Hartley’s test also rejects its null (see Table A5).
48 If inflation is normally distributed at duration t and duration t-1, then the change in 
inflation is also normally distributed (since a linear combination of normals is normal).
49 See G. K. Kanji, 100 Statistical Tests (Sage: London, 1993), pages 64 and 181-2.
50 The skewness-kurtosis test is described in R.B. D’Agostino, A. Balanger, and R.B. 
D’Agostino, Jr., "A suggestion for using powerful and informative tests of normality," The 
American Statistician, Vol. 44, No. 4, 1990, 316-321.
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Table AS: 1Normality tests for rejectee episodes
Threshold
10 percent 
20 percent 
30 percent 
40 percent
Number of Of these, 
rejections of number for 
joint null under which 
Hartley’s test for normality is 
std (inflation) rejected
13 9
5 3
2 2
0 0
Number of Of these, 
rej ections of j oint number for 
null under Hartley’s which 
test for std (change normality is 
in inflation) rejected
14 10
6 4
3 3
1 1
Tables A4 and A5 together suggest the need for a statistical test of 
the equality of k different variances that does not assume normality of the 
underlying distribution. Unfortunately, such tests suffer from particularly 
low power.51 We are thus unsure whether the constant volatility assumption 
is valid.
As an alternative way of proceeding, we adopt a different estimation 
technique, a fixed effects logit model on the six-month intervals, that does 
not rely on constancy of the volatility parameters.
Assuming that the volatility parameter is not constant over an 
episode, we can examine how the probability of stabilizing within a given 6- 
month interval varies with the volatility for that interval. If volatility were 
time-varying, the IRRINV model would predict that higher volatility ceteris 
paribus would reduce the probability of observing a stabilization during that 
interval. But if true volatility were constant, we would not expect any such 
relationship, since any observed changes in the volatility parameter would 
represent noise, to which an optimally behaving government would not 
respond.
In order to examine the relationship between the probability of 
stabilization and volatility within a 6-month interval, we would like to apply 
a discrete-response regression model to our panel of episodes. 
Unfortunately, if there are episode-specific effects, ordinary probit or logit 
regressions would produce inconsistent estimators (with consistency
51 One non-parametric test for the equality of k variances is described in W.J. Conover, 
Practical Nonparametric Statistics (John Wiley: New York, 1980), pages 239-248.
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evaluated as the number of episodes goes to infinity).52 Even worse, the 
standard fixed-effects approach of removing the episode-specific effect by 
taking differences from the episode average is inapplicable because of the 
non-linearity of the discrete-response model.
Despite these problems, it is possible to estimate a fixed-effects logit 
model.53 The approach, as proposed by Chamberlain (1980),54 is based on 
maximizing a conditional likelihood function rather than the unconditional 
likelihood function. To fix ideas, let yit=l if episode i ends in interval t, 
and yit=0 otherwise. Then assume that the probability of episode i ending in 
interval t is given by:
e Ci+p'Xi
^ ,  = l) = T— —1 + e '
The intuition behind the approach is clearest for t=2.55 In that case, 
the unconditional likelihood function is:
L=nm=yn,rl2 = y*)
F= 1
This likelihood function includes the individual-specific effects (ci), and 
therefore using it to estimate the p parameters of interest would yield 
inconsistent estimators. Instead, Chamberlain suggests maximizing the 
conditional likelihood function:
=i[r(vn=y^Yn=yaka + ya)
i=1
52 This difficulty arises because of the "incidental-parameter" problem: there is an 
additional individual-specific parameter to be estimated for each additional episode, so 
that expanding the number of episodes does not increase the degrees of freedom with 
which die parameters are estimated. For a proof of the inconsistency of a logit model in 
the presence of individual-specific effects, see C. Hsiao, Analysis o f Panel Data 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1986), pages 159-161.
53 The probit model is not amenable to a fixed effects approach. See the discussion in W. 
Greene, Econometric Analysis, op. cit., page 655, or B. Baltagi, Econometric Analysis of 
Panel Data (John Wiley: New York, 1995), pages 178-182.
54 G. Chamberlain, "Panel Data," in Z. Griliches and M. Inirilligator, Handbook of 
Econometrics, Volume II (Elsevier Science Publishers: Amsterdam, 1984), pages 1247- 
1318.
55 The discussion follows W. Greene, Econometric Analysis, op. cit., page 656.
76
Note that the probability of yii=yi2=0, given that their sum is zero, is 1. The 
probability that yii=yi2=l, given that their sum is 2, is also 1. Taking the
log of the conditional likelihood function, these two terms drop out (since 
ln(l)=0). We are therefore left with a term for the probability that yn=0 and 
yi2= l, given that their sum is 1, and another term for the probability that 
yil=l and yi2=0, again given that their sum is 1. The former probability is:
rw .. ^ P(y» = 0 , y n =1)
p (yn = o ,y i2 = i|y„ + yn =!) = ~ T 7 ~
1 + ^2  =  !)
1
J ’x , :________ 1 -i- ] i _|_ fici+P xn____________________ e 12
1 e c,+0’Xil eC:+P’x" 1 "  epx" + e pK’‘+
1 + 1 + ec‘* ^ 2 1 + ec,*frx" 1 + eq+/,Xn
which is independent of the individual-specific effect. The probability of 
yil=l and yi2=0, given a sum of 1, is also independent of the individual- 
specific effect: it is just 1 minus the probability given above. Thus the 
conditional log-likelihood function is independent of the individual-specific 
effects, and consistent estimators of (3 can be obtained by maximizing the 
conditional log-likelihood.
For general t, the conditional log-likelihood is given by:56
fexp(/?'£jc„y,,)|
In Lc = V l n ^  l-  f
i 1 2 exp(^ *i<^ ) I
where
Bi = \ d =  (4 ,...,</t) = 0 or 1 and X 4  =
This function is in the form of McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit 
model, and can be estimated by standard econometric packages.57 The
56 See G. Chamberlain, "Panel Data," op. cit., page 1276.
57 D. McFadden, "Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualititative Choice Behavior," in P. 
Zarembka, Frontiers in Econometrics (Academic Press: New York, 1974). A procedure 
for estimating such models is included in the STATA econometric package.
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results of running such conditional logit regressions on the volatility 
parameters and the drift rates are nugatory (see Table A6 for the 10 percent 
threshold; other thresholds are similar). Ordinary logit regressions also 
indicate no relationship between the probability of stabilizing and any of the 
variables of interest, which obviates the need to test for the appropriateness 
of the fixed effects approach, since the conclusion is invariant to the results 
of such a test. 58
Table A6: Conditional and ordinary logit regressions, 10 percent 
threshold
Probability of stabilization in
interval t
Conditional loeit
Std dev of inflation 2.88 2.71
(.97) (0.63)
Std dev of change in inflation 2.26
(1.05)
Mean inflation 0.26
(0.06)
Mean change in inflation -2.69
(-0.32)
N 187 186 186
X2 (p-value) 0.35 0.64 0.50
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.02
Ordinarv loeit
Std dev of inflation -0.48 1.77
(-0.21) (0.70)
Std dev of change in inflation 0.49
(0.75)
Mean inflation -3.91 -4.09
(-1.61) (0.53)
Mean change in inflation
N 187 186 186
X2 (p-value) 0.83 0.24 0.75
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.02 0.00
This appendix suggests several conclusions. First, there is no 
statistically significant time trend in volatility during high inflation episodes. 
Second, a joint test of normality and constant volatility rejects that null 
hypothesis in about half the cases, but normality itself is rejected for the vast 
majority of these cases. Logit analysis fails to indicate any relationship 
between the variables of interest and the probability of stabilizing in any 
given interval. It is difficult, however, to know what to conclude from this
58 In principle, a Hausman test could be used for such a purpose.
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finding. If volatility is indeed time-varying, the logit analysis would 
contradict the IRRINV model. But if volatility is constant over an episode, 
the results are consistent with the IRRINV model. The absence of a 
significant time trend in volatility is at least suggestive that the latter view 
may be the correct one.
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Chapter 3: Privatization of the U.S. Enrichment Corporation: 
An Economic Analysis1
I. Introduction
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 created the United States Enrichment 
Corporation (USEC), a government-owned corporation that inherited the 
Department of Energy’s role in enriching uranium for use in nuclear power 
reactors. With annual revenues of approximately $1.5 billion per year, 
USEC would — if privately owned — easily qualify for the Fortune 500.2 
And it may soon make it onto the Fortune 500 list: the USEC Privatization 
Act of 1996 directed that, following approval from the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the firm should be privatized.3 The proposed privatization of 
USEC is significant not only because it would be the largest privatization in 
the United States since the sale of the Conrail railroad in 1987, but also 
because it highlights fundamental questions about the conditions under 
which privatization is socially beneficial.4
Arguments over the costs and benefits of privatization have a long 
and venerable history. In The Wealth o f Nations, Adam Smith argued that 
selling the crown lands would improve their management:
lrThe author thanks Thomas Neff, Mark Shankerman, and staff members at the Uranium 
Institute for helpful conversations; and Diane Whitmore, for her first-rate fact-finding 
skills. The author — who previously served on the staff of the Council of Economic 
Advisers — participated in U.S. government deliberations on the privatization of USEC, 
and has therefore taken great care to avoid divulging classified or proprietary information. 
The views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of the Council of Economic 
Advisers.
2 Based on fiscal year 1994 revenue, USEC would rank 286th on the Fortune 500. See 
opening statement of Senator Frank Murkowski, Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, U.S. Senate, 104th Congress, 1st Session, “Hearing on S. 755, A Bill to 
Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to Provide for the Privatization of the United 
States Enrichment Corporation,” June 13,1995, page 1.
3 Section 3101 of the USEC Privatization Act states that USEC’s Board, “with the 
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall transfer the interests of the United States 
in the United States Enrichment Corporation to the private sector in a manner that 
provides for the long-term viability of the Corporation, provides for the continuation by 
the Corporation of the operation of the Department of Energy’s gaseous diffusion plants, 
provides for the protection of the public interest in maintaining a reliable and economical 
domestic source of uranium mining, enrichment, and conversion services, and, to the 
extent not inconsistent with such purposes, secures the maximum proceeds to the United 
States.”
4 For our purposes, privatization refers to the sale of the majority of equity in a public- 
sector asset or enterprise. A discussion of the various definitions of “privatization,” and a 
history of the word, can be found in R. Hemming and A. Mansoor, “Privatization and 
Public Enterprises,” International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper No. 56, January 1988.
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The crown lands of Great Britain do not at present afford the 
fourth part of the rent which could probably be drawn from 
them if they were the property of private persons...When the 
crown lands had become private property, they would, in the 
course of a few years, become well improved and well 
cultivated.5
This traditional perspective — that privatization improves internal 
efficiency by bolstering incentives — remains popular.6 The Economist, for 
example, recently argued that the “real benefits of privatization...flow from 
letting managers do their job properly...better managers, encouraged by 
competition and held accountable for their successes and failures, will create 
lasting increases in productivity, year after year.”7 Policy-makers across the 
globe seem to be convinced by these arguments, as demonstrated by the 
increasing frequency of privatization over the past two decades.8
Some economists, however, view privatization somewhat more 
critically. They argue that privatization can reduce allocative efficiency, 
that the separation of ownership and control exists in private firms as well as 
public ones, and that corporatization is more important than privatization per 
se in boosting internal efficiency. As one example of the potential problems 
with privatization, Vickers and Yarrow (1995) note that:
...profit-maximizing monopolists may engage in a variety of 
business practices that run counter to the public interest, and, 
while it may be feasible to limit such behavior via the 
provisions of competition or regulatory policies, the 
complexities of this type of exercise in conditions of
5 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations, Volume II 
(J.M. Dent & Sons: London, 1924 edition), pages 304-306.
6 For arguments emphasizing the efficiency benefits of privatization, see, for example, M. 
Boycko, A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny, “A Theory of Privatization, ” Economic Journal, 
Vol. 106, March 1996, 309-319; World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics 
and Politics of Government Ownership (IBRD: Washington, 1995); and World Bank, 
Privatization: The Lessons of Experience (IBRD: Washington, 1992).
7 “A Case of the DTs: Privatization in Europe will fail to live up to its promise unless it is 
done right,” The Economist, November 23,1996, pages 19-20.
8 According to the World Bank, there were 2,655 privatizations globally between 1988 
and 1993, relative to 696 between 1980 and 1987 (despite the greater number of years in 
the earlier period). And evidence suggests that the average size of the firms being 
privatized was larger in the later period. See World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business, op. 
cit., Summary, pages 5 and 6. The scale of privatization efforts, even outside the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, is momentous. The Economist suggests that $250 billion 
worth of government assets may be sold within the next few years in Europe. See 
“Privatisation in Europe: Is the price right?” The Economist, November 23, 1996, page 
125.
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asymmetric information may render public ownership the 
preferred framework in which to tackle the problem.9
Similarly, Fudenberg and Tirole (1994) argue that “a benefit from public 
ownership is that the government can impose socially desirable 
arrangements to the firm in unforeseen contingencies, while it must bargain 
with a private firm.”10 Given imperfect regulatory contracts and private 
information, there may thus be a tradeoff between internal (productive) 
efficiency and other objectives.11 While the default policy prescription may 
be to favor privatization because of its internal efficiency benefits, in 
particular cases other factors may dominate.
The proposed privatization of USEC dramatically illustrates the 
potential benefits and costs of privatization. By almost all accounts, the 
Department of Energy and its predecessors were inefficient producers of 
enrichment services. While corporatization seems to have improved 
efficiency, there are likely to be further gains from privatization. For 
example, the Federal government is legally prohibited from developing a 
new, more efficient enrichment technology, at least partly because of 
opposition from a politically effective public union. It is therefore likely 
that a private firm would operate with more internal efficiency.12
On the other hand, USEC is a domestic monopoly — with 
approximately 90 percent of the domestic market and 40 percent of the 
world market — so that privatization may reduce allocative efficiency. And 
more important, a privatized USEC may endanger a crucial non­
9 J. Vickers and G. Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis (MIT Press: Cambridge, 
MA, 1995), page 28.
10 J. Laffont and J. Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (MIT 
Press: Cambridge, MA, 1994), page 644.
11 For empirical studies of the effects of privatization, see L. Clements, “Privatization 
American Style: The ‘Grand Illusion”’ in T. Clarke, International Privatisation: Strategies 
and Practices (Walter de Gruyter: Berlin, 1994), pages 95-96; J.A. Kay and D.J. 
Thompson, “Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a Rationale,” Economic Journal, Volume 
96, March 1986, 18-32, pages 22-25; J. Vickers and G. Yarrow, Privatization: An 
Economic Analysis, op. cit., page 3 and Chapters 3-4; and S. Domberger and J. Piggot, 
“Privatization Policies and Public Enterprise: A Survey,” in M. Bishop, J. Kay, and C. 
Mayer, Privatization and Economic Performance (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
1994), pages 32-61.
12 For a discussion of the conditions under which privatization rather than corporatization 
induces restructuring despite political pressures for over-employment, see A. Shleifer and 
R. Vishny, “Politicians and firms,” Quarterly Journal o f Economics, November 1994, 
995-1025.
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proliferation program of the U.S. government: the highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) deal with Russia, under which 500 metric tons of Russian weapons- 
grade uranium is blended into reactor fuel and sold to U.S. utilities. USEC 
serves as the U.S. government’s executive agent with the Russians, but has 
not signed contracts for the entire 500 metric tons. Privatization could 
endanger the deal because USEC’s marginal cost of producing enrichment is 
significantly lower than the cost of the Russian material, so that the more it 
imports, the higher its costs. Privatization — which imposes a profit- 
maximizing objective function on the firm — therefore creates a potentially 
momentous divergence in incentives between the principal (the U.S. 
government) and agent (USEC) in the HEU deal.
This chapter is organized as follows. The second section reviews the 
institutional details of the uranium enrichment market. The third presents 
the divestiture framework developed by Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang 
(1990); the fourth uses that framework to analyze the proposed privatization 
of USEC. The fifth extends the framework to incorporate the irreversibility 
of the privatization and uncertainty over its net benefits. The sixth further 
extends the analysis to reflect private information by modeling the 
implications of privatization for the HEU deal within a dynamic game of 
asymmetric information.
II. The enrichment industry
Before evaluating the merits of privatization, it is important to 
understand the institutional details of the uranium enrichment industry and 
the role USEC plays in it. This section explores the enrichment production 
technology, the market structure, and the significance of the HEU 
agreement.
The enrichment technology
Nuclear power reactors account for approximately 20 percent of the 
electricity generated in the OECD as a whole, as well as in the United States 
by itself.13 The vast majority of these reactors are of the so-called “light
13 OECD, Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Power Economics and Technology: An 
Overview (OECD: Paris, 1992), Table 1, page 14; and Bureau of the Census, Statistical
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water” variety, which must use enriched uranium rather than natural 
uranium as fuel.14 Uranium enrichment is thus a critical part of the nuclear 
energy market.
Light water reactors must use enriched uranium because they cannot 
sustain an ongoing nuclear reaction with natural uranium. The reason is 
slightly technical: light water reactors rely on ordinary (or “light”) water as 
the moderator in the fission process. The moderator slows emitted neutrons 
to raise the probability that they interact with a fissionable atom before 
escaping from the reactor core, thereby ensuring a sustained chain reaction. 
But a light water moderator does not slow the neutrons sufficiently to 
sustain a chain reaction with natural uranium, which contains only 0.7 
percent of the fissionable U-235 isotope.15 To generate electricity, light 
water reactors must therefore use “low enriched uranium” (LEU) fuel, 
which has been enriched to between 3 and 5 percent U-235. USEC’s 
business — uranium enrichment — transforms natural uranium into LEU by 
increasing the concentration of U-235. The LEU is then fabricated into fuel 
for use in nuclear utilities.
The typical nuclear fuel cycle for these light water reactors is 
depicted in Figure 1. After mining, uranium is separated from other minerals 
through chemical extraction and recovered as a solid concentrate (U3O8) 
known as “yellowcake” or natural uranium. This yellowcake contains 0.711 
percent of fissionable U-235, 0.006 percent of the non-fissionable isotope U- 
234, and 99.283 percent of the non-fissionable isotope U-238.16 The 
yellowcake is converted into uranium hexaflouride (UFg) prior to the
Abstract of the United States 1995 (Government Printing Office: Washington, 1995), 
Table 962, page 601.
14 The database maintained by the Uranium Institute in London indicates that light water 
reactors account for 87 percent of current nuclear generating capacity.
15 The Canadian CANDU reactor uses “heavy water” (D2 O) as a moderator. Because 
D2 O is more effective than light water in slowing the emitted neutrons, heavy water 
reactors can use natural uranium as fuel (since the neutrons are slowed sufficiently to 
sustain a chain reaction despite the relatively low percentage of fissionable atoms in 
natural uranium). “Fast” reactors use fuel with such a high percentage of fissionable 
atoms that they do not require any moderator at all. For a discussion of the relationship 
between moderator and fuel, see A. D. Owen, The Economics o f Uranium (Praeger: New 
York, 1985), pages 16-26; AJ. Hyett, “The Structure and Economics of the Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Service Industry,” in L. Brookes and H. Motamen, eds., The Economics o f Nuclear 
Energy (Chapman and Hall: London, 1984); and OECD, Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear 
Power Economics and Technology, op. cit., Chapter 3.
16 A. D. Owen, The Economics of Uranium, op. cit., page 15.
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Figure 1: The nuclear fuel cycle for a light water reactor
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Source: Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Power Economics and Technology: An 
Overview (OECD: Paris, 1992), page 30.
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enrichment process, which is described below. After enrichment, the LEU 
is converted into uranium dioxide (UO2), which is then formed into ceramic
pellets and stacked in thin, sealed metal tubes. Finally, these tubes are 
bundled together into fuel assemblies and shipped to a reactor.
There are currently two principal commercial technologies for 
enriching uranium.17 The first, gaseous diffusion, filters the UFg through a 
semiporous membrane. Since U-235 is lighter than U-238, a higher fraction 
of U-235 isotopes diffuse through the barrier — leaving a slightly enriched 
product on the far side and a slightly depleted product behind the barrier. 
The process is then repeated more than a thousand times in order to obtain 
LEU with 3 percent concentration of U-235.18 The second commercial 
technology, gas centrifuge, injects the UF6 into a spinning centrifuge,
causing the heavier U-238 isotopes to concentrate on the outer edge of the 
centrifuge and the lighter U-235 isotopes to concentrate closer to the center. 
This process is then repeated approximately 10 times until the gas stream 
near the center is sufficiently enriched.19 The final product of both 
enrichment technologies is LEU and a uranium residue, called the “tails,” 
which has a relatively low concentration of U-235. The concentration of U- 
235 in the tails is called the “tails assay.”
17 There are other enrichment technologies, but they are not in widespread commercial 
use. The other technologies include one developed by South Africa that relies on the 
different aerodynamic paths followed by gaseous uranium isotopes as they flow around a 
curved nozzle, and a calutron technology developed by the United States. See O. R. Cote, 
Jr., “A Primer on Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapon Design,” in G. T. Allison, O. R. 
Cote, R. A. Falkenrath, and S. E. Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the 
Threat o f Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (MIT Press: Cambridge, 
MA, 1996), pages 214-15. The advanced vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) 
technology, described in the text below, has not yet reached commercial stages.
18 Each stage raises the U-235 share by a factor of only 1.00429. See A. D. Owen, The 
Economics of Uranium, op. cit., page 28.
19 Each stage of the centrifuge process boosts the U-235 share by a factor of 1.1 to 1.4, so 
that substantially fewer stages are required than in the gaseous diffusion process. But the 
flow capacity of a single centrifuge is much lower than a gaseous diffusion plant: the 
optimal scale of a gaseous diffusion plant (9 million SWU) may be 3 to 5 times higher 
than the optimal scale of a centrifuge plant (2 to 3 million SWU). See A.J. Hyett, “The 
Structure and Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Service Industry,” op. cit., page 170. 
The centrifuge technology uses less than 5 percent of the energy required in the gaseous 
diffusion process. See also statement of W. Howard Arnold, “Hearing on S. 755, A Bill to 
Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to Provide for the Privatization of the United 
States Enrichment Corporation,” op. cit., page 64.
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Enrichment services are measured in Separative Work Units (SWU), 
a metric of the effort required to separate U-235 from U-238.20 There is a 
tradeoff between the tails assay and SWU: The higher the tails assay, the 
fewer SWUs are needed to produce a given quantity of LEU at a given U- 
235 concentration level.21 To some extent, natural uranium and SWU are 
therefore substitutes in the production process — and the optimal mix 
depends on the relative price of natural uranium and SWU.22
It is worth emphasizing that enrichment technology represents a 
significant nuclear non-proliferation risk, since it can be used to produce 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. Indeed, the process 
of enriching uranium into weapons-grade HEU, which usually has a U-235 
concentration of about 90 percent, is identical to the enrichment process for 
LEU; the only difference is the degree of enrichment involved.23 And 
obtaining HEU (or fissionable plutonium) is the key to building a nuclear 
weapon. As one scholar has written, “because only a few countries have
20 Technically, the unit is “kilogram separative work unit,” a metric of the separative work 
done when the natural uranium input and LEU output are expressed in kilograms. The 
unit was devised by Dirac during World War II. For a discussion of the term, see R. F. 
Mozley, “Uranium Enrichment and Other Technical Problems Relating to Nuclear 
Weapons Proliferation,” Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford 
University, July 1994.
21 This tradeoff obtains because the more natural uranium used as an input, the less 
separation work required, and thus the higher the tails assay. For example, 6.6 kg of 
natural uranium combined with 3.4 SWU would produce 1 kg of LEU (enriched to 3 
percent) and 5.6 kg of tails with a tails assay of 0.3 percent. But 5.5 kg of natural uranium 
combined with 4.3 SWU would produce the same amount of LEU, with 4.5 kg of tails and 
a tails assay of 0.2 percent. See A. D. Owen, The Economics o f Uranium, op. cit., page 
183.
22 For given characteristics of LEU, the tails assay implicitly defines the amount of natural 
uranium and SWU used in the enrichment process. The cost-minimizing tails assay, given 
uranium and enrichment prices, is defined implicitly by 
—^— = 4.87 +. 986 in ( — ) - ( 00711. .- ./.x 2 *-1 > where Pu is the price of natural uranium per
pswu ‘( ' - o
kilogram, Psw u is the cost of enrichment services (per SWU), and t is the optimal tails 
assay. For a derivation of the general formula for the optimal tails assay, see T. L. Neff, 
The International Uranium Market (Ballinger Publishing Company: Cambridge, MA, 
1984), Appendix B.
23 The original gaseous diffusion plant, the K-25 facility at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, was 
constructed as part of the Manhattan Project in World War II. It contributed some of the 
enrichment to the uranium bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Interestingly, however, the first 
known separation of uranium isotopes was achieved using the centrifuge process. For a 
discussion of the K-25 plant, see A. S. Krass, P. Boskma, B. Elzen, and W. A. Smit, 
Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation (Taylor & Francis Ltd: London, 
1983), pages 13-16. About 3000 stages of the gaseous diffusion process are required to 
produce 90 percent enrichment, relative to about 1200 stages for 4 percent enrichment. 
See R. F. Mozley, “Uranium Enrichment and Other Technical Problems Relating to 
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, ” op. cit., page 30.
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perfected* the technology to enrich uranium to bomb-grade levels, obtaining 
the material has been far more difficult than building non-nuclear 
components for fabricating an explosive device.”24
The structure o f the enrichment market
Given the sensitive nature of the technology, and the long lead times 
involved in the nuclear power industry, it may not be surprising that the 
enrichment market is not perfectly competitive. It has substantial excess 
capacity: global demand amounts to approximately 35 million SWU per 
year, while capacity is roughly 50 million SWU per year.25 Market demand 
is relatively inelastic.26 And since fuel interruptions are extremely costly, 
long-term contracts are the norm: only about 10 percent of the projected 
demand for SWU between 1996 and 2000 is not already under contract.27 
These long-term contracts are generally of a “tolling” nature. Figure 2 
illustrates a transaction under the type of contract dominant in the
24 G. MacLean, “Trade for Security: The Interplay of Domestic Economic and 
International Security Issues in the HEU Agreement,” speech at the Nuclear Energy 
Institute conference “Fuel Cycle ‘95,” San Diego, California, April 4,1995, page 11.
25 “The New Birth of Urenco,” NUKEM Market Report, June 1994, page 7-9; statement of 
James Phillips, “Hearing on S. 755, A Bill to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to 
Provide for the Privatization of the United States Enrichment Corporation,” op. cit., page 
58; and United States Enrichment Corporation, USEC Annual Report 1994 , page 7.
26 Demand is inelastic because of the high cost of interruptions and because the share of 
enrichment in overall utility costs is relatively low. One of Marshall’s laws of derived 
demand, as amended by Hicks, states that the derived demand for an input is less elastic 
the lower the share of the input, provided that the elasticity of substitution is less than the 
price elasticity of demand for output. The elasticity of substitution between LEU and 
other factors of nuclear power production is zero: LEU is a physical requirement for a 
given level of output. The elasticity of demand for nuclear power output, furthermore, 
may be relatively high. Roughly one-tenth the cost of nuclear power is accounted for by 
enrichment services. “Uranium Enrichment,” Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper 33, January 
1996, http://www.uic.com, page 2. Yarrow reports that total fuel costs account for only 30 
percent of nuclear power costs. See “The price of nuclear power,” Economic Policy 6 
(April 1988), pages 111-112.
27 For the cost of fuel interruptions, see M. Morman, An Empirical Analysis of Uranium 
Spot Prices (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia State University, May 1988), page 37; and 
OECD, Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Power Economics and Technology: An 
Overview, op. cit., Chapter 6. For the prevalence of long-term contracts, see J. A. Paleit, 
“The World Enrichment Industry Since 1987, and the Outlook to 2005,” The Uranium 
Institute, Twenty-First Annual Symposium, 1996, page 4. In September 1996, 
uncontracted demand was projected to be just over 1 million SWU for 1997 and 1998. 
“Whither the Spot Enrichment Market?” The Ux Weekly, Volume 10, Issue 39, September 
23, 1996, page 1. Long-term contracts have dominated the market since the U.S. policy 
change in 1973 described below. Neff reported that in the early 1980s, 70 percent of 
enrichment contracts held by non-U.S. utilities could not be adjusted within 5 years. T. L. 
Neff, The International Uranium Market, op. cit., page 23.
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enrichment industry.28 The first step is for a utility to deliver natural 
uranium to an enricher. The enricher then increases the concentration of U- 
235 to the desired level, and returns the LEU to the utility, charging for the 
SWU required to transform the natural uranium into the LEU. At current 
market prices of about $100 per SWU, approximately two-thirds of the cost 
of LEU is the embodied enrichment; the other third is the cost of the natural 
uranium and conversion.29
Figure 2: Operation of the enrichment market
Delivery of 
128 metric 
tons of 
natural 
uranium as 
UF6
Enricher: 100,000 
SWUUtility
Delivery of
23 tons of 
LEU at 3 
percent 
U-235
Disposal
and
storage
105 '
metric tons
percent
U-235
28 The contract is for 100,000 SWU — roughly the requirements of a light-water reactor 
for one year. A 1300 MWe light water reactor requires roughly 130,000 SWU for one 
year of operation. United States Enrichment Corporation, Serving the World, 1995.
29 At a tails assay of 0.2 percent, 5.5 kgU of UF6 is combined with 4.3 SWU to produce 1 
kg of LEU enriched to 3 percent. The market price of UF6 is approximately $45 per kgU; 
the market price of enrichment is approximately $100 per SWU. Thus, the total cost of 
producing LEU is approximately $675 per KG, of which $430 for 64 percent) is the cost 
of enrichment.
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In addition to being dominated by long-term contracts, the 
enrichment market is also an oligopoly almost entirely served by four 
enterprises: USEC; Eurodif, a French-led consortium; Urenco, a UK- 
German-Dutch consortium; and MIN ATOM, the Russian Ministry of 
Atomic Energy. Table 1 lists their respective enrichment capacities.
Table 1: Global enrichment capacity
Capacity (million SWU per year)
USEC (U.S.) 19.3
Eurodif (France) 10.8
Urenco (U.K., Germany, the 
Netherlands)
3.5
MINATOM (Russia)30 10-20
Others31 1.1
Total 44.7 - 54.7
Source: Uranium Institute, The Global Nuclear Fuel Market: Supply and Demand, 1995- 
2015, Table 10.3, page 120. The Uranium Institute quotes a figure of 19.0 million SWU 
per year for MINATOM.
USEC runs two gaseous diffusion plants: one in Kentucky, and the 
other in Ohio, which collectively employ approximately 4,350 workers.32 
Its shares are currently owned solely by the U.S. Treasury. The corporation 
has enrichment contracts with 63 utilities in 14 countries, generating net 
income of $373 billion.33 It sells 14 million SWU per year, implying a
________*_l____________________
30 The precise Russian capacity figure is not known. Neff, writing in 1984, reported a 
figure of 10 million SWU per year. See T. Neff, The International Uranium Market, op. 
cit., page 21. Falkenrath quotes a figure of 20 to 25 percent of world enrichment capacity, 
which would imply about 10 to 12.5 million SWU per year. See R. Falkenrath, “The HEU 
Deal,” in G. T. Allison, O. R. Cote, R. A. Falkenrath, and S. E. Miller, Avoiding Nuclear 
Anarchy op. cit., page 278. But Oleg Bukharin suggests a figure at 20 million SWU per 
year. See O. Bukharin, “Analysis of the Size and Quality of Uranium Inventories in 
Russia,” Science and Global Security, Volume 6, 1996, page 67. And the Uranium 
Institute cites a figure of 19 million SWU per year. See Uranium Institute, The Global 
Nuclear Fuel Market: Supply and Demand, 1995-2015, Table 10.3, page 120. The 
differences may result at least partly from different treatment of the Russian enrichment 
centrifuges contaminated with plutonium, which precludes them from producing LEU that 
would meet international specifications.
31 The two prominent others are Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, which has capacity of 0.6 
million SWU, and a Chinese enterprise with 0.5 million SWU capacity.
32 The plants are operated by a subcontractor, Lockheed Martin Utility Services, Inc. See 
United States Enrichment Corporation, Annual Report 1995, page 10.
33 United States Enrichment Corporation, Annual Report 1995, pages 6 and 24.
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global market share of about 40 percent.34 Two-thirds of its sales are in the 
U.S. market, and its U.S. market share is in the range of 90 percent.35 As 
mentioned above and discussed in detail below, USEC is also the U.S. 
government’s executive agent in the HEU deal with the Russian 
government. An appendix describes the operations of the other three major 
suppliers in more detail.36
The HEU deal
The HEU deal, originally signed in February 1993, will have a 
dramatic impact on the enrichment market. The agreement is intended to 
transform 500 metric tons of Russian HEU into LEU, import it into the 
United States over a period of 20 years, and sell it to domestic utilities.37 
The LEU “enriched down” from HEU and imported into the United States is 
a direct substitute for LEU “enriched up” from natural uranium.38 The 
amounts involved in the transaction are substantial. The original deal called 
for the Russians to export LEU derived from at least 10 metric tons of HEU 
per year for five years, and then at least 30 metric tons of HEU per year for 
the next 15 years. At 4.4 percent U-235 concentration, the LEU derived 
from 30 metric tons of HEU embodies about 6 million SWU. This is about 
half of the projected annual enrichment requirements of U.S. utilities in
34 Testimony of William H. Timbers, Jr., “Hearing on S. 755, A Bill to Amend the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to Provide for the Privatization of the United States 
Enrichment Corporation,” op. cit., page 28.
35 United States Enrichment Corporation, Annual Report 1995, pages 10 and 28, and 
opening statement of Senator Frank Murkowski, “Hearing on S. 755, A Bill to Amend the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to Provide for the Privatization of the United States 
Enrichment Corporation,” op. cit., page 1.
36 The enrichment market outside the Soviet Union was monopolized by the U.S. 
government until the mid-1970s. In 1973, as a blandishment for utilities to enter into 
long-term contracts, the U.S. government promulgated the Long-Term Fixed-Commitment 
Contract, which required utilities to sign contracts eight years in advance of delivery. 
Utilities rushed to sign contracts, and by 1974 all of the U.S. government’s capacity was 
committed, which opened the door for foreign suppliers to enter the market. Perceptions 
that the U.S. government had acted peremptor ily spurred the foreigners’ entrance.
37 For a thorough description and analysis of the HEU deal until September 1995, see R. 
Falkenrath, “The HEU Deal,” op. cit.
38 To produce LEU from HEU, the HEU is “de-enriched” by blending it with uranium 
having a much lower concentration of U-235. The Russian HEU is blended with uranium 
containing 1.5 percent U-235, rather than the 0.7 percent U-235 found in yellowcake, to 
reduce the contamination of U-234 in the ultimate LEU product. For a discussion, see T. 
Neff, address before the World Nuclear Fuel Market Annual Meeting, Edinburgh, 
Scodand, May 21,1996, footnote 3, page 5.
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2000.39 According to Thomas Neff, who originally proposed it, “the HEU 
deal between the U.S. and Russia has perhaps the greatest, but also the most 
uncertain, potential to affect the supply and pricing of uranium, enrichment, 
and conversion services in this new era.”40
But the HEU deal offers much more than simply another source of 
fuel for nuclear reactors. The 500 metric tons of HEU covered by the deal is 
enough for 25,000 simple nuclear weapons.41 If fully executed, the 
agreement would transform roughly 40 percent of Russian HEU inventories 
into LEU, significantly reducing the risk of proliferation from imperfectly 
secured HEU stocks in Russia.42 It has been hailed as “second only to the 
START I and START II agreements in terms of its implications for post- 
Cold War nuclear non-proliferation and international security.”43 Neff 
(1996) notes that the “purpose of the HEU deal was to carry out an 
international security objective through commercial forces: not to disarm 
anyone, but to create economic incentives to keep surplus fissile material 
from falling into the wrong hands.”44
The deal would also provide the Russian government with billions of 
dollars in export earnings, and potentially lower the cost of electricity within 
the United States, albeit probably only very slightly.45 Furthermore, these 
benefits would accrue at no direct budgetary cost, since the Russian LEU 
would be sold to domestic utilities. As a well-known foreign policy
39 OECD, Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Energy and Its Fuel Cycle: Prospects to 
2025, op. cit., Table 12 and Table 13.3.
40 T. Neff, address before the World Nuclear Fuel Market Annual Meeting, op. cit., page 
3. Neff proposed the basic outline of the HEU deal in an October 1991 op-ed piece in the 
New York Times. For further discussion of the effects of the HEU deal on the enrichment 
market, see A. Max, “Long-Term Impacts of Weapons-Grade HEU on the Uranium, 
Conversion, and Enrichment Markets,” speech at the International Uranium Fuel Seminar, 
October 8-11,1995, Williamsburg, Virginia.
41 R. Falkenrath, “The HEU Deal,” op. cit., page 235.
42 The precise size of the extant Russian HEU stock is unknown. Bukharin estimates that 
Russia held 1,300 metric tons of HEU in 1995. See O. Bukharin, “Analysis of the Size 
and Quality of Uranium Inventories in Russia,” op. cit., page 71. In late 1993, the head of 
MINATOM suggested that Russia had up to 1,250 metric tons of HEU. See G. MacLean, 
“Trade for Security,” op. cit., footnote 2, page 2.
43 G. MacLean, “Trade for Security,” op. cit., pages 1-2.
44 T. Neff, address before the World Nuclear Fuel Market Annual Meeting, op. cit., page 
3.
45 Assume that the HEU deal produces a 10 percent fall in the price of enrichment 
services. Since nuclear power represents 20 percent of U.S. electricity generation, and 
enrichment represents less than 25 percent of the cost of nuclear power, the direct effect 
would reduce electricity prices by only 0.5 percent.
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analyst, Jessica Mathews, wrote in the Washington Post:
This was a classic swords into plowshares, win-win deal.
Russia was to get desperately needed dollars...and an 
enormous security threat was to be removed, not just from 
Russia but from the world, and turned into civilian use.
Some of the dollars would keep Russian nuclear scientists 
from going to work for bomb-seeking governments or 
terrorists. No charity was involved — this was trade, not 
aid.46
But as the Mathews’s use of the past tense intimates, there are concerns 
about the status of the HEU deal. The concerns stem from the naming of 
USEC as the U.S. government’s exclusive executive agent in the HEU deal, 
in combination with its proposed privatization. They will be discussed in 
detail below.
IQ. A perfect-information framework for analyzing privatization
Our focus now shifts to the proposed privatization of USEC. This 
section presents a modified version of the analytical framework for selling 
public enterprises developed by Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang (1990).47 
Section IV will apply the framework to USEC’s privatization.
Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang propose a fundamental formula of 
divestiture, which — after adding a term for transaction costs — is given 
by:48
AW = V „ -V „ -V .+ (A f -A,)Z (1)
where AW is the change in social welfare resulting from the privatization, 
Vsp is the social value of the enterprise under private ownership, Vsg is the 
social value under government ownership, Vss is the social value of the 
resources used to effect the sale, Xg is the shadow value of government
46 J. Mathews, “National Security Blunder,” Washington Post, May 5,1995, page A25.
47 L. P. Jones, P. Tandon, and I. Vogelsang, Selling Public Enterprises: A Cost-Benefit 
Methodology (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1990).
48 Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang subsume transactions costs under the (Xg-Ap)Z term. 
This effectively treats the transactions costs as if they were transfers rather than real 
resource costs. If the financial underwriting market is competitive, the transaction fees 
should reflect the resource costs of the transaction.
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revenue in terms of consumption-equivalents, ^p is the shadow value of 
private profits in terms of consumption-equivalents, and Z is the transaction 
price.
The shadow multipliers may require some explanation. In most 
models, we assume Xg=^p=l. But with distortionary taxation and imperfect 
capital markets, it is likely that Xg>l and Xp>l.49 Jones, Tandon, and 
Vogelsang suggest that ^g=1.3 and that ^g>X,p.50 To avoid basing the
analysis on point estimates of these potentially crucial variables, our results 
are presented for a variety of values between 1 and 2 for both ^g and A,p. 
Note that if ^g=^p, the sale price is irrelevant to the social benefit from 
privatization, whereas if A,g>A,p, social welfare is increasing in the sale price.
Vsp can be written as the present value of consumer surplus under 
private ownership, plus private after-tax profits weighted by Xp, plus tax 
payments weighted by A,g:
where p is the social discount factor, Sp(t) is consumer surplus under private 
ownership in year t, 7Cj)(t) is private pre-tax profits in year t, and X(t) is 
corporate tax payments in year t.
Similarly, Vsg can be written as:
Therefore, (1) can be written as:
49 For analyses of the debate over the use of shadow prices, see Part I of R. Layard and S. 
Glaister, eds., Cost-Benefit Analysis, Second Edition (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, England, 1994).
50 L. P. Jones, P. Tandon, and I. Vogelsang, Selling Public Enterprises, op. cit., Chapter 3. 
Laffont and Tirole concur that A,g=1.3 “is a reasonable mean estimate for the U.S. 
economy.” J. Laffont and J. Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and 
Regulation, op. cit., page 38.
Vv = <Z p ' &„«) + X„ it) -  X(f)}+ xsX (o l
1=0
(2)
(3)
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Let AS = ^ p t \Sp( t ) - S  A x  = ^ p f t y p( t ) - n g(t)]. Define the
t = 0 /= 0
private sector’s maximum willingness to pay for the enterprise as Zp, which 
is given by:
z,=|y[*,(o-x(t)] (5)
where r is the private sector’s discount factor.
Thus (4) can be written as:
AW = AS + Xgt , n -(A , - Xp){Zp -  Z + T > -  V„ (6)
where 4< = |> ' - r ' ) [ * , ( r ) - X ( j ) ] .
f=0
Equation (6) delineates the social implications of privatization. For 
example, assume Xg=Xp=l, and that no resources are required to sell the 
enterprise (Vss=0). Then (6) becomes:
AW = AS+A/r (7)
which illustrates one of the possible tradeoffs inherent in privatization. It is 
often asserted that public managers lack proper incentives for internal 
efficiency, and that enterprises are therefore more efficient under private 
management. If so, A7t>0. But if the enterprise has market power, and if a 
private firm maximizes profits while a public firm prices at marginal cost, 
then privatization (without regulation) creates allocative inefficiency — and 
AS is negative. As (7) emphasizes, the social benefit of privatization in such 
circumstances depends on whether the improvement in internal efficiency 
dominates the deterioration in allocative efficiency.
The Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang framework delineated above
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identifies many of the costs and benefits of privatization. In the next 
section, we use it to examine the proposed privatization of USEC.
IV. Analysis of USEC privatization
In June 1995, the Board of Directors of USEC concluded that the 
corporation “was ready to be privatized” and that “privatization can be 
accomplished in a manner that will serve the interests of the United States 
and its taxpayers.”51 The purpose of this section is to evaluate these claims 
by applying the general form of (6) to the proposed privatization of USEC. 
As a preview of the results, the analysis suggests that privatization is likely 
to raise USEC’s internal efficiency. But the benefit from that increase in 
internal efficiency may not be sufficient to offset the potential social welfare 
costs of privatization — particularly with respect to the HEU deal.
We will examine each term of (6) in turn. Because the AS term is 
particularly difficult to quantify, we temporarily ignore it and address it at 
the end of the section. We begin with the Arc term.
Profits (Arc)
The U.S. government has a history of seemingly poor decision­
making in managing its enrichment enterprise. For example, the 
Department of Energy continued construction of a gas centrifuge enrichment 
plant for < several years after it became clear that additional enrichment 
capacity was not needed — ultimately spending about $3 billion on the 
project, which was never completed. And it continued to operate a gaseous 
diffusion plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee until 1985, well after it had ceased 
to be economically viable.52 Marketing and finance operations were not 
particularly imaginative: the enterprise, for example, had a single type of 
contract that applied to every customer.53
51 United States Enrichment Corporation, Plan for the Privatization o f the United States 
Enrichment Corporation, submitted to the President and the Congress of the United States, 
June 1995, page ii and page 1.
52 These examples are taken from Office of Management and Budget, “History of Bad 
Business Decisions Made by the U.S. Enrichment Enterprise, ” December 15,1995.
53 S. Barr, “William Timbers’s Nuclear Test: Turn A Bureaucracy into a Profitable 
Business,” Washington Post, June 28,1993, page A17.
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Operations have improved since USEC was created in 1993. The 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 exempted USEC from many of the restrictions 
imposed on the Department of Energy, including the need to obtain annual 
appropriations from Congress and to observe various Federal procurement 
rules.54 Partly as a result of this added flexibility, the management of the 
public-sector corporation has achieved record production levels and cut unit 
production costs.55 As the president of USEC has asserted, “We’ve 
transformed a government bureaucracy into a corporate culture.”56
Privatization may produce even more efficiency improvements than 
those already effected by corporatization. A privatized USEC would have 
more flexibility in its employment and pricing policies than the government- 
owned corporation currently does, as predicted by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) for profitable firms transferred into the private sector.57 For 
example, the General Accounting Office has estimated that a private-sector 
USEC could achieve 11 percent higher revenue than a public-sector USEC 
because of the latter’s reduced operating flexibility.58
A potentially important efficiency benefit from privatization involves 
the development of a new enrichment technology, AVLIS (Atomic Vapor 
Laser Isotope Separation). The U-235 and U-238 isotopes of uranium have 
slightly different excitation energies. AVLIS exploits this difference by 
using an extremely precise laser to give a positive charge to the U-235 
atoms, but not the U-238 atoms. The positively charged U-235 ions are 
then attracted to a negatively charged plate and collected. Although AVLIS 
has not yet been tested on a commercial scale, it appears to be a promising 
technological development, with a very high separation factor and one- 
twentieth the energy requirements of the gaseous diffusion process.59 A 
USEC officer believes that AVLIS offers potential cost savings of up to 12
54 General Accounting Office, “Uranium Enrichment: Process to Privatize the U.S. 
Enrichment Corporation Needs to be Strengthened,” GAO/RCED-95-245, September 
1995, page 4.
55 See United States Enrichment Corporation, Annual Report 1995, op. cit., pages 4-5; and 
United States Enrichment Corporation, Plan for the Privatization o f the United States 
Enrichment Corporation, op. cit., pages 7-8.
56 Quoted in P. Passell, “U.S. Goals at Odds In a Plan to Sell Off Nuclear Operation,” The 
New York Times, July 25, 1995, page Al.
57 A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, “Politicians and firms,” op. cit.
58 General Accounting Office, “Uranium Enrichment,” op. cit., pages 53 and 54.
59 A. D. Owen, The Economics of Uranium, op. cit., page 29, and United States 
Enrichment Corporation, Annual Report 1995, op. cit., page 12.
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percent.60 Nonetheless, because of statutory restrictions that were 
undoubtedly the result of employment-driven political pressures, a public- 
sector USEC is prohibited from fully developing the AVLIS technology.61 
(It is interesting that legislators have prohibited a public-sector firm from 
developing a technology, but approved a privatization which will result in 
the adoption of that same technology.)
These differences in internal efficiency imply that Arc is likely to be 
positive. Unfortunately, the numerous analyses that have been conducted 
on the sign and size of Arc are not in the public domain.62 Public documents 
do permit rough present value estimates of both 7tp(t) and rcg(t), and thus of 
Arc. But before we examine estimates of these variables, we must address a 
central difficulty in any present value analysis: the social discount rate.
There is a large economics literature on the social discount rate, and 
whether it is best approximated by the return to private capital, the 
consumer’s rate of time preference, or some other rate.63 There is a related 
literature on adjusting for risk in social welfare cost-benefit analysis.64 This 
literature has failed to reach consensus on the best approach, although the 
most favored approach seems to be (1) converting all flows into 
consumption-equivalents using shadow prices; (2) adjusting the converted
60 R. Kihgdon, “Carpe Diem: Opportunity in the Future Fuel Cycle Markets,” The 
Uranium Institute, Twenty-First Annual Symposium, 1996, page 7. The 12 percent figure 
is calculated for 4.4 percent enriched product, and includes cost savings in other stages of 
the fuel cycle (according to Kingdon, AVLIS will not require conversion of U3O8 to UF6, 
for example).
61 Section 1605 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the Energy Policy Act 
of 1992, provides authority for AVLIS of only $364 million and specifically states that the 
“Corporation may not incur any obligation, or expend any amount, with respect to AVLIS 
or alternative technologies for uranium enrichment ” beyond that amount.
62 These analyses were conducted to evaluate the statutory requirement that privatization 
“result in a return to the United States at least equal to the net present value of the 
Corporation,” which is embodied in Section 1502 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992.
63 See R.C. Lind, ed., Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy (Johns Hopkins 
Press: Baltimore, 1982); Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 
18, Number 2, March 1990, Part 2; and Part I of R. Layard and S. Glaister, eds., Cost- 
Benefit Analysis, op. cit.
64 See R. Wilson, “Risk Measurement of Public Projects,” in R.C. Lind, ed., Discounting 
for Time and Risk in Energy Policy, op. cit. Current government practice on this issue 
lacks consistency — perhaps because OMB Circular A-94 does not provide clear guidance 
on how (or whether) to adjust for risk. See also the discussions in “Economic Analysis of 
Federal Regulations under Executive Order No. 12866,” Executive Office of the President, 
January 11, 1996, and R. M. Lyon, “Federal Discount Rate Policy, the Shadow Price of 
Capital, and Challenges for Reform,” Journal o f Environmental Economics and 
Management, Volume 18, Number 2, March 1990, S-29 to S-50.
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flows for uncertainty by expressing them as certainty-equivalents; and (3) 
discounting at the consumption rate of interest.65 Nevertheless, since there 
is continuing debate over the proper methodology, we present a range of 
figures for Arc using different social discount rates.
We begin with the present value of 7tp, which we calculate as the sum 
of (1) the present value of projected tax revenue (X(t)), and (2) the present 
value of projected after-tax profits (rcp(t)-X(t)). Projected tax revenue 
estimates are readily available: The General Accounting Office, using data 
derived from J.P. Morgan projections and discounting at the government’s 
borrowing rate, estimates that the present value of X(t) is $1.1 billion.66 
Estimates of after-tax profits are implicit in estimates of Zp, which is 
defined as the present value of 7tp(t)-X(t) using the private sector’s discount 
rate. J.P. Morgan estimates that Zp is between $1.5 billion and $1.8 billion.67
Whenever a relevant figure is not published for different discount 
rates, we make a rough adjustment by assuming the underlying flow is a real 
perpetuity, and then adjusting the published figure for the change in discount 
rates.68 For example, J.P. Morgan’s estimate of Zp is predicated on a 15
percent nominal discount rate; figures for other discount rates are not
published. To convert the estimate to one based on a 7 percent nominal
discount rate, we assume the underlying private-sector after-tax cash flow is
12a perpetuity in real terms and therefore multiply Zp by ^  = 3 , to reflect a
15 percent nominal private-sector rate, a 7 percent nominal social discount 
rate, and 3 percent expected inflation.69
65See, for example, R. Hartman, “One Thousand Points of Light Seeking a Number: A 
Case Study of CBO’s Search for a Discount Rate Policy,” Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, Volume 18, Number 2, March 1990, page S-3.
66 General Accounting Office, “Uranium Enrichment,” op. cit., Table 1, page 8 .
67 United States Enrichment Corporation, Plan for the Privatization o f the United States 
Enrichment Corporation, op. cit., page 18.
68 Any adjustment of this type is an extremely rough approximation, since the time profile 
of the cash flows may be incongruous with the perpetuity assumption. It would be much 
more precise to discount the projected annual after-tax cash flows at the social discount 
rate; unfortunately, the annual flows are not published.
69 The 15 percent nominal private-sector rate is roughly the midpoint of the 10.4 to 20.0 
percent range used by J.P. Morgan; see General Accounting Office, “Uranium 
Enrichment,” op. cit., page 44. J.P. Morgan identifies the range of discount rates applied, 
but not the present value estimates resulting from them. The 7 percent nominal social 
discount rate is roughly the 30-year Treasury yield.
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Table 2 presents the estimates of the present value of after-tax profits 
plus tax payments at different nominal discount rates. The figures in the 
table use the upper bound of J.P. Morgan’s estimate for Zp*, they may thus 
be an overestimate. In any case, these are extremely rough estimates; many 
of the assumptions underlying them have been criticized by U.S. 
government agencies, and the real perpetuity assumption necessary to 
generate some of the estimates is likely to be fallacious. But the estimates 
should at least reflect the orders of magnitude of the pre-tax profits likely to 
accrue under privatization.
Table 2: Present value of 7tp(t) for different social discount rates ($ billion)
Nominal social 
discount rate
7 percent 9 percent 11 percent 13 percent 15 percent
Taxes $1.10 $0.73 $0.55 $0.44 $0.37
After-tax profits $5.40 $3.60 $2.70 $2.16 $1.80
Total (pre-tax 
profits)
$6.50 $4.33 $3.25 $2.60 $2.17
Note: Publicly available estimates are used when possible. Other figures have been 
adjusted by assuming the underlying flow is a real perpetuity (assumed inflation rate is 3 
percent per year).
The General Accounting Office has also estimated the net present 
value of Jtg(t), and done so for different discount rates.70 There have been 
serious questions raised about the methodology and assumptions used to 
obtain these estimates, however,71 and a downward adjustment seems 
appropriate. To be conservative, we assume the GAO estimates are 
exaggerated by a factor of 2 in our “corrected” estimates.
Table 3: Present value of 7tg for different discount rates ($ billion
Nominal social 
discount rate
7 percent 9 percent 11 percent 13 percent 15 percent
GAO estimate $3.30 $2.90 $2.60 $2.40 $2.20
"Corrected"
estimate
$1.65 $1.45 $1.30 $1.20 $ 1.10
Using the conservative estimates of 7tg, we obtain the following 
rough estimates of An:
70 General Accounting Office, “Uranium Enrichment,” page 49.
71 See letter from Mozelle Thompson to Charles Bowsher in General Accounting Office, 
“Uranium Enrichment,” op. cit.
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Table 4: Arc at dif 'erent social discount rates ($ billion)
Nominal social 
discount rate
7 percent 9 percent 11 percent 13 percent 15 percent
7tp $6.50 $4.33 $3.25 $2.60 $2.17
rcg $1.65 $1.45 $1.30 $1.20 $ 1.10
Arc $4.85 $2.88 $1.95 $1.40 $1.07
Although these estimates are subject to tremendous uncertainty, they 
suggest that it is unlikely that Arc is negative. This result reflects the 
principal benefit of privatization: it raises the internal efficiency of the 
enrichment operation. But the estimates also suggest that the difference in 
internal efficiency is unlikely to exceed a few billion dollars.
Sale price and discount rates
Assuming that the government is able to capture the full Zp in the 
sale price, so that Z=Zp, the next term in (6) collapses to (Xg-Xp)'F.72 'F is 
non-zero only to the extent that the private-sector discount rate differs from 
the social discount rate. As noted above, these two discount rates coincide 
under the assumptions of the perfectly competitive model. In the presence 
of capital market imperfections and taxation, however, the situation becomes 
more complicated. As above, we therefore assume the underlying flow is a 
real perpetuity (at an assumed inflation rate of 3 percent and a nominal 
private sector rate of 15 percent) and evaluate 'F for different social discount 
rates.
Table 5: Estimates of \|/ ($ bil ion)
Nominal social 
discount rate
7 percent 9 percent 11 percent 13 percent 15 percent
¥ $3.60 $1.80 $0.90 $0.36 $0.00
Transaction costs (VSs)
The next term, VSS) represents the social cost of the resources used in 
the privatization process. J.P. Morgan estimates that privatization
72 Capturing the full private value of the enterprise in the sale price is not a trivial matter. 
We assume the existence of an optimal auction mechanism, but the design of that 
mechanism is a substantial challenge in reality.
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transaction fees will be $100 million.73 Such a fee level corresponds to about 
7 percent of projected gross proceeds, which is consistent with the 
transaction fees in major privatizations from other countries.74 Assuming 
that these fees are true resource costs, which would obtain if the financial 
placement market is competitive, and that the government ultimately incurs 
the costs, VSs is thus equal to $100 million multiplied by Xg.
Summary ofnon-AS terms
We can now summarize the net effects of the final three terms in (6) 
at different discount rates and various shadow prices. Note that our figures 
are intentionally biased toward privatization, since our estimates of An use 
the upper bound of estimates for private-sector profits and a conservative 
estimate for public-sector profits. Also note that for a social discount rate of 
15 percent, Xp does not affect the results; this invariance obtains because Xp 
only enters via the 'P term, and ¥= 0  when p=r.
Table 6: Social benefits of privatization, not including AS ($ billion)
Nominal social 
discount rate = 7 
percent per year
X g
Xp 1 1.25 1.5 2
1 $4.75 $5.04 $5.33 $5.90
1.25 $5.65 $5.94 $6.23 $6.80
1.5 $6.55 $6.84 $7.13 $7.70
2 $8.35 $8.64 $8.93 $9.50
Nominal social 
discount rate = 15 
percent per year
A,g
Xp 1 1.25 1.5 2
1 $0.97 $ 1.21 $1.45 $1.93
1.25 $0.97 $ 1.21 $1.45 $1.93
1.5 $0.97 $ 1.21 $1.45 $1.93
2 $0.97 $ 1.21 $1.45 $1.93
73 United States Enrichment Corporation, Plan for the Privatization of the United States 
Enrichment Corporation, op. cit., page 18.
74 Vickers and Yarrow (1995), for example, report that the expenses from the major 
privatizations in the U.K. amounted to between 3.1 percent (Cable and Wireless) and 11.2 
percent (Associated British Ports) of proceeds. See Privatization: An Economic Analysis, 
op. cit., page 181.
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Table 6 suggests that for a variety of parameter values, the effect 
from privatization of all terms in (6) except AS is somewhere between $1 
billion and $10 billion. In other words, if AS is smaller (in absolute value) 
than $1 billion, Table 6 suggests that privatization should proceed because 
AW is clearly positive. If AS is larger (in absolute value) than $10 billion, 
then AW<0. If it is between $1 billion and $10 billion, then the social 
impact is unclear. We now turn to an examination of AS.
Consumer surplus
Privatization may result in AS<0 for two reasons: (1) the exercise of 
USEC’s market power may raise prices for the nuclear power industry and 
ultimately for consumers, and (2) the lack of incentives for USEC to 
implement fully the HEU deal increases the risk of nuclear weapons 
proliferation.75 We will assume that these two effects are additively 
separable, and that we may therefore write AS= ASm+ ASn, where ASm is the 
change in consumer surplus due to USEC’s market power, and ASn is the 
loss of consumer surplus due to heightened nuclear proliferation risks.
A. USEC’s market power (ASm)
As mentioned above, USEC is a domestic monopoly with 90 percent 
of the U.S. market in an industry with relatively inelastic demand. As a 
profit-maximizing private enterprise, it may leverage this monopoly power 
more than a public-sector USEC would, in which case ASm may be 
negative.76 Proponents of privatization propose three reasons for why 
USEC’s market position is less powerful than it might appear. First, the 
enrichment market is a global business, and foreign producers can compete 
in the U.S. market. But the principal foreign producers have only limited
75 Another element of S is the momentous environmental costs — estimated at as much as 
$17.8 billion — of decontaminating the gaseous diffusion plants. See General Accounting 
Office, “Uranium Enrichment,” op. cit. While this issue may have a large effect on S, it is 
not clear that it has any effect on AS: the costs must be borne regardless of whether USEC 
is privatized. (The portion of the costs that accrued prior to July 1993 will remain with the 
government after privatization, although the cost allocation process may be a difficult 
one.) The costs of cleaning up the gaseous diffusion plants are therefore not considered in 
the privatization analysis.
76 This concern has been brought to the attention of the Federal Trade Commission and 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. See, for example, the letter from 
Senator Orrin Hatch to Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, 
Inside U.S. Trade, August 11, 1995, page 4.
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access to the domestic market. Except for the HEU exports that are 
channeled through USEC, MIN ATOM is effectively barred from the U.S. 
enrichment market because of an anti-dumping case on both natural uranium 
and enrichment.77 And the European producers would, in all likelihood, 
become targets of anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases if they were 
to threaten USEC’s market share; such cases would have a high probability 
of succeeding.78
The second reason to suspect that USEC’s market power may be 
limited in the future is because of the possible introduction of a new 
domestic competitor, Louisiana Energy Services (LES). LES is a 
partnership among three U.S. utilities, an engineering firm, and Urenco; it 
has applied for licenses necessary to operate a gas centrifuge plant with the 
capacity to supply about 15 percent of the U.S. market.79 But because it has 
not yet obtained the licenses, and because its prospects are uncertain, it is 
not yet a credible competitor to USEC.80 Indeed, the LES experience 
highlights the substantial barriers to entry in the enrichment market: the 
capital requirements and licensing process are onerous.
The final potential competitive threat to USEC is the HEU deal, 
since the flow of LEU from Russia is effectively another source of 
enrichment for the domestic utility market. But USEC is itself the conduit 
for the imports from Russia. Thus, under current plans, the HEU deal is 
unlikely to provide much, if any, competitive pressure for USEC. The next 
sub-section examines the HEU agreement in more detail.
77 The suspension agreement to the anti-dumping case allowed a quota of 2.0 million 
SWU in Russian exports outside of the HEU deal in 1994 and 1995. The quota for 1996 
was zero. The quota for future years is being re-negotiated, but is unlikely to be 
substantial. For a discussion of the U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing laws, see P. 
Orszag and J. Stiglitz, “Dumping on Free Trade: The U.S. Import Trade Laws,” Centre for 
Economic Performance Discussion Paper No. 210, London School of Economics, October 
1994.
78 Domestic firms have been extremely successful in securing trade restrictions under the 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws, which many analysts believe have become 
grossly biased toward protectionism. For example, I.M. Destler finds that over 60 percent 
of the anti-dumping cases filed between 1980 and 1993 resulted in a finding of dumping, 
and were withdrawn by the petitioner (usually because some other form of protection was 
proffered). See I.M. Destler, American Trade Politics, Third Edition (Institute for 
International Economics: Washington, 1995), Table 6.2.
79 See statement of W. Howard Arnold, “Hearing on S. 755, A Bill to Amend the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 to Provide for the Privatization of the United States Enrichment 
Corporation,” op. cit., pages 64-68.
80 A. Max, “Long-Term Impacts of Weapons-Grade HEU on the Uranium, Conversion, 
and Enrichment Markets,” op. cit., page 11.
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In sum, USEC is likely to maintain a significant degree of market 
power following privatization. This market power would imply ASm<0 if 
USEC charged a higher markup over marginal cost following privatization. 
But privatization could also imply ASm>0 because of improved internal 
efficiency, which lowers marginal cost and, for any given markup, the 
enrichment price. If the percentage reduction in marginal cost is smaller 
than the percentage increase in the markup, ASm<0, and vice versa.
Table 7 presents rough estimates of ASm from the reduction in 
marginal cost following privatization, and the potential increase in the 
markup for USEC’s enrichment services.81 For simplicity, the calculations 
in the table assume a linear demand curve, current domestic sales of 10 
million SWU, a current average sales price of $125 per SWU, a current 
marginal cost of $60 per SWU. We assume that USEC has a perfect 
monopoly in the U.S. market, and therefore do not incorporate any strategic 
behavior. Our attention is limited to domestic sales because our focus is 
U.S., not global, welfare. The results suggest that the magnitude of AS from 
this factor is likely to be relatively small — somewhere between +$0.2 
billion and -$0.5 billion.
Table 7: Estimates of ASm ($ billion)
Cost reduction 
(percent)
Elasticity of demand for USEC services 
(absolute value)
1.4 1.6 1.8 2
5 -$0.43 -$0.25 -$0.08 $0.06
7.5 -$0.42 -$0.23 -$0.05 $0.10
10 -$0.41 -$0.20 -$0.01 $0.13
12.5 -$0.40 -$0.17 $0.02 $0.17
B. The HEU deal (ASn)
On January 14, 1994, USEC (the U.S. government’s executive 
agent) signed a contract with Tenex (MINATOM’S executive agent) to 
implement the HEU agreement. Given fixed demand, which is the most
81 The assumptions in Table 7 are given in terms of USEC’s elasticity of demand, which 
determines the profit-maximizing markup. Maximizing P(Q)Q-c(Q) with respect to Q 
yields P(l+l/e)=MC, where e<0 is the price elasticity of demand and M C=c'(Q . The 
markup of P over MC is thus determined by the inverse of 1+1/e. Note that the elasticity 
of demand for USEC’s product is higher than the industry elasticity of demand.
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realistic short-run assumption for the enrichment industry, every SWU 
imported from Russia displaces a SWU of domestic production. As George 
Rifakes, USEC’s executive vice president for operations, has been quoted as 
saying: the “HEU deal will be viewed like the rest of our capacity...and we 
will try to meet the requirement at the least cost. So the HEU is just going 
to come into the cost picture.”82
The danger, as has been pointed out by Falkenrath (1996), Neff 
(1996), and others, is that a simple cost comparison is inconsistent with 
purchasing the Russian material.83 USEC’s marginal cost of production at 
the gaseous diffusion plants is somewhere between $60 and $70.84 The 
Russians demand about $85 per SWU, roughly $10 to $20 below the spot 
enrichment price, which is itself below USEC’s average sales price.85 
Purchasing Russian SWU, although objectively profitable (i.e., the cost is 
less than the price at which it is sold), is therefore $10 to $20 less profitable 
per SWU than domestic production. The effect is substantial: fully executing 
the HEU deal would reduce USEC’s net present value by about 20 percent.86 
As Neff (1996) has noted: “There have sometimes been tradeoffs between 
the national security interest of the HEU deal and the objective of 
maximizing the commercial value of the Corporation.”87
The formal optimization problem is trivial. Assuming total revenue
82 Quoted in R. Falkenrath, “The HEU Deal,” op. cit., page 265.
83 Neff notes the potential difficulty in his address before the World Nuclear Fuel Market 
Annual Meeting, op. cit., page 12. The incentive problem has also been noted in the press. 
See, for example, P. Passell, “U.S. Goals at Odds in A Plan to Sell Off Nuclear 
Operation,” op. cit., page A l.
84 Falkenrath (1996) quotes a figure of $60 per SWU. R. Falkenrath, “The HEU Deal,” op. 
cit., page 277. James K. Phillips, vice president of the workers’ union, cites a figure of 
$68 per SWU. See “Hearing on S. 755, A Bill to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
to Provide for the Privatization of the United States Enrichment Corporation,” op. cit., 
page 56.
85 “USEC, Russians Conclude Five-Year SWU Deal, As Pleiades Lobbies for USEC 
Ownership,” FreshFuel, Volume 13, No. 386, November 25, 1996, page 1. The spot price 
is between $95 and $105 per SWU, although the spot market is extremely thin and thus 
the price may not be a reliable indicator of market conditions. USEC often earns between 
$125 and $150 per SWU on its extant contracts. See The Nuclear Review, September 
1996, Figure 3.
86 USEC had originally hoped to be compensated by the U.S. government for the 
differential in costs, calling it a “national security premium.” See, for example, K. H. 
Bacon, “Buy High, Sell Low is Marching Order of Firm Purchasing Ex-Soviet Uranium,” 
Wall Street Journal, January 14, 1994, page CIO. USEC officials have since dropped this 
request.
87 T. Neff, address before the World Nuclear Fuel Market Annual Meeting, op. cit., page
12.
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is given and that inventories are not held, USEC’s profit-maximizing 
objective function is simply to minimize total costs, Min\chH + cdD \yHt D
subject to H + D > Q , andH  > 0,D > 0, where Q is quantity of SWU sold, H 
is SWU imports from Russia, D is SWU domestic production, Ch is the cost 
per SWU from Russia, and Cd is the cost per SWU for domestic production. 
Then since Ch>c<j, the cost-minimizing solution is clearly D=Q, the non­
negativity constraint on H is binding at the maximum, and H*=0.88
None of these incentive problems would matter if there were a 
signed, enforceable contract for the entire 500 metric tons of HEU. But 
there is not. The February 1994 contract promulgated a system under which 
the price would be renegotiated each October.89 In November 1996, USEC 
reached a 5-year deal with the Russians for 132 metric tons of HEU.90 The 
recent switch from an annual to a 5-year basis attenuates, but does not 
eliminate, the underlying concern: that in 5 years, after it has been 
privatized, USEC will not find it profit-maximizing to implement the rest of 
the deal. Even if the recent agreement is fully implemented over the next 5 
years, contracts for more than 60 percent of the original 500 metric ton 
target will still have to be signed. And as Nick Timbers, the president of 
USEC, has stated that “the Russian deal, after all, is cancelable.”91
Even while USEC has remained in the public sector, there have been 
two incidents that illustrate a divergence in incentives between expediting 
the HEU deal and promoting USEC’s commercial interests — a divergence 
that would undoubtedly be exacerbated after privatization, when USEC’s 
directors would have a fiduciary responsibility to maximize profits. The 
first was a series of disagreements that erupted over the natural uranium 
component of the LEU imported from Russia. The LEU imports embody 
both natural uranium and SWU, and under the agreement these two
88 For a discussion of linear programming such as the cost minimization problem faced by 
USEC, see A. Chiang, Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics (McGraw Hill: 
New York, 1984), Chapter 19. Given that the capacity constraint is not binding in the 
relevant region, USEC’s variable cost curve is approximately linear.
89 R. Falkenrath, “The HEU Deal,” op. cit., page 263. If no price was agreed upon, then 
deliveries would continue for an additional year under the previous price. But if 
agreement were not reached by the end of the second year, imports would cease. See 
USEC-Russia LEU Contract Can be Terminated, ” FreshFuel, September 5,1994, page 3.
90 “USEC, Russians Conclude Five-Year SWU Deal, As Pleiades Lobbies for USEC 
Ownership,” op. cit., page 1.
91 Quoted in R. Falkenrath, “The HEU Deal,” op. cit., page 263.
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components are purchased separately. But an anti-dumping settlement 
restricts imports of natural uranium from the former Soviet Union. Since 
the natural uranium embodied in the Russian LEU is treated as imported, it 
falls under the auspices of the anti-dumping order and may only be sold in 
specified ways.92
The HEU deal had been predicated on an assumption that the natural 
uranium component of the LEU would be used by USEC to boost the tails 
assay — in effect, to allow USEC to reduce its SWU requirement for given 
deliveries of natural uranium and LEU orders.93 Such a use was permitted 
under the anti-dumping order. But following its formation, USEC 
concluded that this use of the natural uranium component was “impractical 
under current economic conditions.”94 It therefore decided, as it was 
entitled to under the contract, not to purchase that part of the LEU from the 
Russians. This decision caused substantial problems for the implementation 
of the deal. Viktor Mikailov, the head of MINATOM, called it “robbery in 
broad daylight,” adding “we do not need such a contract.”95 After several 
costly attempts at a solution, the issue was eventually resolved.96 All of this 
trouble was caused by USEC’s unwillingness to incur about $50 to $200 
million in additional annual costs — roughly the same additional cost that it 
would incur by importing the Russian SWU rather than producing 
domestically.
The second incident occurred in 1996. In January 1996, the 
Russians offered to sell 18 metric tons of HEU during 1997, but USEC 
refused. In July 1996, the Russians again offered to sell 18 metric tons in
92 Technically, since the natural uranium embodied in the LEU is not tangible, the anti­
dumping authorities require that an equivalent amount of natural uranium from other 
domestic sources be set aside. For an extensive discussion of the natural uranium anti­
dumping case and its effect on the HEU deal, see R. Falkenrath, “The HEU Deal,” op. cit.
93 T. Neff, “Integrating Uranium from Weapons into the Civil Fuel Cycle,” Science and 
Global Security, Vol. 3 (1993), pp. 215-222.
94 Statement of William H. Timbers, Jr., “Hearing on S. 755, A Bill to Amend the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 to Provide for the Privatization of the United States Enrichment 
Corporation,” op. cit., page 21.
95 S. Efron, “Russian Says U.S. Not Paying for Uranium,” Los Angeles Times, June 14, 
1995, page 10.
96 See discussion in “Hearing on S. 755, A Bill to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
to Provide for the Privatization of the United States Enrichment Corporation,” op. cit. The 
problem was “fixed” by giving title of the material to the Russians and promulgating a 
rising schedule of permitted forward sales in the U.S. market. See Section 3112 of the 
USEC Privatization Act of 1996.
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1997, but USEC rejected the offer, indicating that it was only willing to 
accept 12 metric tons. The reasons for the rejection, and the degree of 
involvement of other U.S. government officials, are the subject of some 
controversy.97 But one concerned party, Senator Pete Domenici, wrote on 
July 31 that he was “convinced that the USEC is acting directly contrary to 
the national-security interests of the United States.”98 The U.S. government 
subsequently instructed USEC to purchase the full 18 metric tons of HEU 
during 1997.99 The incident seems to illustrate clearly USEC’s limited 
incentives to import LEU derived from Russian HEU.
There are several possible solutions to the incentive problem. First, 
the U.S. government’s ability to change executive agents could provide an 
incentive for USEC to implement the HEU deal: although its profits are 
lower if it buys SWU from the Russians, its profits would be even lower if 
someone else imported the SWU. It may therefore be willing to import 
Russian material in order to safeguard its status as sole executive agent. 
This argument will be evaluated in Section VI of the chapter; to preview our 
results, it is not obvious that this “threat effect” aligns USEC’s incentives 
with society’s non-proliferation objective.
The second possibility would be to subsidize the imports from 
Russia. The problem with this solution is that the HEU deal is supposed to 
be budget neutral.100 Perhaps more important, there is no need to subsidize 
the deal: the market price of SWU, at about $100 even in the spot market, is 
well above what the Russians are asking. As Dr. Klaus Messer, CEO of 
Urenco, has stated: “The USEC will be paying about $82 per SWU. If the 
U.S. utilities have access to a substantial amount of material at such low 
prices, it will hurt us.”101 [emphasis added] In other words, the price the 
Russians are demanding is well below the market price. With any other 
executive agent but an enricher, there would be no need to subsidize the 
deal.
97 P. Passell, “Profit Motive Clouding Effort to Buy Up A-Bomb Material,” New York 
Times, Wednesday, August 28,1996, page A l.
98 Quoted in P. Passell, “Profit Motive Clouding Effort to Buy Up A-Bomb Material,” op. 
cit., page A l.
99 Text of letter from Charles Curtis, Deputy Secretary of Energy, to Senator Domenici, 
quoted in Nuclear Fuel, September 9, 1996, pages 8-9.
100 R Falkenrath, “The HEU Deal,” op. cit., pages 277-278.
101 Interview with Dr. Klaus Messer, NUKEM Market Report, op. cit., page 18.
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The final possibility would be to name another executive agent, 
possibly including the U.S. Department of Energy itself. The benefits of 
such an option are that another agent would not face USEC’s incentive 
problem, and that competition within the United States enrichment market 
would be enhanced. The cost is that no other U.S. entity has the market 
experience, extant contracts, and backup production capability that USEC 
does, although it is not clear that any of these variables is crucial to being a 
successful broker for the Russian LEU. This final option remains viable, but 
has not been adopted.
In sum, while there are possible solutions to the incentive problem, 
none has been implemented. Without such a solution, the possibility that a 
profit-maximizing USEC will not fully pursue the nation’s non-proliferation 
objectives must therefore be incorporated into the cost-benefit analysis of 
privatization.
It is difficult to quantify ASn, the value of the risk to national security 
from endangering the HEU deal. But it is potentially momentous. For 
example, Secretary of Defense William Perry has identified preventive 
nuclear non-proliferation efforts as being “perhaps our most important tool 
in protecting American interests from the special dangers that characterize 
the post-Cold War era.”102 A prominent group of Harvard foreign policy 
experts under the leadership of Graham Allison has identified the risk “that 
former Soviet nuclear weapons and materials will leak of out Russia, finding 
their way into the hands of rogue states or terrorist group” as the “most 
serious direct threat to U.S. vital interests today and for the foreseeable 
future.”103
A revealed preference argument may be helpful in evaluating the 
potential cost in terms of ASn. According to one recent estimate, the annual 
cost of maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent is $20 billion.104 The present
102 “Message of the Secretary of Defense: The Dangers of the Post-Cold War World, ”
1996 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/ 
adr96, page 2.
103 G. T. Allison, O. R. Cote, R. A. Falkenrath, and S. E. Miller, Avoiding Nuclear 
Anarchy, op. cit., page 7.
104 S. Sestanovich, “High Time to Scrap the Nuclear Legacy of the Cold War, ” 
International Herald Tribune, December 31, 1996, page 6. Some analysts believe that the 
figure is lower. Since we are only interested in orders of magnitude, die precise figure is
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value of these costs is therefore hundreds of billions of dollars. Assuming 
that the costs reflect the implicit value of nuclear protection, it is clear that 
ASn could dominate the internal efficiency from privatizing USEC. After 
all, the benefits from privatization presented in Table 6 are equivalent to the 
average cost of merely a couple B-2 bombers.105
As another estimate of the possible costs involved, consider the 
following back-of-the-envelope calculation. Assume that privatizing USEC 
under current conditions raises the probability by just 1 percent that 
terrorists are able to acquire 100 pounds of HEU for use in an attack on the 
United States. A bomb with 100 pounds of HEU could devastate a three- 
square-mile urban area,106 a tenth the area of the Manhattan borough in New 
York. About 1.5 million people live in Manhattan,107 and personal income 
per capita is at least $28,000.108 Assuming a real discount rate of 3 percent, 
zero real per capita income growth, and an average life expectancy of 30 
years, the human capital of Manhattan’s residents is therefore worth at least 
$825 billion.109 In addition, there are 265 million square feet of occupied 
commercial real estate in Manhattan, and the average rent per square foot for 
midtown office space is about $30 per year.110 Assuming a real 8 percent
not crucially important; we do not multiply by A,g for the same reason. To put the estimated 
cost of the nuclear deterrent in perspective, note that t he United States spends over $250 
billion annually on all defense activities. Office of Management and Budget, A Citizen’s 
Guide to the Federal Budget, FY 1997, Table 2-2 (Government Printing Office: 
Washington, 1996).
105 The B-2 bomber program is expected to cost $45 billion for 21 bombers. See General 
Accounting Office, “B-2 Bomber: Status of Efforts to Acquire 21 Operational Aircraft,” 
October 22, 1996, GAO/NSIAD-97-11. The average cost per bomber is therefore 
approximately $2 billion.
106 G. T. Allison, O. R. Cote, R. A. Falkenrath, and S. E. Miller, Avoiding Nuclear 
Anarchy, op. cit., page 1.
107 Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, op. cit.,, Table 46, 
page 45.
108 Per capita personal income in the New York Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical 
Area was $28,122 in 1993. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract o f the United States 
1995, op. cit., Table 715, page 463. The personal income per capita in Manhattan is 
undoubtedly higher than for the New York City area as a whole.
109 Valuing human capital as the present value of future earnings over 30 years at a real 
discount rate of 3 percent yields a figure of about $550,000 per person. This is at the 
lower end of the “reasonable” range proposed in R. Layard and S. Glaister, “Introduction” 
in Layard and Glaister, eds., Cost-Benefit Analysis, op. cit., page 25. The total human 
capital figure may be conservative for two reasons. First, we are not accounting for the 
loss of future generations. To the extent that human capital earns supernormal returns, 
this omission leads to an underestimate of the costs involved. Second, the assumption of 
zero real per capita growth is unduly pessimistic: a reasonable long-run estimate of real 
per capita growth for the United States as a whole is about 1 percent per year.
110 In 1995, there were 319.2 million square feet of commercial real estate in Manhattan 
(excluding government-owned, owner-occupied, and medical buildings), and the vacancy
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rate of time preference plus depreciation, and a constant occupancy rate, 
Manhattan’s commercial real estate is therefore worth about $100 billion. 
The expected cost — in terms of lost human and physical capital — from a 
1 percentage point increase in the threat of a nuclear terrorist attack that 
would obliterate a tenth of Manhattan is thus about a billion dollars.111 This 
figure is not intended as a serious estimate of the non-proliferation risk from 
USEC’s privatization; rather, it is intended to illustrate that ASn could well 
be sufficiently large that AW<0, even for small changes in probabilities.
In sum, despite the significant internal efficiency benefits that may 
accrue from privatization of USEC (AtoO), the social implications may be 
deleterious (AW<0) even in a full-information framework because other 
factors (AS<0) may dominate. Indeed, there may be a lesson in the fact that, 
despite massive privatization efforts undertaken by both the British and 
Russian governments, neither has privatized its uranium enrichment 
enterprises.112
V. Privatization under uncertainty and irreversibility
The framework introduced in Sections III and applied in Section IV, 
while quite useful in identifying the various tradeoffs inherent in 
privatization, nevertheless has several shortcomings. For example, it 
implicitly assumes that privatization is “reversible,” in the sense that the 
enterprise, once privatized, could be costlessly nationalized. But in reality, 
privatization would be difficult and costly to reverse. Both the transactions 
costs involved and the government’s loss of credibility imply that 
privatization is at least partially irreversible, and that the Jones, Tandon, and 
Volgesang framework is therefore biased toward approving privatizations
rate was 17.0 percent. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1996 
(Government Printing Office: Washington, 1996), Table 1204. The Cushman and 
Wakefield office market report indicates that the average annual rental rate in the third 
quarter of 1995 for midtown office space in Manhattan was $30 per square foot
111 The expected cost is 0.01($825 billion+$100 billion)/10=$0.925 billion.
112 The May 1995 review of nuclear power privatization in the U.K. held open the 
possibility of privatizing British Nuclear Fuels, Limited, which owns a third of the shares 
in Urenco. See Department of Trade and Industry and the Scottish Office, The Prospects 
for Nuclear Power in the UK, Presented to Parliament, May 1995, pages 59-60. The 
Russian 1993 privatization law explicitly prohibited privatization of firms producing 
fissionable or radioactive materials. For a discussion of the Russian privatization 
program, see M. Boycko, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, Privatizing Russia (MIT Press: 
Cambridge, MA, 1995).
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that are not socially optimal.113 This section explores the ramifications of 
privatization’s irreversibility.
Privatization can be thought of as a social investment in the 
privatized enterprise. The cost of the investment is the social value of the 
forgone public-sector production and the resources necessary to effect the 
transaction. At least part of these costs are sunk. The benefit is the social 
value of the corporation under private ownership. As with many 
investments, the return is uncertain since the social benefit from private 
ownership is not precisely known ex ante. Therefore, privatization is 
effectively an investment under uncertainty, and the literature on such 
investments suggests that a simple net present value rule, such as the one 
employed in Section IV, is potentially misleading.114
Intuitively, the government has an incentive to “wait and see” how 
privatization will affect social welfare to avoid situations in which 
privatization, ex post, turns out to have been a serious — and difficult to 
reverse — mistake. For example, if the AVLIS technology turns out not to 
be commercially operable, the social benefits of privatization will be less 
than had been expected. Or if some shock to the HEU deal raises the cost of 
having a private-sector executive agent, the social benefits of privatization 
will again be less than had been expected.
Somewhat more formally, irrreversibility and uncertainty imply that 
the government owns a “privatization option.” When privatization takes 
place, the option is exercised.115 The price of the option must therefore be 
included in the cost-benefit analysis. In order to incorporate uncertainty 
over both Vsp and Vsg, assume that both follow geometric Brownian
motions with drift:
113 If the government’s credibility is a social asset in that it facilitates a preferred 
equilibrium in the economy, then “spending” that credibility can be just as socially cos Uy 
as incurring real resource costs.
114 More precisely, irreversibility and expandability imply that a simple net present value 
rule sets too low a threshold. See A. Abel, A. Dixit, J. Eberly, and R. Pindyck, “Options, 
the Value of Capital, and Investment,” NBER Working Paper No. 5227, August 1995. For 
a general introduction to the investment under uncertainty literature, see A. Dixit and R. 
Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1994).
115 We assume that the government sells all its shares. For a discussion of why 
governments often do not sell all their shares immediately, see E. Perotti, “Credible 
Privatization,” American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, September 1995, pages 847- 
859.
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dVsp= a pdt + a pdzp 
dVsg = a gdt+ <ygdzg
(8)
(9)
where dzp = £p ■fit and dzg = £g f i t  are increments to Wiener processes, £p
and £g are standard normal variables, and E(dzpdzg)=u
For simplicity, assume Xg=Xp=l, and that Vss is a constant. Define 
FCVspbVsg^Vss) as the value of the enrichment enterprise. Then, since the 
government can choose to privatize at any point, F is equal to the immediate 
exercise value, or the expected continuation value, whichever is higher:
Assuming that the problem is well-behaved, (10) implies pFdt=E(dF) 
in the region for which the enterprise remains within the public sector.116 
Applying Ito’s lemma to compute dF, taking expectations, and setting the 
result equal to pFdt:
where Fi is the first partial derivative of F with respect to Vsi, Fu is the 
second partial derivative, and Fy is the cross-partial derivative. The partial 
differential equation defined by (11) holds in the region for which the 
enterprise is kept within the public sector. At the boundary of this region,
In addition, the geometric Brownian motion assumptions in (8) and 
(9) ensure that:
116 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of sufficient conditions for the problem to be well- 
behaved.
the “value-matching” and “smooth-pasting” conditions must obtain:
4V^K*(0*X}= vsp( t ) * - v sg(t)* - v ss (12)
(13)
(14)
116
F{0,0,0} = 0 (15)
In general, the free-boundary partial differential equation system 
defined by (11) through (15) is difficult to solve, even with numerical 
methods. To simplify the mathematics and permit an analytical solution, we 
therefore assume that the resource costs of privatizing are proportional to the 
social value of the enterprise within the government (the larger the value of 
the enterprise, the larger the resource costs of the transaction). In other 
words, we assume Vss=uVSg. In this case, F is homogeneous of degree 1 in 
Vsp and Vsg (doubling Vsp and Vsg will double both the benefit and cost of 
holding the option, thus doubling its worth). We can therefore reduce the 
partial differential equation to an ordinary differential equation in the ratio 
of Vsp to Vsg. Define R = -JL. Then the homogeneity implies:
F(Vsp,Vsg,uVsg)= V sgf(R )  (16)
Using (16) and the definition of R to calculate the partial derivatives of F, 
and then substituting into (11), we obtain an ordinary differential equation in 
R:
l v a pa s + i + {«, -  a f ] « / '( * ) - { a ,  + p ] f = 0 ( i7)
Adapting the boundary conditions, we have:117 
f(R * )  = R * - ( l  + u)
f '(**) = 1
/(/?* ) = R * f ' ( R * ) - ( l  + u)
/ ( 0) = 0
Notice that any two of (18) through (20) imply the third.
Solving (17) subject to the two binding boundary conditions in (18)
117 Applying Ito’s lemma indicates that dR ={ap - a g + -  a j - vagop)Rdt+ (apdzp - ogdZg)fl, 
so that R is itself a geometric Brownian motion.
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
117
through (20) and subject to (21), we obtain:118
fl* = (l + w ) - ^ -  (22)a - 1
where a is the characteristic root of (17) that is larger than 1:
a = -2
-2wr,<7, + a ]] - \a g - ccp}
a 2p- l v a pog+a\
~lvapas + <}-{«,-<}] +2(as+P'>H-2vaP(Js+al }
a l - l v a ^  + c^
(23)
The solution (22) illustrates the fundamental point of this section. 
Under the simple net present value rule as applied in Section IV, the 
government should privatize whenever V Sp -V Sg ( l+ u )> 0 . jn other words,
whenever R>l+u, privatization seems socially beneficial. But (22) indicates
that such a rule is misleading if there is uncertainty and irreversibility: the
a
optimal threshold for R is larger than 1+u, since    >1 for a>l.
a —I
The gap between R* and (1+u), which determines the degree to 
which the conventional analysis is misleading, is larger the larger is the 
variance of the innovations to Vsp or Vsg, the smaller is the correlation 
between those innovations, and the larger is a g relative to a p. The 
privatization option is worth more the more uncertainty there is, and the less 
that uncertainty is common to both the privatized and government enterprise 
scenarios (since it is the difference between social welfare under the two 
cases that is relevant to the government’s decision). It is relatively more 
important to account for this effect when there is more uncertainty over 
future events, and when the social implications of those future developments 
are likely to vary significantly across the privatized and public-sector cases 
— both of which seem likely to be relevant for the proposed privatization of
118 The solution method, which follows the method used in Chapter 1, involves positing a 
solution of f=AiRa+A2 Rb, plugging the proposed solution into (17), using the f(0)=0 
condition to set A2 = 0  (since b<0), and using two of the conditions from (26) through (28) 
to solve for R*.
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USEC.
To consider the potential importance of accounting for the real 
privatization option in USEC’s case, assume AS=0 and X,g=Xp=l. Then 
from (6), AW=A7t-Vss, and from Table 4, R=2 at a social discount rate of 15 
percent per year. Assuming u=. 1, the threshold R for privatization under a 
conventional cost-benefit analysis (the “conventional threshold”) is 1.1. 
Since R> 1.1, the conventional approach would thus suggest that 
privatization is socially beneficial. But the real options approach delineated 
in this section shows that such a privatization could be a mistake. For 
internal consistency, set p=. 15. Then assume a g=ocp=0, a 2p=l/9, and v=0. 
Given these assumptions and after taking account of the real privatization 
option, Figure 3 shows how the threshold for privatization (the”optimal 
threshold”) varies with a 2g. The optimal threshold is above 2 for a 2g>.25.
Figure 3: Privatization threshold vs. volatility under 
government ownership
 Conventional -  Optimal
3.5 T
0 -I-------------- 1-------------- 1-------------- 1-------------- 1-------------- 1-------------- h
o  o  o  o  o  o  o
O y—t' CS CO «0
o o o o o o o  
Volatility under government ownership (a2g)
Parameter values: p=.15, Op=.l, v=0,ag=0, a p=0, u=.l
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In other words, if the proportional change in the social value of 
USEC within the public sector varies, on average, by about 15 percent per 
month or more, then privatization is not socially optimal. (A standard 
deviation of 0.15 per month corresponds to an annual variance of about 
0.25.) This example illustrates the importance of accounting for the real 
privatization option in some settings. The exercise is admittedly tendentious 
because it examines the case of p=.15, which has a relatively low R, and 
assumes v=0. But on the other hand, it also assumes AS=0 and thus no 
nuclear non-proliferation risk from privatization (note that with regard to the 
HEU deal, v is likely to be negative).
In summary, this section shows that failing to account for the real 
privatization option could bias the cost-benefit analysis. The closer the 
conventional AW is to zero, the more volatile are Vsp and Vsg, and the lower 
the correlation between shocks in the public and private sectors, the more 
likely it is that the real privatization option could actually change the 
optimal social decision regarding the ownership of the enterprise.
VI. Privatization under asymmetric information
Section V illustrated one shortcoming of the framework employed in 
Section IV. This section emphasizes another: the failure to account for 
asymmetric information, which is crucial to evaluating the costs and benefits 
of privatization. Indeed, without private information, the performance of a 
public-sector enterprise and an optimally regulated private-sector enterprise 
should coincide. As Shapiro and Willig (1990) argue, “the presence of such 
information is necessary for privatization to have a genuine effect.”119 
Asymmetric information is particularly important in connection with the 
impact of privatization on the HEU deal.
As discussed in Section II, USEC’s profit-maximizing behavior may 
not be consistent with full implementation of the HEU deal. Advocates of
119 C. Shapiro and R. Willig, “Economic Rationales for the Scope of Privatization,” in E. 
N. Suleiman and J. Waterbury, eds., The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and 
Privatization (Westview Press: Boulder Colorado, 1990), page 56.
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privatization, however, argue that a simple marginal cost comparison is 
misleading. The HEU agreement promulgates that either party can change 
its executive agent with 30 days’ notice. USEC argues that a breakdown in 
negotiations would therefore lead the U.S. government to name another 
agent, and that this threat provides sufficient incentive for it to purchase the 
Russian material.120 Other analysts question USEC’s argument. Neff 
(1996), for example, argues that:
the possibility of replacement as executive agent is probably 
not enough [to assure implementation of the HEU deal] — 
the U.S. does not have a clear mechanism for choosing a new 
one...nuclear fuel markets are complex and the inventiveness 
of market participants can easily outclass the second-guessing 
of well-intentioned but under-informed government 
officials.121
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the supposed “threat 
effect,” USEC’s claim that the risk of being replaced as executive agent is 
sufficient to align its profit-maximizing interests with the non-proliferation 
objective of aggressively importing Russian LEU. We model the HEU 
negotiations with the Russians as a dynamic game under asymmetric 
information.122 We first examine a scenario in which the U.S. government 
bargains ; directly with the Russians; abstracting from internal agency 
problems, this scenario can be interpreted as equivalent to keeping USEC 
within the public sector. We then extend the model to include USEC as the 
U.S. government’s agent.
Direct U.S. government negotiations with Russia
We consider a three period game. At period zero, nature determines 
the level of domestic enrichment production costs per SWU, c, which are 
high ( c h )  with probability q and low ( c l )  with probability 1-q. The 
probability distribution of c is known to both the United States and Russia, 
but its realization is known only to the U.S. government. Nature also
120 See quotations from Nick Timbers in P. Passell, “U.S. Goals at Odds in a Plan to Sell 
Off Nuclear Operation,” op. cit., page A l.
121 T. Neff, address before the World Nuclear Fuel Market Annual Meeting, op. cit., page 
13.
122 For an informal discussion of dynamic asymmetric information games, see R. 
Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 
1992), Chapter 4.
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independently determines the aversion of the Russian government to selling 
its HEU inventories to the United States, which is affected by factors such as 
internal political opposition.123 This value is proxied by a , which is either 
high or low ( a n  or o c l)  with probability k and 1-k respectively. The 
realization of a  is independent of the realization of c and known only by 
Russia.
In the first period of the game, the U.S. government makes an offer 
to Russia for the purchase of HEU amounting to L million SWU. For 
simplicity, we normalize L to 1. The U.S. government offers a price of 
either Ah or Al  per SWU, where we assume:
C L  < a L  <  C H  <  <  & H  < < P (24)
This structure captures the realistic notion that domestic costs are lower than 
the cost of the Russian material, both of which are lower than the domestic 
price. In the second period, Russia either accepts or rejects the offer.
After the initial round of negotiations, the U.S. learns how important 
non-proliferation risks (N) are to its national security. We assume that N is 
either high or low (N h  or N l ), with probability t and 1-t respectively. Both 
sides know the probability distribution of N but only the U.S. learns its 
realization, which is independent of c and a . If the initial offer had been 
rejected by Russia, the U.S. can make a second offer, of either A h  or A l , 
after learning the value of N. If this second offer is accepted, the non­
proliferation benefit accruing to the U.S. is N(l-e), where e is the 
proportionate non-proliferation risk from delaying agreement. We assume:
^ ^ < N l < A» ~ ‘)C» 2 (^ ‘,)Cl < N h <Ah - cl (25)
P - A h > £E (N ) (26)
123 Evgenij Mikerin, Head of MINATOM’S Technology Department, has noted the 
political pressures involved in the HEU deal: “some even say we jeopardize our national 
security by dismantling these warheads in order to receive money from the United States.” 
See E. Mikerin, “Russia’s Enrichment Program: New Challenges,” speech delivered at 
U.S. Council for Energy Awareness, International Conference on Enrichment, 
Washington, DC, June 13-15, 1993.
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k > ------- “----- L-----
eE{N) + Ah - A l
Because Russian HEU displaces domestic enrichment production, the 
net benefit to the U.S. from an accepted offer is the non-proliferation benefit 
(N) minus the premium of the offer over domestic production costs (A-c). In 
the absence of a deal, the U.S. payoff is zero. The payoff to Russia is A if 
agreement is reached on the first offer, A (l-8) if agreement is reached on the 
second offer, and a  if agreement is not reached. The 8 loss from delaying 
agreement reflects the costs to Russia (e.g., the time value of money) from 
postponing the sale at a given price; we assume 8 is small enough that AH(1- 
8)>aH.
Figure 4 presents the game in extensive form. A strategy for the 
U.S. government, tf(US), defines a probability distribution over its choice(s) 
of A, given its private information and its beliefs. Its beliefs, |i(US), are its 
expectations about the Russian aversion factor and, until it is revealed, the 
value of N. A strategy for Russia, a(Russia), defines a probability 
distribution over rejecting or accepting the U.S. offer, conditional on the 
U.S. action(s), Russia’s private information regarding a , and its beliefs. 
Russia’s beliefs, p(Russia), are its expectation of N and its conditional 
expectation of c given A.
A perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies and beliefs 
such that:
• The U.S. strategy maximizes its expected payoff conditional on Russia’s 
optimal strategy, its own beliefs about a  and N, and its private 
information about c and possibly N;
• The Russian strategy maximizes its expected payoff given the optimal 
U.S. strategy, the offer of A, its posterior belief about c conditional on 
observing A, its expectation of N, and its private information about a ;
• The U.S. belief about the Russian aversion type reflects the probability 
distribution of a  and uses Bayes’ rule if the initial offer is rejected; 
Russia’s posterior beliefs use Bayes’ rule for an A that has non-zero 
probability mass in equilibrium (any posterior beliefs are acceptable for
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any A with zero probability mass in equilibrium); and both beliefs about 
E(N) reflect the probability distribution of N .124
The unique pure-strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the 
game is defined by:
• a(US)={ Offer AH if c= cH; offer ALif c= cL; offer AL again if c= cLand 
initial offer is rejected};
• c(Russia)={ Accept all offers of AH; accept first offer of ALif AL>a; reject 
first offer of AL if AL<a; reject all second offers of AL};
• p,(US)={E(N)=tNH +(l-t)NL; P(Russia rejects first offer of AL)=k;
P(Russia rejects second offer of AL)= 1; P(ajfirst offer of ALis rejected) = 1}; 
and
• |n(Russia)={E(N)=tNH +(l-t)NL; P(ch\a h ) = 1;P(cl\a l ) = 1}.
To prove this is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, start by 
considering the U.S. government’s final move if its initial offer of A l has 
been rejected. Russia will always accept a final offer of Ah, since it then 
receives a return of A h (1-5), which lies above the support of a . Since a 
second offer of Ah is always accepted, the U.S. receives N(l-e)-(An-c) 
from such an offer. We will show that Russia will always reject a second 
offer of Al , s o  the U.S. return from a final offer of Al  is zero. The U.S.
will therefore offer Ah in the final round when N(1-£)-(Ah-c)>0. Since
A.  c
Nh<Ah-cl from (25), Nh is also less than ' L for 0<e<l. Thus the 
U.S. would never offer Ah in the final round if c=cl- But since
^    Q
Nl > —^ , the U.S. would always offer A h in the final round if c=ch-
124 For a formal exposition of the general conditions for a perfect Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium, see D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 
1995), pages 325-26.
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Figure 4: US-Russia negotiations
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Now consider the first round of the game. For c=ch, the U.S. will
offer AH if B.N)-(AH -c H)>(l-r)[E(N}-(AL-c H)}+r{EiN(\ -e))-{AH-c^}} where
*
r is the probability that Russia will reject an offer of A l. For 
A - A
r >  H L , this condition obtains and therefore the U.S. always
£E(N) + Ah - A l
offers Ah  if c=ch* The intuition is that with high domestic costs, the non­
proliferation benefits of purchasing Russian material are relatively 
inexpensive. The U.S. will therefore ultimately offer Ah to secure the 
Russian HEU. And if r is high enough, it is not worth the risk of waiting 
until the final round. The U.S. therefore offers Ah immediately, and Russia
accepts.
When c=cl, the U.S. never offers Ah , since (25) implies that Ah-cl 
lies above the support for N and therefore an offer of Ah  always results in a 
negative payoff. Russia can therefore infer that if A=Al , U.S. costs must be 
low. And Russia thus also knows that if it rejects the initial offer of Al , the 
U.S. will not offer Ah in the second round. Russia therefore rejects the 
initial offer of Al  if oc>Al , which happens with probability k, since 
cxl<Al<cxh from (24). And if Russia rejects the first offer of Al , then 
cx>Al and it therefore also rejects any second offer of Al , since (x>Al 
clearly implies oc>Al (1-8). Thus, r=k, ensuring from (27) that the U.S. does 
indeed offer Ah in the high-cost scenario.
In this perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the HEU deal is 
concluded l-(l-q)k percent of the time. The U.S. government’s expected 
payoff is:
q{E(N ) -  (A„ -  c„ )}+ (1 - q ) (  1 -  k){E(N) -  (At  -  cL)} (2g)
and the Russian government’s expected payoff is:
qAff + (1 — q^^kcc^ + (1 — k)A ^\ (29)
A private-sector USEC as the U.S. government’s executive agent
The game is now extended to incorporate a private-sector USEC 
serving as the U.S. government’s executive agent. In this extended game, 
we model the U.S. government’s loss of information following privatization
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by assuming that it can no longer observe the realization of domestic 
enrichment costs. Instead, c is revealed to USEC alone, while the U.S. 
government continues to be the only party that knows N.
In the first period of the game, USEC makes an offer of either Ah  or 
Al  to the Russians, who either accept it or reject it in the second period. If 
the offer is accepted, the deal is implemented. If the Russians reject the 
offer, the U.S. government can allow the deal to collapse, or can replace 
USEC as the executive agent. In the latter case, it is assumed that an 
alternative agent offers Ah  (still below P) and the deal is consummated.
Figure 5 presents the extensive form of the game.
As Figure 5 illustrates, the key change following privatization is that 
the U.S. government no longer knows whether a breakdown o f the 
negotiations occurs in the high or low cost state o f the world. This 
ambiguity reflects the fact that government officials are unable to monitor 
USEC perfectly. The government is thus forced to form its best Bayesian 
guess as to USEC’s private information, conditional on the actions (A l  and 
rejection) it has observed. It therefore replaces USEC if:
qnr[E(N)( 1 - e ) -  (AH -  cH)]+ (1 -  q)mr[E(N)( 1 - £ ) -  (AH -  cL)]> 0 (30)
where n is the probability that USEC offers Al  conditional on the high-cost 
state; m is the probability that USEC offers Al  conditional on the low-cost 
state; and r is the probability that the Russians reject an offer of Al .
Assume t=0, so that N is always equal to Nl . Then a perfect 
Bayesian Nash pooling equilibrium exists in which USEC offers Al  in the 
first round regardless of whether domestic costs are high (n=l) or low 
(m=l), the Russians reject the offer of Al with probability k (r=k), and the 
U.S. government always allows the deal to collapse if the Russians reject it. 
To see why this is an equilibrium, note that t=0 implies that the replacement 
condition (30) never obtains when n=l and m=l: from (25), Nl  lies below
—2 . Thus the Russians face a simple choice of A l or a , 
l - £
and they therefore accept A l if cx<Al, which occurs with probability 1-k. 
USEC is also behaving optimally with n=l and m=l, since it benefits from 
offering a lower price while never being replaced. In this equilibrium, the
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HEU deal is consummated only 1-k percent of the time. The equilibrium 
payoff to the U.S. government is:
(31)
while the equilibrium payoff to the Russians is:
kccH +(1 — k)AL (32)
Relative to the non-privatized scenario, the HEU deal is 
consummated qk percent less frequently. The change in U.S. welfare, 
relative to (28), is <z{(Aw -  A L) - k ( N L — (AL - c H))}, which is
Aft — A l
unambiguously negative if k > —-----—--------  , which in turn is implied by
L  ~  '  L ~ C H '
(27) and (25). The fall in U.S. welfare occurs only because Al is offered 
when c= c h ;  thus the higher q, the larger the decline in U.S. welfare.
Russian welfare is also lower under privatization. The Russian payoff in 
(29) is a weighted average of (32) and Ah; since Ah is greater than (32),
(29) is also.
This example illustrates that a breakdown in negotiations will not 
necessarily induce the U.S. government to replace USEC. The “threat 
effect” thus does not exert enough discipline to align USEC’s incentives 
with the U.S. government’s, and privatization reduces both national and 
global welfare.
Now consider t= l.125 Then another perfect Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium exists in which the U.S. government always replaces USEC if 
the Russians reject the initial offer, the Russians always reject an offer of 
A l ,  and USEC offers A h  regardless of whether domestic costs are high or 
low. The HEU deal is consummated with probability 1. Thus, Timbers’s 
argument is corroborated in this case: despite the cost differential between 
domestic production and Russian HEU, USEC is induced to offer A h to
125 The choices of t=0 and t=l are merely for ease of exposition. The critical t is defined 
by the replacement condition (30).
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Russia Accept
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U.S. government
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Russian payoff AH AH(l-8)
USEC payoff PQ-c^Q-UA (P-c^Q-l) (P-c„)Q
Accept
Figure 5: USEC-Russia negotiations, with US veto
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avoid being replaced as executive agent. Comparing domestic costs to the 
cost of the Russian material is therefore a misleading indicator of incentives, 
as USEC argues.
Even in this case, privatizing makes the U.S. government worse off. 
In equilibrium, the U.S. government’s expected payoff is
N h ~ ( A h ~QCh • Relative to the payoff in the non-privatized
case as given by (28), the change in U.S. welfare is
(1 -  q){k(NH -  (Ah - c l ) ) ~  (Ah -  Al ){ 1 -  k)}, which is unambiguously
negative since (1-q) is positive and both terms within the brackets are 
negative from (25). Ironically, the problem is that the U.S. government’s 
loss of information leads the HEU deal to be implemented too often, which 
hurts U.S. welfare. The decline in welfare arises only when c = c l ,  the state in 
which the U.S. government would never offer Ah if negotiations were 
direct.126
This section illustrates how the government’s loss of private 
information following privatization results in AS<0. The result can be 
viewed in light of the Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) fundamental theorem 
of privatization: that the principal difference between public ownership and
privatization is the transaction costs of government intervention in the
enterprise’s activities. As they conclude, “When the task is particularly 
novel and complex, unforeseen contingencies are likely to arise. If rapid 
adaptation to these events is crucial (as in the case of national defense, for 
example), ease of intervention to redirect activities may be relatively 
important; under such circumstances, public provision is more likely to be 
the preferred mode of organization.”127 The HEU negotiations are both 
novel and complex, and have already demonstrated the need for rapid 
adaptation to changing events. It is unlikely that government oversight will 
provide as much flexibility to respond to these events as government
126 Note that Russia’s welfare is higher than under the government-only scenario (12), 
since it always receives A h for its uranium. This equilibrium would also be achieved by 
appointing an alternative executive agent, which does not know c and could either 
purchase LEU from Russia or be forced to buy it from USEC. Such an alternative
A  — A
executive agent always prefers to offer A h to Russia if r > / _  A L • This restriction
on the rejection probability is credible in equilibrium given the conditions (26) and (27).
127 D. Sappington and J. Stiglitz, “Privatization, Information, and Incentives,” Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 6, No. 4, Summer 1987, page 581.
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ownership.
VII. Conclusion
Privatization is usually seen as a method of bolstering internal 
incentives and thus improving internal efficiency. But it often has broader 
implications than its internal efficiency effects. For example, privatizing a 
monopoly creates a potential trade-off between internal efficiency (Arc) and 
allocative efficiency (AS).
In the specific case study examined here, privatization under current 
institutional constraints may involve a trade-off between internal efficiency 
and a national security objective. The full information analysis in Section
IV suggests that USEC’s internal efficiency may be significantly higher in 
the private sector, but that the expected costs from the national security 
concerns could potentially dominate the gain in internal efficiency. Section
V raises further questions about privatization by demonstrating that the 
analysis in Section IV does not take sufficient account of uncertainty and 
irreversibility. If privatization is irreversible, and if there is uncertainty over 
its social returns, the “threshold” of AW=0 proposed in Section IV will be 
biased toward approving privatizations that are not truly socially optimal. 
Given that AW could be close to zero even under full information, this 
section raises additional doubts about the net social benefits from privatizing 
USEC under current conditions. The dynamic game studied in Section VI 
highlights the principal-agent problem in implementing the HEU deal after 
USEC is privatized. The results of the game indicate that the government’s 
loss of information following privatization reduces social welfare. The 
conclusion is that privatization is not always a panacea. Indeed, in USEC’s 
case, it may be quite costly.
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Appendix. The three major non-U.S. enrichment suppliers
This appendix briefly describes the three major enrichment suppliers 
outside of the United States: Eurodif, Urenco, and MINATOM. Eurodif 
runs a gaseous diffusion plant in Tricastin, France, with employment of 
about 1,400. The majority of its shares are owned by Cogema, a subsidiary 
of the French government’s Atomic Energy Commission.128 Eurodif sold 7 
million SWU in 1994 (a global market share of roughly 20 percent). 
According to the company itself, its “economic production capacity is 
limited to 8 million SWU, after which the use of very high cost incremental 
power becomes prohibitive.”129
Urenco operates three gas centrifuge plants: one in Capenhurst, the 
United Kingdom; the second in Almelo, the Netherlands, and the third in 
Gronau, Germany. Its shares are divided equally between the U.K. 
government (British Nuclear Fuels, Limited), the Dutch government, and 
private German utilities. Most of its business is in the U.K. and Germany, 
where it has a market share of about 75 percent, although it also has 
contracts in 13 countries and supplies 4 percent of the U.S. market.130 The 
nature of the centrifuge technology, in which the optimal plant size is 
relatively small, implies that Urenco is usually near capacity in the short run. 
As Dr. Klaus Messer, the Chief Executive Officer of Urenco, has put it: 
“Our customer orders and capacity expansion always go hand in hand.”131
MINATOM runs three principal enrichment facilities: Chelyabinsk- 
65, Krasnoyarsk-26, and Tomsk-7.132 MINATOM uses the gas centrifuge 
technology, having closed its last gaseous diffusion plant (at Tomsk) in 
1991 133 w ith assistance from its government-owned marketing agent, 
TENEX, it has been supplying enrichment services — on the order of 2 to 4
128 Cogema holds 52 percent of Eurodif s shares. The remainder is held by the Italians 
(16 percent), the Belgians (11 percent), the Spanish (11 percent), and the Iranians (10 
percent). The Italian and Iranian shares are inactive and do not carry voting rights. See 
Eurodif, “Fact Sheet on Eurodif,” transmitted to the author on October 17,1995.
129 Eurodif, “Fact Sheet on Eurodif’
130 “The New Birth of Urenco,” NUKEMMarket Report, op. tit., page 9.
131 Interview with Dr. Klaus Messer, NUKEM Marked Report, op. tit., page 17.
132 Ex-USSR Nuclear Technology and the World, “Russian Republic,” 
http://www.ida.net, page 1.
133 O. Bukharin, “Analysis of the Size and Quality of Uranium Inventories in Russia,” op. 
tit., page 67.
132
million SWU per year — to Western Europe since 1974.134 But there are 
strict quotas on MINATOM’s exports to the European market, and an anti­
dumping case limits exports to the United States.135 MINATOM is also the 
Russian government’s representative in the HEU deal.
134 A.J. Hyett, “The Structure and Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Service 
Industry,” op. cit., page 171; and A. D. Owen, The Economics o f Uranium, op. cit., page 
188. Bukharin cites a figure of 40 million SWU in Soviet exports to the West between 
1973 and 1988; see “Analysis of the Size and Quality of Uranium Inventories in Russia,” 
op. cit., page 67.
135 The anti-dumping case in the United States exempts SWU imported under the HEU 
deal.
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